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I

When it comes to proverb scholarship, we have all been
taught by the same master, Wolfgang Mieder, without question
one of the greatest paremiologists of all time. His body of work
on proverbs is so extensive as to make it nearly impossible to
say anything new, but we nonetheless dedicate our efforts in this
collection to that very purpose as a way of thanking him for his
brilliant leadership in the ﬁeld of international proverb scholarship, his unsurpassed intellectual generosity, and his incredible
humor, kindness, and spirit. We only hope that the essays in this
volume do justice to the ever-increasing ways he has inspired us
to think about proverbs in all their various contexts and manifestations. Thus, the title of our book, What Goes Around Comes
Around, is meant ﬁrst to honor Wolfgang Mieder, to convey our
deep appreciation not only for his intellectual inﬂuence on our
work but also for his wonderful presence in all of our lives.
The circulation of proverbs in our everyday lives reminds us
that folklore is, indeed, a truly dynamic process. The vitality of
proverbs—the constant emergence of new proverbs, together with
their continual expression in new contexts—captures the ways
in which folklore draws together our gravest concerns and our
strongest commitments, our most precious values and our wisest
perspectives, at times even our coarsest humor and our basest
beliefs, thereby structuring the world around us. In this collection,
we look speciﬁcally at proverbs as they go out into the world
beyond their usual contexts (“what goes around”) as well as the
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ways in which the world beyond traditional folklore comes into
being through the creation and recontextualization of new proverbs (“what comes around”). The diverse perspectives and analyses
in these essays raise the question of what, precisely, is meant by
proverb. Thus, we begin by reviewing the long tradition of scholarship that endeavors to deﬁne this dynamic genre of folklore.

Proverbs: What They Are and What They Do
One of the great paradoxes of the proverb is that it is generally understood to epitomize simplicity and common sense, but it
turns out to be both complex and hard to deﬁne. Although most
people can list many examples of proverbs, few can accurately
deﬁne what makes them proverbial. Scholars have discussed
proverbs for hundreds of years, and hundreds of different deﬁnitions have been advanced, making it impossible to provide even
a cursory summary of them. Instead, we offer a brief overview
of some of the classic scholarship on proverbs, and then touch
brieﬂy on recent and more unconventional deﬁnitions.
Because proverbs are both linguistic items (possessing concrete elements of verbal and logical structure) and behaviors
(possessing motives, strategies, and outcomes), it is imperative to
discuss not only what they are in linguistic and structural senses
but also what they do in social and behavioral ones. Proverbs are,
ﬁrst of all, messages passed between and among people. They are
principally expressed in speech, though they can also be transmitted through writing, visual arts, and electronic communication. In their verbal form, they are brief and pithy, wise and witty,
rhetorically forceful but discreetly indirect. They include old sayings like “A rolling stone gathers no moss,” as well as recent ones
such as “You snooze, you lose.” They can be as short as two words
(“Money talks”), or they can be thirty times as long (“For want of a
nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse was lost; for
want of a horse, the rider was lost; for want of a rider, the message
was lost; for want of a message, the battle was lost; for want of the
battle, the war was lost; and all for the want of horseshoe nail”).
But aside from memorizing lists of proverbs, how can we tell
if any given utterance can be considered a proverb? In some cultures and situations, we are lucky that proverbs are preceded by
a framing device: “You know what they say”; “As someone once
said”; or, in some locales, “We have a proverb for that.” In most
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cases, though, we need to look for other clues. Sometimes proverbial messages are metaphorical so that, for example, being
circumspect in signing a mortgage can be described as “looking before you leap.” Sometimes proverbs are poetic, featuring
rhyme (“No pain, no gain”; “Early to bed and early to rise makes
a man healthy, wealthy, and wise”), near rhyme (“Honesty is the
best policy”; “A stitch in time saves nine”), regular meter (“There’s
many a slip twixt the cup and the lip”; “A bird in the hand is worth
two in the bush”), or alliteration (“Where there’s a will, there’s a
way”; “Love laughs at locksmiths”). Sometimes they use unusual
or archaic syntax (“He who hesitates is lost”; “Here today, gone
tomorrow”; “It’s an ill wind that blows nobody good”). Although
all of these attributes apply to many proverbs, none of them is
present in every one. How, then, is it possible to determine what
constitutes proverbiality?
This problem has been discussed since ancient times; philosophers like Plato and Aristotle had much to say about proverbs, though they were not always referring to the same kinds of
expressions we call proverbs today. For instance, Aristotle calls
the phrase “an Attic neighbor” a proverb, though today it would
be considered an idiom at best. Still, classical and medieval deﬁnitions of the proverb do include statements of intuitive and descriptive power, such as Michael Apostolius of Byzantium’s dictum:
A proverb is a statement which conceals the clear in the unclear, or
which through concrete images indicates intellectual concepts, or
which makes clear the truth in furtive fashion. And further in this
fashion, a proverb is . . . a trite phrase constantly used in popular
speech . . . or a saying that has become thoroughly habitual in our
daily customs and life. (Apostolius, quoted in Whiting 1994, 65)

Two American scholars, writing in the 1930s, ushered in the
modern era of proverb study by summarizing and evaluating the
centuries of scholarship before them. The ﬁrst, Archer Taylor,
rejected out of hand the possibility of creating a strict and orderly
deﬁnition in a famous passage from his book The Proverb:
The deﬁnition of the proverb is too difﬁcult to repay the undertaking; and should we fortunately combine within a single
deﬁnition all the essential elements and give each its proper emphasis, even then we would not have a touchstone. An incommunicable
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quality tells us this sentence is proverbial and that one is not.
Hence no deﬁnition will enable us to identify positively a sentence
as proverbial. . . . Let us be content with saying that a proverb is a
saying current among the folk. At least so much of a deﬁnition is
indisputable. . . . (Taylor 1985, 3)

Taylor’s inﬂuence on other deﬁnitions began almost immediately.
Spurred to action by his colleague’s statement, B. J. Whiting
published “The Nature of the Proverb” in 1932. Whiting’s article
draws ideas about proverbs from classical authors, medieval writers, and a whole host of English men of letters. Out of these varied
ingredients, Whiting constructs his own deﬁnition of the proverb,
which stands today as an often-quoted and much-admired statement about the nature of proverbiality:
A proverb is an expression which, owing its birth to the people,
testiﬁes to its origin in form and phrase. It expresses an apparently
fundamental truth—that is, a truism—in homely language, often
adorned, however, with alliteration and rhyme. It is usually short,
but need not be; it is usually true, but need not be. Some proverbs
have both a literal and a ﬁgurative meaning. . . . A proverb must
. . . bear the sign of antiquity, and, since such signs may be counterfeited by a clever literary man, it should be attested in different
places at different times. (Whiting 1994, 80)

Both passages proceed from an intelligent recognition of the
difﬁculties inherent in the nature of proverbs, but both also have
their weaknesses. Taylor uses the vague term “saying” to describe
the type of expression that may be a proverb but never explains
what he means by it. The lack of a more precise description of
proverbs boils Taylor’s deﬁnition down to one feature: “currency”
among “the folk,” but even that is problematic; the concept of “the
folk” is not elucidated, either. Currency, in Taylor’s sense, apparently means that the proverb is repeated frequently—though just
how often it must be repeated is again undeﬁned.
Whiting’s passage, while it is more thorough, can be reduced
to a similar result: Where Taylor uses “saying,” Whiting calls the
proverb an “expression,” but what exactly does he mean? Surely
every utterance owes its birth to people; what does he mean by
“the people”? All the concrete characteristics Whiting mentions
(rhyme, alliteration, brevity, truth, and double meaning) are
optional, not present in every proverb. Every point of this
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deﬁnition is therefore either very vague or so speciﬁc it applies
only to some proverbs. The only easily deﬁned characteristic
Whiting claims proverbs must unequivocally have is age, and the
proper test of age, he tells us, is repetition.
Like Taylor, then, Whiting ﬁnds that belonging to a cultural
canon of repeated sayings is the most essential quality deﬁning
proverbiality. While Taylor uses currency to express this idea,
Whiting uses age. For both scholars, the test of this feature is the
same: If the proverb can be found in multiple places, it is likely
to have both age enough for Whiting and currency enough for
Taylor. In this, Taylor and Whiting were following an old tradition in English-language scholarship; the ﬁrst deﬁnition of the
proverb in English seems to be that of Thomas More, who in 1528
called it simply “an old said saw” or a saying long said (Whiting
1994, 69).
Whiting also contributes one more crucial idea to our understanding of proverbs: The proverb, he tells us, “expresses an
apparently fundamental truth.” This characteristic, combined
with age and currency, is essentially the basis of many, if not
most, proverb deﬁnitions. One of the world’s ﬁnest proverb scholars, Wolfgang Mieder, for example, follows his own teacher Stuart
Gallacher (1959, 47) and adapts that scholar’s deﬁnition to “a
Proverb is a concise statement of an apparent truth that has [had,
or will have] some currency among the people” (Mieder 1993, 14).
This then, at its basic level, is what the proverb is: a saying encapsulating a culturally recognized truth, repeated until it is recognized as traditional.
However, most scholars are not satisﬁed with this level of
description, and many have tried to provide a more concrete or rigorous deﬁnition. In particular, citing logical and structural composition has become an important means of deﬁning proverbs. This
has resulted in a rich literature, but also a broad and disparate
one, with such ideas as “analogic structure” (Crépeau 1975), “topiccomment structure” (Dundes 1981), and “quadripartite structure”
(Milner 1969a), all advanced as possible deﬁnitional models. (For
other structural possibilities, see Seitel 1981; Priebe 1971; Milner 1969b; Barley 1972; Permiakov 1979; Cram 1994; Grzybek
1994). Because proverbs exhibit such a variety of structures on
the surface, and because there are many kinds of structures
(e.g., syntactic, logical, conceptual, etc.), scholars must resort
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to analyzing deep structures. These they derive themselves from
the proverbs they analyze, interpreting them as they see ﬁt. This
leaves a lot of room for other scholars to disagree, and, predictably, their work has not led to widely accepted deﬁnitions.
Some scholars have approached the problem from a different
angle, asking, “Is there some other way we recognize the traditional nature of the proverb, besides by having heard it before?”
Shirley Arora (1994) found that among Spanish speakers poetic
features such as rhyme were as important as a previous hearing in
people’s decisions about what a proverb was. But poetic features,
as already explained, are not present in every proverb, and thus it
is difﬁcult to deﬁne a proverb by their presence or absence.
Since proverbs cannot easily be deﬁned by what they are,
scholars have also tried to deﬁne them by what they do. Instead of
analyzing the linguistic or logical structure, these students of the
proverb analyze its rhetorical and social functions. This approach
also has a long history. Hermogenes of Tarsus, a Sophistic rhetorician of the second century C.E., wrote that “a proverb is a summary saying, in a statement of general application, dissuading
from something or persuading toward something, or showing
what is the nature of each” (Hermogenes, quoted in Whiting 1994,
59). This essentially rhetorical deﬁnition still describes many instances of proverbial speech today, making it one of the earliest
proverb deﬁnitions still recognizable in the modern world.
Hermogenes’ deﬁnition does not account for every proverbial
utterance, however. Proverbs can persuade and dissuade, but
they can also accomplish many other rhetorical goals: They can
express deference or conﬁdence or worry, instill fear or respect,
or even mock the listener. Recognizing this, modern proverb
scholars tend to follow philosopher of language Kenneth Burke,
who describes proverbs as “strategies for dealing with situations”
(Burke 1957, 296).
Burke points out that proverbs name and sum up certain recurrent social situations. For example, a man is taking a long time
to make up his mind, and we think he needs to act more quickly.
This is a commonly recurring situation, and we have many
proverbs to deal with it. We can say, “He who hesitates is lost,” or
“When opportunity knocks, answer the door,” or “Strike while the
iron is hot,” or “Shit or get off the pot,” or even “You snooze, you
lose.” All these send the same message: Act now.
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As Burke’s theory suggests, proverbial speech is a complex
process. First, we recognize a situation in our life as a special instance of a social situation or context that recurs. Then we realize
that there is a proverb for that recurrent situation. We speak the
proverb in an attempt to contribute to the conversation. Our goal
is to recast the speciﬁc, unique situation as a version of the general, recurrent one, and if we are successful, our hearer will understand the implied advice. Burke’s approach to proverbs, ﬁrst
published in 1941, has been very inﬂuential and informs the work
of such scholars as Abrahams (1968, 1972), Seitel (1981), Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1981), Briggs (1994), Yankah (1989), Prahlad
(1996), and Winick (1998, 2003), all of whom have contributed
to our understanding of proverbs as rhetorical strategies and devices of communication.
Ideally, a successful proverb deﬁnition would answer both of
our initial questions: What are proverbs (how they are internally
constructed?), and what do they do (how do they communicate or
make meaning?)? A few, like Crépeau’s deﬁnition of the proverb
as “a sentence with analogic structure and normative function”
(1975, 303), touch on both questions, but more often proverb definitions address only one of the two.
In one of the more interesting deﬁnitions that does discuss
both what proverbs are and what they do, Richard P. Honeck
(1997) describes proverbs as “a discourse deviant, relatively concrete, present (nonpast) tense statement that uses characteristic
linguistic markers to arouse cognitive ideals that serve to categorize topics in order to make a pragmatic point about them” (p. 18).
In pointing out that “characteristic linguistic markers” are part
of the way proverbs function, Honeck makes such markers part
of the deﬁnition. Thus, rhyme, meter, alliteration, metaphor, and
other poetic features are re-incorporated into this modern proverb deﬁnition. At the same time, Honeck also includes the fact
that a proverb categorizes topics and makes points about them,
clearly a derivation of Burke’s theory.
Honeck’s point that the proverb “uses characteristic linguistic
markers to arouse cognitive ideals” suggests an important aspect
of “proverbial markers,” such as rhyme, alliteration, and meter.
These are not only part of what proverbs are but also part of what
they do; they are not only physical features of the proverb but also
serve a rhetorical function.
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Winick (1998, 2003) also combines poetic, structural, and
functional approaches, together with entextualization theory and
intertextual theories of genre, to deﬁne the proverb:
Proverbs are brief (sentence-length) entextualized utterances, which
derive a sense of wisdom, wit and authority from explicit and intentional intertextual reference to a tradition of previous similar wisdom utterances. This intertextual reference may take many forms,
including replication (i.e., repetition of the text from previous contexts), imitation (i.e., modeling a new utterance after a previous
utterance), or the use of features (rhyme, alliteration, meter, ascription to the elders, etc.) associated with previous wisdom sayings.
Finally, proverbs address recurrent social situations in a strategic
way. (Winick 2003, 595)

Like Honeck’s deﬁnition, this one addresses what proverbs are
(short utterances with features that act as intertextual references)
and what they do (address social situations).
Where does this exploration get us? How do these disparate
deﬁnitions relate to each other? Most scholars agree on certain
features of the proverb: its brevity, its ability to sum up social
situations and encapsulate principles held true and important
by the culture that speaks them. Most also believe that sentences require another ingredient to make them proverbial. Taylor,
Whiting, and Mieder call for age or currency. Some scholars instead look for characteristic structures (e.g., Dundes), linguistic
markers (e.g., Honeck), or forms of intertextual reference (e.g.,
Winick).
What all of these scholars are trying to describe is the proverb’s relationship to tradition. For Mieder, Whiting, and Taylor,
tradition is the process of handing down the item from person
to person and perhaps generation to generation. For structuralists like Dundes, certain structures are traditionally associated
with proverbs, while for scholars like Arora, Honeck, and Winick,
certain poetic features are. These traditional associations are important to the transmission and reception of proverbs. Although
their theories of tradition are quite different, these scholars would
all agree on at least the following: Proverbs are short, traditional
utterances that encapsulate cultural truths and sum up recurrent social situations. This, then, becomes our working deﬁnition
of what proverbs are and what they do.
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of popular culture—to and from vernacular oral tradition—has
reached a fevered pitch over the past decade. Indeed, the present
age is one in which the proverb has reasserted itself as a basic form
of expression (cf. Jolles 1930), rather than one in decline. Consider,
for example, the following list of popular (proverbial) phrases:

Comes Around

The Circulation of Proverbs in(to) Contemporary Culture

Where’s the beef?
You’re off the island.
Is that your ﬁnal answer?
It takes a village.
No soup for you.
You’re ﬁred!
If you build it, they will come.
I’ve fallen, and I can’t get up.

This list contains items which originated in commercial media
and then entered vernacular speech, as well as items imported
into popular culture from living vernacular (both American and
foreign), which then migrated back into active oral usage with new
connotations and associations. The list includes phrases associated with popular movies, television broadcasts, advertisements,
and best-selling books. Most notably, all of the items in the list
appear so frequently in various discursive contexts that they are
certainly part of American vernacular speech. The generation and
circulation of such phrases have become so much a part of contemporary life that a current series of television commercials for
Burger King depicts a group of employees debating the possibility
of spontaneously coining a “catchprase” to describe a new burger
—a metaproverbial advertisement, so to speak.
We do not offer this set of examples to ignite debate over the
ultimate source of any individual phrase, nor do we wish to demonstrate a static borrowing among domains of creativity, nor even
the priority of one medium over another in terms of signiﬁcance or
precedence. Rather, we wish to demonstrate that, although many
of the phrases vary in their usage, they have all become traditional
utterances that, for their speakers, encapsulate cultural truths
and sum up recurrent social situations. Moreover, the dynamism
of form and ﬂuidity in the creative domains exhibited by these
examples verify the ongoing negotiation of meaning to which
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speakers subject popular phrases. We hope this list, and the following descriptions of how some of the items have been used, afﬁrms the necessity of the contemporary paremiologist remaining
attuned to the comings and goings of proverbial speech. We live
in an era “after the great divide” (Huyssen 1986), when gaps between high and low—elite, popular, and folk—no longer deﬁne the
ﬂow of cultural and discursive practices. Indeed, as Winick (1998)
argues in his dissertation, The Proverb Process: Intertextuality and
Proverbial Innovation in Popular Culture, it is precisely in this intertextual gap between domains that we can frequently locate the
meaning of proverbial utterances.
Several of the items in our list are most readily associated
with the recent crop of “reality” television shows. “You’re off the
island”—meaning “you’re out” or “you’re eliminated”—references
Survivor, one of the ﬁrst successes in this broadcast genre. The
phrase quickly spread beyond the conﬁnes of the television set.
For instance, one UCLA folklore student reports the phrase being
used in his dorm room in spring 2000: Following the annoying
intrusion by an unpopular hallmate into a private conversation
among several students, one of the members in the group remarked, “I wish we could just kick his ass off the island and be
done with him!” The folklore student goes on to comment that
the speaker “used the phrase to mean that [the unpopular resident’s] presence was no longer desired within our group, and he
should be barred from returning, just as if we were contestants
on Survivor, voting him off the show.” Completing the circular
ﬂow, the comings and goings, the student adds that he has seen
the phrase on the Web site www.espn.com, where a poll asked,
“If these eight athletes were on Survivor Island, who would be the
ﬁrst to be kicked off the island?”
A contrasting example of the phrase appeared in an advertisement the United Way of Greater Los Angeles placed in the Los
Angeles Times (21 August 2000). The copy inverts the saying in
its headline, “None of These People Will Be Voted off the Island.”
Below this banner, presumably intended to draw attention to the
work of the United Way in an unexpected fashion, the full-page
ad lists all donors who contributed a thousand dollars or more to
the organization.
Two other recent catchphrases associated with television
programs also rapidly found their way into other media as well
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as popular usage. Both “Is that your ﬁnal answer?” and “You’re
ﬁred!” existed in American vernacular prior to their ﬁfteen minutes of fame in the mass media, but at this writing, most Americans associate them with Regis Philbin, host of the game show
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?, and Donald Trump, host of The
Apprentice. The former is a quiz show where contestants attempt
to answer a series of increasingly difﬁcult multiple-choice questions leading up to the ultimate million-dollar question. To unnerve contestants, Philbin occasionally urges them to reconsider
their tentative response: “Is that your ﬁnal answer?” On 31 May
2000, a two-inch headline across the front page of the Los Angeles Times sports section declared, “That’s no ﬁnal answer.” Immediately above this banner, readers could see that it referred to the
score in game ﬁve of the western conference ﬁnals of the National
Basketball Association: Portland 96, Lakers 88. Just as the United Way advertisement attracts attention by invoking a popular
television show, this headline achieves much of its effect through
its intertextual reference to Philbin’s phrase, even though the two
phenomena have no apparent relationship.
On the recently completed ﬁrst season of The Apprentice, a
group of aspiring businesspeople competed to convince entrepreneur Donald Trump that he should hire them into a management position with a six-ﬁgure salary. Each week Trump put the
contestants through various tasks designed to demonstrate their
suitability for the prize, and at the end of the hour, he told one of
them, “You’re ﬁred!” While Trump did not, of course, invent this
phrase, he did bring it to proverbial status, inspiring an upsurge
in its use in various contexts beyond employment. Indeed, Trump
is reportedly even attempting to obtain a trademark on it (ABC
NewsOnline, 3 March 2004), providing perhaps the ultimate evidence of the phrase’s widespread circulation.
Another instance of proverbial speech circulating among media and the vernacular appears in a Los Angeles Times headline over a story about football players who endorsed Campbell’s
Chunky Soup having bad luck (either injuries or slumps): “Curses
. . . No Soup for You!” (Los Angeles Times, 8 December 2002).
There was no need for this column even to mention the television
show Seinfeld. By the time the story appeared, the phrase was circulating independently and with new, metaphorical meanings. Indeed, the humor of the newspaper story and the headline derived
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from this circulation. What began as a literal admonishment by a
chef to the character Elaine in the notorious “Soup Nazi” episode
of Seinfeld became a locution for denial in popular speech. By reconnecting the phrase to a story about soup, the columnist uses
its intertextual resonances to suggest humorously that football
players should focus on the sport rather than endorsements. “Already, the Chunky Soup curse is part of NFL folklore,” the story
reports as it ponders why the soup is “nowhere to be found on the
league’s list of banned substances.”
As our ﬁnal two examples, we take phrases associated with
a movie and an advertisement. In The Proverb Process, Winick
treats cinematic proverbial speech in depth, particularly phrases
associated with Forrest Gump. One ﬁlm not mentioned by Winick
is Field of Dreams, starring Kevin Costner. In the ﬁlm, Costner’s
character gets the notion that he must construct a baseball ﬁeld
on his farmland. The message mysteriously reaches him in the
words, “If you build it, they will come.” In the years since the
release of the ﬁlm, the phrase has become part of political discourse during the past two presidential administrations, as well
as an element of other discursive domains. To cite some timely examples from the many available, it is ironic that during President
Clinton’s second term of ofﬁce, national security advisor Sandy
Berger employed the phrase to declare that if then-Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein rebuilt the nuclear reactor destroyed in an Israel air strike, the U.S. would intervene: “If he rebuilds it, we will
come.” Even though Saddam did not rebuild it, the United States
still came.
Although Clinton’s vice president, Al Gore, did not take ofﬁce
as a result of the 2000 election, the phrase still found its way into
the next administration. In 2001, political cartoonist Margulies
depicted the current president (identiﬁed by a W on his baseball cap) surrounded by an array of incoming missiles. A grinning
Bush reads from a document entitled “Missile Defense” and declares, “Build it and they WON’T come. . . .” Margulies reveals his
commentary in the caption: “Shield of Dreams.”
The baseball-ﬁeld metaphor rose to the level of national political debates, but commentators also found it useful to describe
local controversies. For instance, a radio commentator in Los Angeles summed up his opinion about expanding the freeway interchange between the San Diego and Ventura Freeways (Interstates
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405 and 101) with the remark, “If they build it, trafﬁc will ﬂow.”
The phrase lent itself to a Los Angeles debate over a different
mode of transportation as well. In a 26 May 2002 article reviewing the merits of utilizing smaller regional airports (a potential
alternative to expansion of Los Angeles International Airport), Los
Angeles Times travel columnist Jane Engle summarized, “If you
build it, they won’t come. If they come, you had better build it.”
A less lofty example of the circulation of proverbial speech
comes from a low-budget television commercial for an emergency
communication device. The advertisement promotes the necessity
of the device by depicting an elderly woman who has fallen outside her home. She retrieves the device and tells the helpful voice
which responds that “I’ve fallen, and I can’t get up.” Like the other
examples, this one has experienced a healthy second life in the
vernacular. The graphic image of a ﬂoundering body has made
the phrase attractive to sportswriters:
“The St. Louis Rams have fallen, and there’s no telling when they’ll
get up” (Los Angeles Times, 24 September 2002).
“Twins Are Falling and Can’t Get Up” (Los Angeles Times, 16
August 2001).
“I’ve Fallen—and I Can’t Get Up” (caption on a photo of a speed
skater whooshing by a fallen opponent in the Canadian Olympic
trials; Los Angeles Times, 12 December 2001).

In a delightful proverbial twist, this last example comes from a
regular feature in the Times sports section entitled “1,000 Words’
Worth,” which features unusual and compelling sports photos.
Ironically, the photos frequently require substantial captions to
clarify what they depict to readers.
A number of folklore students have also documented this
phrase in contexts unrelated to sports. One describes throwing her
pencil to the ground in frustration during a calculus study group
and telling her peers that she has fallen and can’t get up, meaning she cannot solve the practice problems. In another instance,
which suggests the wide appeal of the phrase, a male student
reported to class that he employed it in a sexual situation. Notably, this vocal student went on to become a professional football
player and made a name for himself by not falling down when
catching a desperation “fourth and twenty-six” pass from Donovan McNabb in a recent NFL playoff game.
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This somewhat haphazard set of examples clearly indicates
the comings and goings of proverbial speech in our contemporary
discourse. These phrases circulate in diverse domains of popular
media, folk speech, and political debate. They appear in various
incarnations, shifting, as proverbs do, to account for the immediate context but retaining textual and contextual features, which
endow them with proverbiality. Reporters, headline writers, and
admen can assume a wide familiarity with these popular phrases
among their readers, and politicians, comedians, commentators,
and ordinary conversationalists can evoke the intertextual relationships contained in these phrases to enhance communication
in culturally resonant ways.

What Goes Around Comes Around
The following essays explore the wide-ranging comings and
goings of proverbs in(to) and out of contemporary culture through
close historical, literary, and sociocultural analyses of diverse
proverbs, proverb (re)usage, and proverbial speech. We open our
collection with Charles Doyle’s “‘In Aqua Scribere’: The Evolution
of a Current Proverb.” Doyle reminds us that proverbs come into
literary expression with the same frequency that literary quotations go into proverbial use. While many English speakers probably identify the phrase “written in/on water” with the poet John
Keats, Doyle ﬁnds references to the phrase in early Greek and
Latin writings and offers strong evidence to suggest that these
references indicate fairly wide vernacular use. Thus, “written in/
on water” moves from ancient proverb into classic literature, then
from classic literature into nineteenth-century literary circles
(though through much more vernacular expression in Keats’s
spoken desire that his epitaph read, “Here lies one whose name
was writ in water”), and eventually from literary circles back into
vernacular expression as proverbial speech.
The process of evolving into proverbs occurs in numerous
contexts and often represents the particular interests and motivations, the needs and desires, the passions and anxieties of
the people whose cultural practices give rise to such innovative
linguistic expressions. In their essay, “‘From One Act of Charity, the World Is Saved’: Creative Selection of Proverbs in Sephardic Narrative,” Isaac Jack Lévy and Rosemary Lévy Zumwalt
demonstrate the ways in which Sephardic storytellers employ
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traditional proverbs as a rhetorically powerful means of ordering
their narrative performances. Lévy and Lévy Zumwalt detail the
strategic choice of proverbs in structuring and commenting on
traditional narratives, thereby allowing the storyteller to render
indisputable any potential ambiguity in the narrative’s meaning
in the immediate context of its telling. In these cases, then, the
intended meaning of the narratives evolves into proverbial expression through the use of proverbs in titles, introductions, and
conclusions and closes the possibility of alternative meanings
through the proverb’s power to signify uncontested cultural wisdom.
Shirley Arora’s “Baseball as (Pan)America: A Sampling of
Baseball-Related Metaphors in Spanish” and Stephen Winick’s
“‘You Can’t Kill Shit’: Occupational Proverb and Metaphorical
System among Young Medical Professionals” both offer excellent
examples of how speciﬁc cultural (and subcultural) drives ﬁnd
their way into proverbial expression over time. Arora details the
innumerable ways in which common baseball referents and images have given rise to ﬁgurative proverbs and proverbial speech
in a diversity of Latin American countries. Here, then, baseball
achieves proverbial expression as a sign of the widespread passion for the sport, and new proverbs and folk expressions drawing
on its jargon and imagery capture baseball’s centrality in Latin
American cultures, not only as a sport but as a way of thinking
and a way of making meaning.
Similarly, Winick focuses on the medical proverb, “You can’t
kill shit,” the related acronym SHPOS (subhuman piece of shit),
and other medical folk speech to show how the demands of medical culture, particularly the stress and anxiety that young doctors experience as they realize the impossibility of controlling all
aspects of the hospital environment, ﬁnd expression through occupational proverbs and group folk speech. Winick’s extensive
analysis of both of these proverbial expressions, as well as the
previous scholarship on medical subcultures, foregrounds the
boundaries of medical folk expressions like “You can’t kill shit”
within the immediate contexts of their use while simultaneously
drawing attention to their ﬂexibility within the unarticulated (perhaps subconscious) logical system of the young doctors.
While these essays reveal the ways cultural meanings, practices, beliefs and worldviews evolve into expressive existence
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through (often new) proverbs and proverbial speech, and the
motivations driving the use of these expressions, the remaining
essays examine the movement of proverbs into new contexts. In
his essay, “‘Cheaters Never Prosper’ and Other Lies Adults Tell
Kids: Proverbs and the Culture Wars over Character,” Jay Mechling follows proverbs as they move from traditional, vernacular
contexts into the rariﬁed realms of “cultural literacy” (a concept
fully entrenched in an elitist view of what constitutes education)
and neoconservative attempts to help children build character.
Here, proverbs are no longer folk expressions of cultural wisdom invoked in speciﬁc performative contexts which create their
meanings, but rather become concrete adages expressing unchanging and unquestioned “truths” and values. As such, hundreds of proverbs ﬁnd themselves on lists children are encouraged to memorize as a character-building exercise devoid of the
classical rhetorical skill of situating and manipulating proverbial
speech.
In addition to pointing out the absurdity of considering proverbs out of their everyday, oral contexts, Mechling emphasizes the
fact that proverbs are rarely used by children in their own folklore
(though they do, sometimes, parody them) and, consequently, are
likely to be ineffective as character-building devices. These new
uses to which proverbs are put, however, do tell us something
about the adults who continually enlist tradition in their attempts
to address the supposed crisis in character among children, especially boys, and Mechling does a superb job of laying bare their
rhetoric as well as their neoconservative motivations.
Just as proverbs are put to work by neoconservative traditionalists, so, too, are they mobilized in advertising campaigns for
an extensive range of products, services, lifestyles, and ultimately
to promote American hegemonic ideals, as Anand Prahlad demonstrates in his essay, “The Proverb and Fetishism in American
Advertisements.” Prahlad does far more than identify proverbs
and their strategic placement in magazine advertisements; he
also suggests that the deep entanglements of proverb and advertisement produce an altogether new cultural form, what he calls
the “ad/altar,” at the heart of which is the altered proverb itself.
Through close readings of several proverb ad/altars, Prahlad begins to build a new theory of the fetishized proverb in American
advertising (itself something of a fetish), a theory that emerges
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from the proverb’s movement (and incorporation) into new contexts and cultural conﬁgurations.
At the same time, however, traditional proverbs in traditional
contexts also ﬁnd innovative ends. Jan Brunvand’s essay, “‘The
Early Bird Is Worth Two in the Bush’: Captain Jack Aubrey’s
Fractured Proverbs,” is an incredible survey of the intentionally
fractured proverbs invented by novelist Patrick O’Brian in creating the quirky, though entirely believable, character of Captain
Jack Aubrey, hero of O’Brian’s vastly popular series of maritime
novels set during the Napoleanic War. In keeping with the spirit
of much of Mieder’s own work, Brunvand has combed O’Brian’s
full series to compile a list of fractured proverbs and misspoken
proverbial expressions attributed to Aubrey and some of the other
characters in the series who either intentionally or accidentally
offer versions of fractured proverbs, Wellerisms, or clever puns
and witticisms. Most impressive, perhaps, is Brunvand’s ability
not only to recognize various proverbs and proverbial expressions
but also to trace them to their origins and offer correct versions.
We close our collection of essays on proverbial circulation with
Alan Dundes’s “As the Crow Flies: A Straightforward Study of
Lineal Worldview in American Folk Speech.” Dundes assembles a
seemingly inﬁnite number of proverbs and examples of proverbial
speech, folk metaphors, and traditional expressions that detail
the American cultural preference for the linear over the circular.
As Dundes demonstrates, a vast range of proverbs and folk expressions come into existence—into articulation—as reﬂections of
an American cultural ideology and worldview rooted in the lineal.
While our own emphasis on circularity both in proverb scholarship
and circulation may seem to ﬂy in the face of the straight-minded
crow in Dundes’s title, we should also reiterate that the proverb in
our title is also very frequently used to comment negatively on another’s behavior (as in “He’ll get his”) and, thus, is fully consistent
with Dundes’s masterful delineation of a lineal worldview in American folk speech. In his essay, Dundes shows that at the broadest
level, we arrive at proverbs and proverbial speech from the cultural
expanse that gives meaning not only to speciﬁc performative utterances but to our entire mental map of the world around us.
As these essays collectively argue so persuasively, proverbs
may come, and proverbs may go, but the roles they play and the
tendencies they reveal about the people who employ them are
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hardly insigniﬁcant. Just as we are certain that proverb usage
will continue to engage and fascinate, we know, too, that the
name Wolfgang Mieder shall never be writ in water.
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“In Aqua Scribere”
The Evolution of a Current Proverb
Charles Clay Doyle

T

he name Wolfgang Mieder is not written in water. Like the
names Archer Taylor and B. J. Whiting, it will long endure
wherever paremiologists labor—if not chiseled in granite or cast
in bronze, then ﬁrmly inked on high-quality acid-free paper. However, if Wolfgang Mieder did assert, with unmerited modesty, that
his name might prove to be “written in water,” what would be the
implications, proverbially speaking?
The old expression is much alive at the beginning of the twentyﬁrst century. A well-read portion of English speakers may associate the phrase speciﬁcally with the poet John Keats, who is reported to have asked, on his early deathbed in 1821, that his epitaph read, “Here lies one whose name was writ in water.” Even as
a literary aphorism, however, the expression has been subject to
the variability that tends to characterize proverbs and anecdotes.
For instance, references to the epitaph often give the form “writ
on water”—a small variation indeed; yet the difference between
the two prepositions can suggest a fundamental difference in the
imagery. With the preposition on, we imagine Keats’s name being
inscribed on the surface of a pool or stream. With the preposition
in, the expression can be interpreted that same way, but “writ
in water” also permits us to imagine the name being written on
paper with a pen dipped in water instead of ink. Either way, of
course, “writ in water,” like “writ on water,” signiﬁes invisibility
or (symbolically) oblivion for the name and fame of the individual
whose appellation is so scripted.
Keats’s wish was carried out. Carved in the stone over his
anonymous grave in the Protestant Cemetery in Rome appears
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this inscription: “Here lies One/Whose Name was writ in Water”
(a legible photograph appears in Rogers 1957, facing 33). The
story of the poet’s deathbed utterance depends on a letter of 14
February 1821—Keats died February 23—from his friend Joseph
Severn to Charles Armitage Brown; the two of them oversaw the
design and placement of the stone (Brown 1937, 85; see also
Brown 1966, 91).
There persists some question as to whether Keats actually
requested “writ in water” and not “writ on water”—both of these
forms, with “writ” often modernized to “written,” are still current in writing and in oral tradition. Prior to the carving of the
gravestone, Keats’s friend and publisher John Taylor reported the
poet’s request in the form, “Here lies one whose Name was writ
on Water” (Blunden 1940, 88). A fragment of poetry by Keats’s
conﬁdant Shelley, possibly intended for some version of the elegy “Adonais,” bears the title, “On Keats who desired that on his
tomb should be inscribed ‘Here lieth one whose name was writ on
water’”; it appeared in Mary Shelley’s posthumous edition of her
husband’s verse (1969, 82), sent to the publisher in 1823, prior
to the erection of Keats’s gravestone.
Innovator of expressive images though he was, Keats hardly
invented the conceit of writing in (or on) water. In English, the
expression was prevalent in Elizabethan times, while Latin and
Greek versions extend back to antiquity.
Pivotal between those two ages was the great polymath Erasmus of Rotterdam, whose Adagia transported (and translated) so
much of ancient learning to the culture of a newer Europe. Following the procedure used throughout his magisterial compilation, Erasmus gave the adage in Latin—whether or not it was
current in that form at the end of the Middle Ages—followed by
one or more versions from the Greek.
In 1500 he included the proverb “In aqua scribes” in the ﬁrst
of the many expanding editions of his Adagia (Erasmus 1993–,
1:450; my English translations are based on Erasmus 1974–,
1:359). The Latin translates g_e p
b_okn al_v ¡fn or (alternatively)
¡fvn p
btl al_v ¡fn. Next, Erasmus quoted and translated (into Latin)
a Greek analog from Lucian: “Are you joking, Charon, or are you,
as they say, writing on water . . . ?” [. . . in aqua, quod aiunt,
scribes]; one from Plato: “Will he not then write these things carefully on black water, sowing with his pen?” [. . . in aqua scribet

What Goes Around

Comes Around
nigra seminana calamo]; one from “the Greek maxims” [sententias
Graecas], of Menander: “You should write the oaths of wicked men
on water” [Hominum improborum inscribe iusiurandum aquae];
a version “misquoted” [deprauat] by Xenarchas, which Erasmus
added in the edition of 1517–18: “. . . a woman’s oath is written with wine” [Inscribo vino si qua iurat foemina]; Erasmus may
have been unaware that Xenarchas was parodying a line in a
fragment by Sophocles, which gives the normative “water” version
(Sophocles 1994–96, 3:362–63); and ﬁnally an occurrence in the
Latin of Catullus, added in the 1520 edition: “What a woman says
to her ardent lover should be written on the wind and running
water” [in vento et rapida scribere oportet aqua].
Not included by Erasmus were some other early versions (cited
by Lahr [1972–73, 17–18] and corrected by Woodman [1975, 12–
13]; both of those Keats scholars were apparently unaware of the
central role Erasmus would have played in transmitting the proverb
to educated English speakers): In the Greek prose of Philostratus,
“. . . this is no dream, nor are you writing this love of ours in water”
(Philostratus 1921, 160–61); and in the Latin of St. Augustine’s
The City of God, purporting to translate the Greek of Porphyry,
who consulted Apollo regarding the means to convert his previously Christianized wife back to paganism—the oracle declares,
“You may perchance more easily write in lasting letters on water [in
aqua impressis litteris scribere], or spread light pinions and ﬂy like
a bird through the air” (Augustine 1957–72, 6:214–15).
Versions of the Greek adage can also be found in the secondcentury collection of the Greek paremiographer Diogenianus (adages 2.59 and 5.83), in a group of sayings ascribed to Plutarch
(adage 5), among the “paroimiai” of Macarius (adages 4.95 and
5.50), among the proverbs of Mantissa (adage 1.74), and in the
tenth-century lexicon associated with the name Suïdas (adages
3283 and 327); the adage also appeared among the late-ﬁfteenthcentury Apothegmata of Michael Apostolius (adages 6.56 and
6.80) (Leutsch and Schneidewin [1839–87] 1958–65, 1:344, 2:27,
176, 184, 267, 379, 387, 756; Suïdas [1928–38] 1967–71, 2:431,
543). Erasmus had access to at least some of those compilations.
(A few other early versions are cited by Boissonade [1829–33]
1962, 1:5, 96, 394.)
Erasmus interpreted the adage “In aqua scribes” [You write on
water] to mean “You are wasting your time” or, more literally, “You
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are doing nothing” [nihil agis]. However, some of the examples that
he (and I) have quoted pretty clearly carry the more recent sense
of “Your utterance, your resolve, or your reputation is transitory,
ephemeral,” an application that Erasmus acknowledged when he
glossed the same proverb in another place: “de re euanida” [of
something that will vanish] (Erasmus 1993–, 2:128). Other quotations illustrate the meaning, “Your words are unreliable, not to
be credited.” St. Augustine used the proverb as a paraphrastic
expression of impossibility—like numbering the stars or counting
the sands of the beach.
Regarding the ambiguity of the English wording “writ in water”: No such ambiguity exists in Latin. With the Latin preposition
in—as in Erasmus’s main entry, “In aqua scribis”—the phrase
means “You write on water.” With the noun aqua alone, the ablative case (or, less commonly, the dative aquae) signiﬁes “by means
of”—that is, without the preposition, “Aqua scribis” means “You
write with water (instead of ink).” As the quotations show, both
versions—both images, presumably—occurred in antiquity.
The disparate imagery appeared again when Elizabethan
Englishmen adopted or adapted the old saying. The two earliest known instances in English both appear in publications from
1580. Austin Saker, in Narbonus: The Laberynth of Libertie, obviously thought of water as a substitute for the ink that a document would ordinarily be written with: “. . . my warrante shall bee
written with water, and sealed with sauce: put into the Paper of
obliuion, and deliuered with the hande of forgetfulnesse” (Saker
1580, 119). In the same year, 1580, the proverb appeared with
the other sense in John Lyly’s Euphues and His England : “. . . the
care that I haue had of thee . . . hath beene tried by the counsaile
I haue always giuen thee, which if thou haue forgotten, I meane
no more to write in water[;] if thou remember imprint it still” (Lyly
1902, 2:187; cited by Tilley 1950, W114). The edition of 1597 alters (corrects?) the last phrase to read “imprint it in steele” (Lyly
1916, 412); this more concrete antithesis clariﬁes that water is
the medium written on. Whether he intended “still” or “in steele,”
Lyly contrasts remembrance with the forgetfulness of writing on
water.
In 1598 Nicolas Ling, in Politeuphuia: Wits Common Wealth,
gave—in the category of aphorisms concerning oaths—“Wicked
mens oaths are written in water” ([Ling] 1598, fol. 146v; Tilley
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[1950, W114] cited the 1597 edition, which does not contain the
saying—nor is Tilley’s attribution of the book to John Bodenham
to be credited).
Dating sixteenth and seventeenth century proverbs can be
problematic. The composition of a book, which would be the date
of the actual use of a proverb, could precede the publication date
by some years. For plays, the situation is more complicated still,
since early performances would probably have omitted matter
that appears in the texts that were eventually published. Be that
as it may, the next datable instance of our proverb occurs in an
epilog, “To the Reader,” after Ben Jonson’s Poetaster, published in
1616 (Jonson 1981–82, 2:226; cited by Dent 1984, W114):
. . . I could stamp
Their foreheads with those deep and public brands
That the whole company of barber-surgeons
Should not take off, with all their art, and plasters.
And these my prints should last, still to be read
In their pale fronts: when, what they write ‘gainst me,
Shall like a ﬁgure, drawn in water, ﬂeet,
And the poor wretched papers be employed
To cloth[e] tobacco. . . .

In this passage, the ﬂeeting “ﬁgure” can be interpreted according
to either reading of “in water.”
In some lines traditionally ascribed to the poet and musician
Thomas Campion (an attribution that Campion’s modern editor
deems “doubtful”), ﬁrst published about 1623, a lovelorn singer
laments, “My object now must be the aire,/To write in water words
of ﬁre,/And teach sad thoughts how to despaire” (Campion 1969,
455). With a probable pun on “aire” (in the sense of “song”), the
poet embellishes the proverb with further elemental imagery to
create the paradox of writing “in water” (in the sense of “on water,”
most likely) “words of ﬁre”—suggesting not only the invisibility of
his professed passion but also its inevitable cooling.
In Beaumont and Fletcher’s tragedy Philaster, published in
1620, the title character exclaims, “Your memory shall be as foule
behind you/As you are living: all your better deeds/ Shall be in water
writ, but this in Marble” (Beaumont and Fletcher 1966–96, 1:469);
the parallelism suggests that in means on. A similar sentiment
occurs in Henry VIII by Shakespeare, probably in collaboration
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with Fletcher, ﬁrst printed in the 1623 folio of Shakespeare’s plays:
“Mens euill manners, liue in Brasse, their Vertues / We write in
Water” (Shakespeare 1968, 579; cited by Dent 1981, W114). In
1630 appeared another version of the proverb with the “water”/
”brass” antithesis; John Taylor (nicknamed the “water poet”) paid
tribute to King James I in a “funerall elegie”: “His anger written
on weak water was,/His Patience and his Loue were grau’d in
Brasse” (Taylor 1630, 324 [2nd series of pagination], sig. Iii [1st
such signing] 2v).
A year earlier, in 1629, an English poem loosely adapting or
paraphrasing a long epigram from The Greek Anthology (epigram
9.359, where the adage itself does not appear) was published in
Thomas Farnaby’s Florilegium epigrammatum Graecorum; the lines
have been attributed to Francis Bacon: “The world’s a bubble. . . ./
Who then to fraile mortality shall trust,/ But limmes the water, or
but writes in dust” (Farnaby 1629, sig. A5v). To make a connection with Keats’s circle of acquaintances: Mary Shelley employed
the quoted couplet as the epigraph to volume 1, chapter 10 of her
novel Lodore in 1835 (1996, 6:54).
The same connection between inscribing water and the equally futile attempt to write on another substance occurs in Philip
Massinger’s play The Maid of Honour, published in 1632: “but all
that I had done,/My beneﬁts, in sand or water written,/As they
had never been, no more remember’d!” (Massinger 1813, 4:101).
Separate instances of the proverbial phrase “to write in sand” have
been recorded; both Tilley (1950, W114) and Dent (1981, W114;
1984, W114) consider it the same proverb as “to write on water.”
Another paralleling of images occurs in a poem titled “The Expostulation,” which has been attributed to both John Donne and
Ben Jonson, ﬁrst published in 1633; like the Roman Catullus—
behind whom stood Xenarchus and Sophocles—it focuses on female ﬁckleness: “Are vowes so cheape with women, or the matter/
Whereof they’are made, that they are writ in water,/And blowne
away with wind?” (Donne 1965, 94). Catullus had likewise linked
the images of wind and water. Still another proverbial association occurred in 1635 in John Reynolds’s The Triumphs of Gods
Revenge: “But this is to write upon the water, and to build Castles
of vaine hopes in the ayre” (Reynolds 1635, 364). In 1638, Henry
Adamson’s The Muses Threnodie said of nations, “Yet time hath
overturn’d them, and their names/Are past, as Letters written
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on the streames,/To tell us, here we have no constant biding”
(Adamson 1638, 84).
The traditional antifeminist application of the proverb is reversed in Argalus and Parthenia by Henry Glapthorne, published
in 1639, where a female character decries male inﬁdelity: “And let
their words, oaths, teares, vowes, passe,/As words in water writ,
or slippery glasse” (Glapthorne 1639, 35; cited by Tilley 1950,
W114). Those lines are quoted (with attribution) as one of the
“Formulae Majores. Or, Common Places” in Thomas Blount’s The
Academy of Eloquence, 1654 (115–16). In a play of doubtful authorship, The False One, which ﬁrst appeared in the 1647 folio of
Beaumont and Fletcher, a character employs the “wine” variant
anticipated by Xenarchus’s parody of Sophocles: “And though I
had killd my Father, give me gold,/I’le make men sweare I have
done a pious Sacriﬁce/ . . . /And my brave deed shall be writ in
wine, for virtuous” (Beaumont and Fletcher 1966–96, 8:149). In a
play published in 1654, Revenge for Honour, doubtfully attributed
to George Chapman, we return to the antifeminist use of our proverb (this time spoken by a female character): “Of what frail temper
is a woman’s weakness!/Words writ in waters have more lasting
essence/Than our determinations” (Chapman 1961, 2:726).
By 1658 the proverb was demonstrably familiar enough to
be adapted in a wittily allusive way: “Write in water” is used to
mean “paint in watercolors,” as an anonymous poet (in a commendatory poem) praises a treatise on painting by Sir William
Sanderson, in the process explicitly identifying the expression
as a proverb and recording one of its applications, one that speciﬁcally anticipates Keats’s epitaph on the meaninglessness of a
writer’s life: “Your fame shall (spite of Proverbs) make it plain, To
write in Water’s not to write in vain” (Sanderson 1658, sig. b1v). In
1659 Henry More’s treatise The Immortality of the Soul gave an innovative twist to the old “water”/”wind” pairing: “For when a man
is so fugitive and unsetled, that he will not stand to the verdict of
his own Faculties, one can no more fasten any thing upon him,
then he can write in the water, or tye knots of the wind” (More
1987, 24). In 1692 Richard Hollingsworth, paying belated tribute to King Charles I (beheaded in 1649), echoed the “limming”
version of the proverb in the 1629 epigram attributed to Bacon;
during his trial, the king had “minded them of what he had done
. . . and wherein can it justly be blam’d? Especially considering
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all he had done, was but a kind of Limming the Water, to them”
(Hollingsworth 1692, 73).
Between the seventeenth century and the death of Keats in
1821, I can ﬁnd no record of the proverb, except as it appeared in
translations of Catullus or in The Restauration by George Villiers,
second Duke of Buckingham, ﬁrst published in 1715 (though Villiers had died in 1687); Buckingham’s play, however, is nothing
but an adaptation of Beaumont and Fletcher’s Philaster (Villiers
1715, 1:64). This seeming absence may result, partly, at least,
from three factors:1) compilers of proverb dictionaries have more
assiduously searched medieval and Renaissance works for English proverbs than works from the eighteenth century; 2) the invaluable online databases of full-text documents represent the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries more abundantly than earlier periods; 3) my own literary expertise lies in the literature of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To be sure, nineteenthcentury men of letters were well read in literature of earlier times,
and they could have revived an archaic or dormant saying. However, the prevalence of the proverb—apparently independent of
Keats’s inﬂuence—in nineteenth-century records suggests that it
had remained in oral tradition, if not much in literary use, during
the interim.
Although I know of no interesting examples of the proverb from
1700 to 1821, I have on ﬁle some ﬁfty instances from the remaining decades of the nineteenth century, the majority of them American—a predominance, again, which may result from the bias of
the available databases or scholars’ sampling procedures—even
though the saying has no entry in Archer Taylor’s 1958 Dictionary
of American Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases, 1820–1880. About
a third of the nineteenth-century mentions make direct reference
to the death or the grave of Keats or allude to Keats in some other
obvious manner. The remainder suggest that the proverb was going along its own way, as if in uninterrupted popularity.
In 1829 Sarah Josepha Buell Hale, like several of her early
predecessors—but unlike Keats in 1821—used the proverb in an
antithesis: “But it should be remembered that though the human heart is like water when we would write thereon lessons of
virtue, it is like the rock to retain the impressions of vice” (Hale
1829, 55). Other nineteenth-century writers vary the terms of the
antithesis:
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. . . The ﬁgures, the motions, the words of the beloved object are not
like other images written in water, but, as Plutarch said, “enamelled
in ﬁre.” (1841—Ralph Waldo Emerson 1971–, 2:102)
[Of the “Negro” race:] Our slightest faults are engraven on stone, and
our brightest virtues written on water. (J. H. Perkins 1849, fol. 1r)
“Crowns and sceptres,” says one, “do not secure us from the inconstancy of changes; and we may better trust unto the wind, or to letters written upon water, than unto human felicity.” (Rev. J. Leonard
Corning 1857, 156)
The angels are so near us in our infancy, that the troubles of the
world, which are afterward engraved in marble, are then only written in water. (William Henry Holcombe 1870, 19)
Woman’s love is writ in water!
Woman’s faith is traced on sand!
(William Edmonstoune Aytoun circa 1870, 140)
The men who group around Leicester square are the exiles without
a fame, . . . the men who come like shadows, and so depart; the
men whose names are writ in water, even though their life-paths
may have been marked in blood. (Justin McCarthy 1872, 202)
The name of the man who so beautiﬁed and enriched this city [Paris] that he loved is writ in water, while that of the great scourge of
his country is carved in the hearts of his people. (Helen B. Mathews
1877, 63)
One lesson the rubric of conﬂict has taught her [the city of Boston]:
Though parted awhile by war’s earth-rending shock,
The lives that divide us are written in water
The love that unites us cut deep in the rock.
(1880—Oliver Wendell Holmes 1892–1908, 13:230)

In 1833 Theodore Fay seems to have playfully literalized the
proverb’s metaphor to suggest impossibility: “A person standing
on the brink of a running stream on a cold day, seriously employed
in ‘writing his name in water,’ would be accounted insane—the
attempt to write muniﬁcence and generosity on the coachman’s
mind is equally futile” (Fay 1833, 2:147). Like Fay, other nineteenth-century writers enclosed some version of our expression in
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She loved—he deserted her—she followed him to a great city and
died there. That was all the father could tell. But her name was not
“written in water,” so far as he was concerned. (William H. Bushnell
1867, 15)
. . . The good men who labored to give us equitable laws and happy
homes[:] . . . Let not our children search for their names and ﬁnd
them “writ in water.” (J. Ross Browne 1875, 347)
There are those to whom the work might well be one of love . . .
telling us something also of the men whose names were “writ in water”—in the most shifting, quickly-running stream that ﬂows. (E. L.
Burlingame 1877, 406)

Again like Theodore Fay in 1833, several nineteenth-century
writers ironically made the image in the proverb somewhat literal,
as if assuming the readers’ familiarity with the expression in its
standard, ﬁgurative sense:
[Explaining a whaler’s ability to “track” his prey:] . . . This hunter’s
wondrous skill, the proverbial evanescence of a thing writ in water,
a wake, is to all desired purposes well nigh as reliable as the steadfast land. (1851—Herman Melville 1967, 453–54)
A stream or a fountain survives many successive buildings, and a
local superstition attached to either has the best chance of permanence. A tradition, to be lasting, must be writ on water. (William
George Clark 1858, 286)
[When the stalwart Warwick has dissolved in a none-too-manly ﬁt of
weeping:] He yielded to it, letting the merciful magic of tears quench
the ﬁre, wash the ﬁrst bitterness away, and leave reproaches only
writ in water.” (1864—Louisa May Alcott 1991, 131)
And mark how full of grace and ease the running water is. . . . The
motion of the brook, indeed, is music written in water. (N. H. Chamberlain 1865, 209)

In most of these quotations, whether in the form “on water”
or “in water” (“in” construed in either sense), the proverb—like
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quotation marks, presumably thus marking it as either proverbial
or allusive: for example,
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Keats’s epitaph—expresses impermanence or oblivion. So do other instances:
That race upon whose sepulchre we rear
Our temples and our hearth-stones, and whose names
Written in water, still as Time rolls on
Are deep ingulphed within the rushing stream,
Whose sweep is onward to Eternity.
(Gretta 1849, 291)
. . . Men’s lives for the most part have been written in water, and
that of the muddiest. (Samuel Phillips 1852, 19)
. . . Those grand ideas . . . are small beside the simple Bible truths
. . . that shall stand for ages, while others will prove to have been
written in water. (Mary A. Denison 1863, 72)
. . . This little waif makes me feel that the story of human life and
hope is writ in water. (Theodore Tilton 1874, 264)
A kindness shown seems written in water. (Thomas Dunn English
1894, 637)
It is more than conceivable that important discoveries in experimental physics were made by men whose names and works were
written on water. (Rev. George McDermot 1900, 392)

One particular sense of the proverb, which became increasingly prevalent in the twentieth century, was anticipated by early
uses in reference to the promises of lovers or of “wicked men”:
An insincere vow or resolve—or an unenforceable command or
rule—consists of words “written in water”:
. . . There will come a time in these colonies when the king’s commands will be as if written in water, and the king’s threats will
make no man tremble. (Mary A. Denison 1860, 145)
His sudden impulse, his enthusiastic vow, were not as words written in water. (“A Son of the Crusaders” 1873, 434)
. . . let the glorious name be said,
Lest mine oath in the water be written, and I wake up, vile and
betrayed,
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In the arms of the faint-heart dastard. . . .
(1876—William Morris 1910–15, 211)
. . . But these pledges as we know were writ in water. (James D.
Phelan 1896, 108)

The popular currency of the saying has continued through the
twentieth century and into the twenty-ﬁrst, although it failed to
gain entry into Whiting’s Modern Proverbs and Proverbial Sayings
(1989). With the more extensive availability of searchable fulltext databases (articles in newspapers and popular magazines,
law-review articles, judicial decisions, scholarly articles, literary
works) and the World Wide Web itself, I have collected more than
a hundred “modern” examples, about a third of them (again) making some fairly clear allusion to Keats. Among the remainder, a
few uses of the phrase “write on water” that were formerly rare
seem to have gained prominence—although the Oxford English
Dictionary’s assertion that it can mean “to spend money” (2d ed.,
s.v. “water,” sb. 1f) has never been exempliﬁed at all, as far as I
can ascertain.
Frequently encountered is the concept that the words one
writes, literally—not just one’s name or reputation—will prove
especially ephemeral because of the genre in which the writer
works. In the ﬁrst of these, the metaphor is oddly mixed:
The [newspaper] editor, no matter how distinguished, writes in water; his page is a palimpsest on which he expends all his talents,
wit, learning and judgment for the day alone, to be erased with the
next sun. (Allan Nevins 1928, v)
. . . Like all the words of man, our own words [those of historians]
will be writ on water. (J. H. Hexter 1954, 221)
“I used to say reporters write on water, but now I see that we write
on paper. Which crumbles.” (Richard Stout, quoted in Kernan 1978,
B1)
“My efforts with Hollywood are like things written in water,” she
said. (Brian D. Johnson 1992, 66)
As someone once said, theater is written on water. (Jackie Campbell
1994, 26D)
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Potter dedicated himself to the medium at a time when to write for
television was to write in water. (Allison Pearson 1995, 15)

Even more prevalent—accounting for about a fourth of all the
non-Keatsian references—is the use of the proverb to suggest the
unenforceability or disregard of a rule, law, agreement, or other written promise—adapting the conceit which extends back to
antiquity (and taking more literally the image of writing) that a
lover’s vow is like words written in water:
The trial has often been made[,] and the agreements which have
been elaborated, signed, ratiﬁed, seem to have been written in water. (James Brown Scott 1908, 128–29)
If the Court does not abide by its Rules, how can it expect the bar
to do so? Standards must be enforced to be respected. If they are
merely left as something on paper, they might as well be written on
water. (Felix Frankfurter 1957, 352 U.S. 521)
No one would want a presidential decision written in water. Yet
must it be carved in stone? (“Adrift from Sea Law” 1982, 24).
Gramm-Rudman deﬁcit-reduction requirements were written on
water and are about to be relaxed. (George Will 1987, 82)
It allows for ﬂexibility, precisely because arrangements are “written
on water” rather than in stone. (Rachel Kelly 1994, 43)
Unless the Constitution is “ﬁxed,” its limits are writ on water. (Raoul
Berger 1997, 524)
His pronouncements [Buffalo’s mayor’s] are written on water, not
carved in stone. He’s got a preservation policy nobody follows, a
residency policy everybody ignores. . . . (“Pick a Mayor” 2002, B1)

In reference to the arid American West, “written in water” (or
“with water,” but not “on water”) has acquired a distinctive new
meaning, ﬁgurative in a wholly different way: It means “determined by (or in regard to) the availability (or absence) of water.”
About 1940 the Colorado poet Thomas Hornsby Ferril wrote, “Here
is a land where life is written in water”—a line now engraved on a
plaque in the Colorado state capitol (a photograph can be seen at
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roverbs are used to speak the message in Sephardic narratives, and they do so with “the authority of generations” (Mieder and Mieder 1981, 310). The taletellers weave proverbs into
their stories with creative selection in a variety of ways. They may
choose a proverb as the opening or closing frame and link it in the
telling to the heart of the message; they can cement the appeal
to the past of the narrative, which begins “many years ago”1 and
ends with the wisdom of the ages; and, in literary fashion, they
can even title their narrative with a proverb. Through the creative use of proverbs, the listeners join in active dialogue, indeed
in some instances even in dispute, with the narrator. The power
then in the use of proverbs in Sephardic narratives lies in the
combination of the authority of the past as spoken in proverbs to
summarize a moral message and the narrator’s ability to craft the
message creatively by choosing just the right proverb.
In his essay, “Proverb Speaking as a Creative Process: The
Akan of Ghana,” Kwesi Yankah emphasizes the need to focus on
the “situated uses of proverbs”; this approach includes “a close
study of the proverb in interaction situations” and a critique of
“the view that proverb use is essentially an exercise in quotation”
(1986, 195, 196). Yankah emphasizes the dynamic possibilities of
the proverb, for as he says, the proverb “is subject to creative deformation during performance, even as the proverb retains its historical identity.” He remarks on the importance of tradition and
history “in lending acceptability to the proverb,” and he continues,
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“for knowledge of history and tradition is, in several cultures, a
privilege that may be used to key and heighten performance, authenticate, validate, as well as confer power and authority; and it
is to the performer’s advantage to invoke this knowledge to augment his word.” However, for Yankah the appeal to tradition and
history is not a static hold, a weight of ages past, but rather a gift
to the narrator to reshape and reinterpret by creatively changing
and elaborating on the summation of wisdom in the form of the
proverb. “Creativity,” Yankah says, “. . . may be interpreted in
three senses:1) the creation of novel proverbs, 2) the timely invocation of an effective proverb in a ﬁtting rhetorical context, and 3)
the adaptation and manipulation of existing proverbs” (p. 197).
Our emphasis will be on creative selection of proverbs, rather
than Yankah’s “creative deformation.” We agree with Yankah’s position that the use of proverbs is much more than “an exercise
in quotation” (p. 196). While our work is informed by Arewa’s
and Dundes’s article, “Proverbs and the Ethnography of Speaking Folklore,” we differ in our emphasis on creative selection of
proverbs. Arewa and Dundes write that the one using the proverb
“is but the instrument through which the proverb speaks to the
audience” (1964, 70). We will see that the Sephardic audience is
not so passive in receiving the wisdom of the tale in proverb form.
In many instances, not only does the narrator choose a speciﬁc
proverb to summarize the tale but the audience actively critiques
his choice. There is nothing static or uncontested about the appeal to tradition through the use of a proverb, for there are a variety of appeals that can be made and a plurality of proverbs from
which to draw. The process of narration and proverb use is, in
sum, a creative, dynamic process. As Barre Toelken writes,
All folklore participates in a distinctive, dynamic process. Constant
change, variation within a tradition, whether intentional or inadvertent, is viewed here simply as a central fact of life for folklore,
and rather than presenting it in opposed terms of conscious artistic
manipulation or forgetfulness, I have sought to accept it as a deﬁning feature that grows out of context, performance, attitude, [and]
cultural tastes. (1979, 10)

The Sephardic konsejas (folktales) are drawn from those collected by Isaac Jack Lévy over a period of forty years (1960–2000)
from his grandmother, Sarota Amato Musaﬁr; his mother, Caden
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Lévy Israel; his father, Baruch Israel;2 and other relatives and close
family friends. All of these people originated in Turkey and Rhodes
(Greece). They all shared in the rich traditions of Sephardic life. The
language of the home was Judeo-Spanish, and the chief entertainment in the evenings was the telling of konsejas. Isaac remembers
such storytelling sessions from his childhood in Rhodes:
I recall that on wintry rainy evenings, men and women gathered in
a neighbor’s house, shared a meal, and told one story after another
until they had to retire for the night. The telling of stories was also
popular during the cool summer evenings when people gathered in
the patios, seated among the blooming ﬂower pots and under the
lattice with its hanging vines. . . . There was no stopping once the
narration of tales began. Time was of no consequence, especially
when the master tellers took the ﬂoor. Many a time, I recall how
the stories mesmerized those present. In our family circle, the narratives began with serious—didactic, moral, religious—themes and
as the night advanced, they took a lighter vein. All present were
ready for some laughter, and the stories dealing with Djuha, marital affairs, and the frivolous, were welcomed. There was humor in
the air. In this atmosphere of gaiety, when everyone was oblivious
of the daily problems, men and women would join with their tales,
hilarious jokes, even with obscene stories. Of course, by now all the
children were asleep. (Lévy 1989, 69–70)

Years later, when as a college student, Isaac began to collect
all manner of Sephardic folklore, his family members were doubly
willing to share with him. Ballads, proverbs, folktales, folk beliefs
were all a natural part of their daily lives. They responded to Isaac’s
keen interest in collecting the folklore with a somewhat shocked
and appreciative wonder as if to say, “Why should anyone—and
especially our Isaac who is studying in college—be interested in
such things?” As our mother, Caden Lévy Israel, remarked when
both Rosemary and Isaac together collected materials from her,
“I can’t say anything, but they write it down!” The transcribed
and translated texts of the konsejas show clearly the comfort of
family members—father, mother, and grandmother—in sharing
their stories with their son and grandson; and sharing more than
stories, for in these texts are lessons in wisdom, clearly conveyed
in the wise words of proverbs.
In his classic work The Proverb, Archer Taylor discusses the
relationship between proverbs and narrative. Taylor particularly
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focuses on the origin of proverbs—whether this be the proverb
deriving from a narrative, or a narrative giving story to a proverb.
While the question of origins is a hapless and frustrating enterprise that we eschew, we ﬁnd provocative Taylor’s comments on
the connection between the proverb and the fable:
There may perhaps be certain classes of stories which yield proverbs more readily than others. The Aesopic fable, for example,
stands godfather to many a proverb: Sour grapes; A dog in the manger; Don’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs; Don’t count your
chickens before they are hatched. . . . I am not sure that the Latin
proverb We lose the certain things, while we seek the uncertain ones
. . . alludes to the fable of the dog which lost its meat by snapping
at the reﬂection in the water. (1962, 28)

As if continuing a conversation with Taylor on the link between fable and proverb, Ruth Finnegan observes in “Proverbs in
Africa,” “A moralizing story may end with, or imply, a proverb to
drive home its point” (1981, 12). She notes the “close connection
between proverbs and other forms of oral literature” and speciﬁcally refers to the work by H. Chatelain among the Kimbundu of
Angola in the latter part of the nineteenth century: “Proverbs are
closely related to anecdotes, so much so that anecdotes are sometimes just illustrations of a proverb, while a proverb is frequently
an anecdote in a nutshell” (p. 12).3
For the Sephardim, proverbio comes from the same Latin root
as the English word “proverb”: “prô- forth + verbum word, (originally) a speaking, speech” (Barnhart 1974, 2:1661), an etymology
which places the emphasis squarely on the process of speaking.
Additionally, a proverb may be referred to as refran, or reﬂan,
meaning “adage, saying, proverb, maxim” (Nehama 1977, 469).4
Joseph Nehama, in his Dictionnaire du Judéo-Espagnol, even
quotes a proverb about proverbs—or a metaproverb—“Refran
mentirozo no ay” (There is no lying [false] proverb) (p. 469).
In Prolegomena to the Study of the Refranero Sefardi (1969),
Lévy notes the lack of a speciﬁc term for proverb in medieval
Spain. “Instead, an author quite regularly used a formula, a word,
or an adjecctive when quoting a common or classical phrase adopted by the people. In the exempla and other philosophical and
didactic works, when the authority of a sage was desired, the
author preceded the saying by a formula, Los antiguos dicen [The
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ancestors say], or Como dize el sabio [As the wise one says]” (p.
18).
Still, a range of terms often replaced the formulaic opening. Included among these was retraire, retrayre or retraere, in common
usage from 1250, “which means to go back, to repeat, to tell, to
think or to recall an old story or teaching worthy of remembrance”
(Lévy 1969, 19). There were also other terms—“brocardi[c]o, castigo, conseja, dicho, escritura, exemplo, . . . sentencia, verbo, verso,
. . . and vulgar”—which all “imply a lesson or judgment derived
from a fable” or a folktale (Lévy 1969, 18). One of the most important terms which Lévy identiﬁes, fabla, was also glossed as
“fabiella, fabilla, fabriella, fabrilla,” and most interestingly, as
habla (language, talk), which again emphasizes the importance of
speaking (p. 18). Lévy continues, “These terms, found as early as
1200, denote not only a fábula but also the lesson obtained from
it, and in time the reference condensed into a proverb: ‘Esta fabla
compuesta de Yosete sacada (Libro de buen amor, Qtr. 96)” (Lévy
1969, 18–19).5
The Judeo-Spanish folktale—known as kuento or konseja,
the latter derived from konsejar, to advise, to teach—may itself
be framed by proverbs as Isaac’s mother did in her narration of
“Marido, maredo” [Husband, Log].6 She began, “Ken kon peros se
echa kon pulgas se alvanta [He who goes to bed with dogs wakes
up with ﬂeas]”; and she closed, “Ansi es ke ‘Antes ke te kazes,
mira lo ke azes’” [Thus it is that ‘Before you get married, see what
you are doing’]. The tale opens with Simha, a widow, drinking
Turkish coffee with her friend Rebeka: “When Simha mentioned
the name of Avraam, the deceased, Rebeka, as was customary,
said, ‘May he rest in peace. May we be among the living.’ But
Simha jumped and said [of her husband], ‘El guerko se lo yevo i
el guerko ke se lo guadre!’ [The devil took him and may the devil
keep him!].”
There ensues a discussion about the worth of husbands, with
Simha saying they are all worthless, and Rebeka saying hers is an
“alma del Dyo” [a saint]. Simha says,
”Look, let’s play a trick. I’m going to give you a potion that is going
to make you as if you are dead. When your dear one comes home,
I’m going to talk to him, and you listen to the conversation.” . . .
When [Rebeka’s husband] came home and saw that his wife was
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lying in bed, all white and lifeless, he started . . . to cry big tears.
Simha took his hand . . . and told him that before dying, Rebeka
begged her not to leave him alone [but] to [marry] Avram. Avram
replies with great sighing, “And she said it to me, and she said it
to me.” At that moment, Rebeka opened her eyes and [yelled at her
husband], “Son of a jackass, when did I tell you that?” Thus it is
that “Antes ke te kazes mira lo ke azes” [Before you get married, see
what you are doing.]

The same proverb that begins this story concludes the story of
“La media ermana” [The Half Sister]:
One day, the son of Djuha comes to see his father. He says, “Papa,
I have found the most beautiful girl, and I am going to marry her.”
Djuha asks, “Who is she?” And his son replies, “She is the daughter
of the butcher.” Djuha says, “You can’t marry her; she is your half
sister.”
Each time that the son comes to the father to tell about meeting
a young woman he wishes to marry, Djuha tells him that he can’t
because she is his half sister. Finally, the mother asks her son why
he is so sad. He says, “Each time that I talk with my father and I
say who I am going to marry, he tells me that I can’t because she is
my half sister. I don’t know what I’m going to do!” The mother says
to him, “Son, you can marry anyone you choose. Djuha isn’t even
your father.”

The narrator concludes the story, “See how Djuha ‘se echo kon peros
i se levanto kon pulgas’ [Djuha ‘lay down with dogs and got up with
ﬂeas’]. That is to say that Djuha lay down with other women without
knowing that his own wife was also having her own affairs.”7
The narrator may elect to open the narrative with a formulaic
phrase, which serves to alert the listener that a story is to follow,
end with a proverb, and sandwich a proverb in the midst of the
narration. Isaac’s father, Baruch Israel, did just that in his story
of “The Anti-Semite.”8 He began, “In the time of old Russia, there
was a Jew who was a peddler. . . . He used to go to all the villages
to sell [clothes]. There was a village at a distance where everyone was an anti-Semite, and they were against the Jews. He was
afraid of that village.” The peddler met a man who encouraged
him to come to his village, the one of the anti-Semites. “When
a week passed, two, the business was going poorly. This Jew
remembered that person who told him to go to the village. Even
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though he knew that ‘Di lus malus nu se aspera dinguna bondad’
[From evil people no one expects any goodness], even so he took a
little chance.” The peddler had “to earn a living [so] he decided to
go to the village of the anti-Semitic people.”
Isaac’s father continued with the story, but pointedly asked
him if he understood:
Well! When he went to that village, the people already saw that he
was a Jew. Do you understand? [Directed to Isaac] They took him,
they grabbed him, they accused him. The man says, “What have I
done?” “Oh, you,” he says, “are the one who killed Christ,” he says.
“I?” he says. “I don’t have any news about it; I was not he.” “No?” he
says. “You’re not Jewish?” “Yes,” he says, “I’m Jewish, but—“ ”You
are the one who did the killing,” he says.
The villagers took him before a tribunal, and the verdict was that
“the Jew killed Christ. So. ‘You who are a Jew, you are of the same
race, and the guilt falls on you.’” The man engaged a lawyer who
“instead of helping him, told him, ‘They’re right . . . because you are
of that race, and you must pay for the sin that they have committed.’” The peddler saw that there was no remedy and asked for one
last wish. “He says, ‘I want to go to church.’”
When he entered the church, he went to the Christ, and he spoke
to him in his ear. Everyone is looking at him. “Is he crazy, this one?
What is it?” He spoke in the ear, [and] then he put his own ear to
the Christ so that [Christ] may speak to him. When he ﬁnished
speaking to Christ, he started to laugh. He started to laugh, he
came down [from the cruciﬁx], [and] says, “All right. Let’s go now,”
he says. “Now I’m happy,” he says. They say, “What is happening
that you are happy now?” He says, “That is for me to know.” “No,”
they say. “You must tell it to us.”
“The truth is that I spoke with Christ; he told me, ‘What they
are doing to you,’ he says, ‘they did to me also, to me,’ he says.
‘When I was alive, nobody loved me. Everyone wanted to kill me.
They are going to kill you,’ he says. ‘They are going to hang you,
and then they are going to ask for forgiveness. They, their children,
their grandchildren—they are all going to ask you to forgive them,
and they are going to throw themselves at your feet.’” “Ah!” [the
people] say, “That’s what you want to do, eh? It’s not enough that
we already got duped by one,” they say, “and now we are going to
be duped by another,” they say. “To the street. Throw out this bastard.” And they took him and they threw him into the street, and
the man saved himself.
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Isaac’s father concludes, “This proves that ‘Kun il djidio ni el
guerku la kita’ [With the Jew, not even the devil succeeds].” And
then he turned to Isaac and said, “Do you know, ‘Para un dimzis
si keri un kademsis’ [For a bastard, you need a son of a bitch].
That’s how the good Jew saved himself.” And Isaac’s mother, who
was listening, added, “Kon el djenio se salva del fuego” [With ingenuity, one saves oneself from the ﬁre (trouble)].9
In some instances, the narrator used a proverb as a way of
summarizing the wisdom of the tale. Isaac’s mother began the
story of “El Hap” [The Pill]:
I’m going to tell you about a very unhappy marriage in which every time that the husband came home from a hard day’s work, he
would hear his wife complain without end. This poor man didn’t
know what else to do. Every day that God created, he would listen
to his companion of many years speak evil of one thing or another.
She always complained of her unfortunate destiny. Tired of life, he
tells her that it was time to see the chief rabbi of the city about giving him a divorce.10
Together the husband and wife petitioned the rabbi for a divorce.
After listening to their complaints, the rabbi spoke to each one separately. “To the wife, he gives some pills and tells her to take one half
an hour before the arrival of her husband.” These, he said, would
make her happier and allow her to tolerate her husband for another
month, “but he warns her that if she would open her mouth before
one hour had passed after she had taken the pill, she would die
because the pill had poison inside.”
For thirty days, the man came home from his work and sat in
his armchair with a meze, an appetizer, resting after a long day at
work. Meanwhile, the wife did not say a word and continued cooking for her husband. She, frightened of dying, did not open her
mouth at all. In such a manner, the thirty days passed, but neither
one nor the other fought.
At the end of the month, neither wanted a divorce. The rabbi explained to the wife that the pills had not been poison but were just
made of sugar water. It was necessary, he said, for her to give her
husband thirty minutes to rest after his day at work.

Isaac’s mother concluded the narrative, “The two thanked the
rabbi for his good advice and understood that in life each person
must have a little solitude in order to rest and to think and that
this does not mean that one does not love his wife.” And then she
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remarked directly to Isaac, “The konseja tells us that in a marriage, as in everything one does in life, we have to give our dear
ones a moment to breathe and that paying ‘Muncha atension i
posesion atabafa al ombre’” [Too much attention and possession
suffocates an individual]. When her daughter concluded the story, Isaac’s grandmother turned to him and said, “Muncho avlar,
muncho yerrar [The more one speaks, the more one errs], and she
added, “For this reason, the human being has to guard against
what he says and when he says it.”11 At another telling, Isaac’s
mother concluded the story with the following proverb: “El muncho avlar arrebuelve” [A lot of talk agitates]. When Isaac asked
his father what arrebuelve meant, he explained it with another
proverb, “El muncho avlar dezrepoza” [A lot of talk upsets]. The
third time Isaac collected this story, the narrator concluded, “Ken
mucho avla poko el repoza” [He who talks much, rests little], and
then immediately explained this with the proverb, “Poko avlar,
salud para el kuerpo” [Little talk is healthy for the body]. Thus,
each time this konseja was told to Isaac, the narrator encapsulated the moral as he or she saw it by voicing a different proverb.
In the story about “The Rabbi and the Sinner,” Isaac’s father
concluded on one occasion with a single proverb, and on another,
with four. The konseja begins,
There was once a much-sainted rabbi who was highly respected
both by Jews and Turks. There was nothing in the world that he
would not do for God’s children. He spent every hour of the day
helping his ﬂock and reading the Law of Moses. His fame was so
well known throughout the lands. This rabbi had only one constant concern. For several nights, he dreamt that upon dying, they
buried him at the foot of the city butcher, who was an evil person,
a shameless person, a thief, a liar. He could never understand the
reason for the dream and why the Master of the Universe paid him
back with this dishonor.12
The rabbi went to the butcher and asked him to tell his life story.
The butcher said that “there was nothing to tell and, as everyone
already knew, he had no friend.” As he represented himself, he was
an evil person with one purpose in life: “to make a lot of money.”
Persistently, the rabbi questioned the butcher and begged him not
to leave out a single incident.

As Isaac’s father recounted,
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The butcher continued with his darshar (narration).13 Finally, he
tells the rabbi that one Friday . . . he was passing through a wood
where he saw some thieves who were trying to abuse a young girl.
He felt so upset for the poor thing that he begged them to let [her] go
and that he would give them all the money that he had on him in order for them not to touch her. The thieves, seeing that this rich Jew
was carrying so much money, agreed to what he said; they took the
moneybag and ran away. The rabbi did not want to hear any more.
He got up, kissed the hand of the butcher, and told him with great
emotion, “You, my son, are blessed by the Holy God. God knows
what he does. For me, it is a great honor to be buried at your feet.”

Isaac’s father concluded, “This teaches us that man, no matter how evil he may always be, he can be redeemed. Among all
the evil that he may cause, if he does one action to save his fellowman, the Master of the World takes this action as kapara (sacriﬁce), a substitute, and forgives all his sins. Thus it is, ‘Azi lo
bueno i toparas lo bueno’ [Do good, and good will come to you].
Isaac’s mother, who was listening to the story, clearly desired to
make a more literal connection between a proverb and the tale.
She remarked, “This proverb is not correct. It should be, ‘Aun al
malo, el Dyo lo rihme’” [Even to the evil person, God redeems].
Three years later, in March 1972, Isaac asked his father to tell
the tale once again. Isaac’s father concluded the story with the
same proverb, “Azi lo bueno i toparas lo bueno” [Do good and good
will come to you], and then explained, “Es ansi ke ‘Azi bien i no
mires a ken’ porke ‘Por un zahut, por una sola mizva, se salva el
mundo’” [It is thus that ‘Do good and don’t pay attention to whom
you do it’ because ‘For one good deed, for a single mizva, the world
is saved’]. In the latter proverb, Isaac’s father combined two proverbs with the same meaning: “Por un zahut se salva el mundo”
[For a good deed, the world is saved] and “Por una [sola] mizva,
se salva el mundo” [From one act of charity, the world is saved].
Thus, Isaac’s father ended the tale with one proverb, encapsulated the meaning of the narrative with another, and explained its
meaning with two other proverbs.
Isaac’s mother began the following story by saying, “I’m going
to tell you the story of ‘Sfuegra, ni di baru buena’” [Mother-inLaw, Not Even of Clay Is Good]. Then she anchored it in the authority of the family: “This is a story my mother told to me.” She
continued,
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A daughter-in-law did not care for the mother-in-law and spoke
badly about her to a neighbor. This neighbor did not have a motherin-law, and she, to see, would say, “All [women] have mothers-inlaw, and I shouldn’t have one!” What did she do? She took clay and
made a mother-in-law and placed her in a corner. Every time she
passed, walked, she bumped into it. She would remove it from this
place; she would place it in another. She would pass by there, and
by there would bump herself. Finally, she got angry, took [it], and
threw it into the river. When she threw it into the river, she said,
“The river splashed me and soiled me all over with clay.” And at the
end, she said, “Sfuegra, ni di baru buena [Mother-in-law, not even
of clay [is] good]. Even though I threw her into the river, she still
caused me harm.”14

Isaac’s mother concluded, “This means that no one wants a mother-in-law.”
As was his custom when collecting narratives, Isaac asked
his mother to repeat this story half an hour later. This time she
prefaced her story with, “This is the proverbial hate for a motherin-law,” showing her conscious link between the proverb and the
moral of the story. The narrative was almost precisely the same,
save for the ending, in which Isaac’s mother intensiﬁed the harm
caused by the mother-in-law: “When she threw her into the river,
the sand splashed her and dirtied her all over with clay. She ﬁnally said, “Mother-in-law, not even of clay is good. Even though
I threw her into the river, she harmed me. Even though I threw
her into the sea, she still hurt me.’” She concluded in the same
fashion as the ﬁrst time: “This means that no one wants a mother-in-law.”
In his article on the Judeo-Spanish proverb, Jesús Cantera
Ortiz de Urbina remarks, “Of the various interpretations that were
given in order to explain the proverb, Suegra, ni de barro buena,
the most credible . . . is the one that tells, . . .” and here Cantera
proceeds to recount in truncated form what must be another version of the previous narratives. A married man had a clay statue
as a memento of his mother, and when it broke, “the delighted
daughter-in-law exclaimed, ‘Mother-in-law, not even of clay is
good’” (Cantera 1997, 154). Tracing this proverb back to the Spanish Middle Ages, Cantera attributes it to the Marqués de Santillana’s Refranes que dicen las viejas tras el fuego and to several medieval authors. Cantera also lists the following rhyming variation
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of the proverb: “Suegra, ni de azúcar buena; nuera, ni de barro ni
de cera” [Mother-in-law, not even of sugar good; daughter-in-law,
not even of clay nor of wax].
Cantera continues, “Moreover there is another magniﬁcent
one” from the work of Gonzalo Correas, Vocabulario de refranes
y frases proveriales. “It says, Suegra, ninguna buena; hícela de
azúcar, y amargóme; hícela de barro, y descalabróme (Mother-inlaw, none good; I made her of sugar, and she made me bitter; I
made her of clay, and she cracked my skull).” Cantera continues
quoting Correas:
A married woman without a mother-in-law, writes Correas, heard
it said that mothers-in-law were evil. Not believing it, she desired
to try out a mother-in-law. Her husband told her that she was better off without one. To satisfy her craving, she made one of sugar.
The husband in the dark [secretly] coated it with aloe [a bitter substance]. The daughter-in-law embraced it and kissed it, and found
it bitter. She said, “This one did not come out good. I want another
one of clay.” She made another and stood it up; she wanted to embrace her. And as the statue was heavy, it fell on her, and cracked
her skull. And she remained disillusioned with mothers-in-law.
(Cantera 1997, 154)

Right after his mother had ﬁnished telling him the story of
“Mother-in-law, Not Even of Clay Is Good,” Isaac asked her to
tell the tale of the hazelnut. His mother began the story, “The
same way, another daughter-in-law did not care for her motherin-law.” She continued,
One day, the mother-in-law got up and began to toast some hazelnuts in the oven. To see if they were well toasted, she placed one in
her mouth. The poor woman, since she could not eat [did not have
any teeth], she moved it from one side [of her mouth] to the other.
In the evening, when her son arrived, he asked his wife, “And my
mother, what is she doing?” The daughter-in-law said of her mother-in-law, “All day long she is eating and chewing.” When the son
asked her, “Mother, what are you eating?” the mother replies, “My
son,” she said, “I do not have any teeth. From the morning, when I
placed a hazelnut in my mouth, I have moved it from one side to the
other, and I am not able to eat it.” And this is what the unfortunate
mother-in-law is eating, and the daughter-in-law cannot see it. She
did not care for her. And this is proof that ‘Una madri es para mil
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Isaac’s mother ended the story with a variant of the following
proverb, which is better known and which she used frequently to
remark on a mother’s devotion to her children and, concomitantly, on children’s neglect of their mother: “Una madri para sien ijos
i no sien ijos para una madri” [A mother for one hundred children,
but not one hundred children for one mother]. On another telling,
Isaac’s mother ended the tale with the proverb, “Ilmuera, dolor di
muela” [Daughter-in-law, pain in the molar].15
In still another tale, it is the child who teaches the parents
how they should care for their parents. As well as his father, several Sephardim told this tale to Isaac. Its power lies in its parallel
to speciﬁc situations in life, for at least two individuals told Isaac
that they had known of such cases of neglect, and Isaac recalls
one from Rhodes in the late 1930s.

The World Is Saved”

ijos i mil ijos para una madri no’” [A mother for a thousand sons,
and a thousand sons not for one mother].

An old man lived with his son and daughter-in-law. This woman
could not stand her father-in-law. She always treated him badly.
She fed him in a corner of the kitchen and spoke to him as if he
were a donkey. The husband was hurt to see how his wife treated
his father but did not say anything because he was afraid of her.
One day, when the son and his wife came home, they saw their
son seated on a small bench with a knife in his hand, cutting a
piece of wood. They asked him, “What are you doing?” The child
replied, “I am making a fork and a spoon for you when you are old.”
The father asked him, “Why are you doing this?” The child replied,
“I love you a lot and because of it, I am preparing a fork and a spoon
for when you will get old. I want you to have the same as grandfather has.”
The husband looked at his wife and said, “‘Look what you are
doing. Our future will be such as my father’s.’ From that day on,
the life of the old man changed as if it were a miracle. From this
moment on, they treated him as a balabay (the master of the home).
They set him at the head of the table; they gave him the best to
eat.” Isaac’s father concluded, “The proverb says that ‘Uno tiene ke
tratar a otros komo kere ke lo traten a el mizmo’” [One has to treat
others as he wants to be treated].16

Proverbs are employed in another way to frame narratives: as
the title of the story. At ﬁrst, this seemed the perfect example of
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an opening frame, a proverb that named the narrative to follow.
We, however, came to realize that this, itself, was a literary inﬂuence. Written stories are given titles, and so the literate person
would give a title to the story. Perhaps even more to the point, we
often entitled the narrative with the proverb at the end of the tale.
Our own desire for classiﬁcation in written form led almost intuitively to using proverbs for the title. There is, of course, nothing
wrong with giving narratives a title. Our good friend and colleague,
Matilda Koen-Sarano, as she told us, also gives proverbs as titles
to the narratives she publishes so proliﬁcally.17 However, for us in
this work, the pitfall lies in assuming that the people themselves
did that. Indeed, it helps to return to the words of the people. In
telling a story, a narrator would say, “Lis vo a kontar la konseja de
. . .” [I am going to tell you the story about . . . ], and the listener
would ask the narrator to “Kontime/Kontimos la konseja de . . . “
[Tell me/Tell us the story about . . .]. Thus, both the narrator and
the listener placed the emphasis on the act of narration.18
So well did the Sephardim know the proverbs, they didn’t
even have to complete them. The narrator telling the story, “Los
chapines apretados” [The Tight Shoes], of a father who no longer
complained about his tight shoes after seeing a man without legs
ended in elliptical fashion:19 “The father realized that ‘La persona
ke no se kontenta kon lo suyo . . .’ [The person who is not happy
with what he has . . .]. In similar fashion, Kwesi Yankah observes,
“The proverb’s already condensed form is subjected to further
abbreviation on the assumption that both speaker and listener
share the same socio-cultural history and do not require the use
of elaborated codes for mutual understanding” (1986, 210).20
Proverb use in Sephardic narratives is the essence of creativity. When Isaac asked Shaul Angel Malahi if tales always ended
with a proverb, he responded, “Generally it ends with a proverb; if
there is no proverb, I invent one!”21 This remark followed Malahi’s
personal narrative about his grandmother catching him smoking
cigars in the outhouse when he was young and convincing him
never to smoke again by telling him something “very beautiful.”
The grandmother took a branch from a ﬁg tree and told Malahi to
make it stand straight. He said to her, “How can I make it stand
straight when it has been crooked for so many years?” Then she
showed him a pine tree and told him to bend it down. He responded, “The pine tree has grown straight, and no one can make

“From One Act of Charity,
The World Is Saved”

it bend down.” His grandmother concluded, “Thus it is with a
person: ‘Kuando krese tuguerto, grande no se puede enderechar’
[When one grows up twisted, once grown, one cannot straighten
up]. Now promise me to smoke no more; thus, [be] like the pine
tree. No one can do you harm, no one. Because as the Bible says,
‘La persona es komo el arvol del kampo’” [The person is like the
tree of the ﬁeld].
While Malahi’s remark about inventing proverbs was more
likely in the spirit of humor, still he pointed to the ﬂexible use of
proverbs, the choice and selectivity of making the proverb ﬁt the
way one chooses with the spirit of the narrative as one wishes to
interpret it. Kwesi Yankah remarks speciﬁcally on this:
The speaker’s creative genius may be measured on the basis of his
discreet choice of a proper mode of proverb use in a ﬁtting argument or discourse. Creativity here is deﬁned in terms of propriety
of proverb choice, or rather proverb congruence in an appropriate
context. But creativity in proverb use also consists in the conscious
embellishment and manipulation of proverb form and meaning.
(1986, 203)

This creative pairing of the proverb with the narrative shows
the integral link between what folklorists designate as two separate genres. For the Sephardim, there are no rigid categories for
narrative genres: The emphasis is on the process of narrating, the
process of speaking the proverb, the process of telling the tale.
While they would recognize the distinction between a konseja and
a proverbio or refran, they would see using proverbs in narrative
as simply a way to drive home the message, and quite explicitly
so. Isaac was told two versions of the story about the father who
was teaching his foolish son to behave by having him imitate everything he did.
One night, he saw that his father went to bed with his mother, and
he went to bed with his grandmother. On seeing this, the father
grew upset about not being able to do anything with his son; he
called him, and, full of fury, he commanded him not to do this
again. The son couldn’t understand the words of the father and
seeing his red face, he said, “Well! Look at my father. He goes to bed
every night with my mother, and I don’t say a word. I go to bed one
night with his mother, and he is burning up.”
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The narrator ended, “You know that in this world, ‘Ken hamor
nase, hamor muere’” [He who is born a jackass, dies a jackass).

Years later, Isaac’s father told him the same story and ended, “You who already know about proverbs must know, ‘Palo tuguerto nunka se enderecha’” [A crooked branch will never grow
straight].22 His father, of course, was directly referring to Isaac’s
work on proverbs—“You who already know about proverbs.”
This assumption of shared knowledge was not singled out
for Isaac alone. Following Richard Bauman’s remarks on performance, we can say that the Sephardim form a “speech community” and that they draw on “a structured set of distinctive communicative means . . . in . . . culture-speciﬁc ways to key the
performance frame,” and thus set off as performance all “that
takes place within that frame” (1984, 16). Also referring to shared
knowledge, Gregory Bateson observes that “the quality and characteristics of metacommunication” between individuals depend on
the degree to which they know each other and the extent to which
they are mutually aware of “each other’s perceptions” (1987, 209–
10). Our focus on the creative use of proverbs in narratives and
the way in which the tellers select the proverbs to communicate
the message as pointedly as the pine tree that has grown straight
is not in our view metanarration, as Bateson deﬁnes it and others
discuss it. There is nothing meta or above or outside of the narrative process in the conjoining of proverbs and narratives. The
proverbs are an integral part of the performance. The essence of
the konseja and the proverb is on the conveying of wisdom and
making wise the foolish.

Notes
1.
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The Judeo-Spanish orthography differs from modern Spanish. Several phrases were used to begin the narrative: “Andi avia di ser”
[Once upon a time/There was once]; “Al tiempo” [In the past]; “Aze
antanyos” or “Antanyo” [Many years ago/In ancient times]; “Un dia
de los dias” [Once upon a time]; “Savesh komo un dia [. . . una vez]”
[Do you know how some time ago/ . . . once]; “Segun muestros padres
[. . . dezian muestros padres]” [According to our ancestors/As our
ancestors said]; “Les vo a kontar. . .” [I am going to tell you . . . ].

“From One Act of Charity,

3.

The World Is Saved”

2.

There were several phrases to end the narrative. For happy occasions: “Eyos tengan bien i mozotros tambien” [May they have
good fortune, and we also]; “I bivieron alegres toda la vida” [And
they lived happily all their life]; “Eyos dukados, mozotros salvados”
[They (should receive) ducats, and we be saved]. For sad occasions:
“Leshos de mozotros” [May it be far from us/It should not happen
to us]; “Eyos ayi, mozotros aki” [They (should remain) there, and we
here]. See Crews 1935.
Isaac’s grandmother, Sarota Amato Musaﬁr, was born circa 1889 in
Milas, Turkey; she died in 1970 in Atlanta, Georgia. His mother, Caden Lévy Israel, born in Milas in 1905, moved with her mother, who
was widowed at the age of eighteen, to Rhodes, then Turkey, circa
1920. Widowed with two sons at the age of twenty-ﬁve, Caden Lévy
left Rhodes with her son, Isaac, her mother, her father-in-law, and
other family members to go as refugees to Tangier, Morocco, in 1939;
and from there to Atlanta, Georgia, in February 1945. In 1947, she
remarried Baruch Israel, who was born in Rhodes circa 1900 and
had immigrated to New York City in 1910. Baruch Israel died in Atlanta in 1978, and Isaac’s mother died in Atlanta in 2000.
As Finnegan writes,
This is sometimes apparent in the local terminology, for proverbs are not
always distinguished by a special term from other categories of verbal art.
The Nyanja mwambi, for instance, refers to story, riddle, or proverb, the
Ganda olugero means, among other things, a saying, a story, a proverb,
and a parable, and Mongo bokolo is used of all poetic expression including
fable, proverb, poetry, and allegory . . . the Limba mboro refers to story,
riddle, and parable as well as to sayings which we might term proverbs,
while the Fulani tindol can mean not only a popular moral story but also a
proverb or maxim. (1981, 12)

4.
5.

6.

7.

Translated from the French by the authors.
For a fuller discussion of the terms for proverb, see Chapter 1, “The
Spanish Proverb: The Semantic History of the Term,” in Lévy 1969,
15–32. See also O’Kane 1950.
Told to Lévy by his mother, Caden Lévy Israel, in Atlanta, Georgia, in March 1968. AT 1350, “The Loving Wife” (Thompson 1973,
400–401); see also Haboucha 1992, 555–56.
Told to Lévy by his mother, Caden Lévy Israel, in Columbia, South
Carolina, in April 1974. In the fall of 2002, at the American Folklore
Society, a fellow folklorist told us the following variant of this story,
which had been told to her in April 1998 by a relative. On 10 January 2001, the colleague sent it to us by e-mail:

53

What Goes Around

Comes Around
One Sunday morning, Chelsea burst into the living quarters at the White
House and said, “Dad! Mom! I have some great news for you. I am getting
married to the greatest hunk in Washington. He lives in Georgetown, and
his name is Matt.” After dinner, the president took Chelsea aside. “Honey,
I have to talk with you. Your mother and I have been married a long time.
She’s a wonderful wife, but she’s never offered much excitement in the
bedroom, so I used to fool around with women a lot. Matt is actually your
half brother, and I’m afraid you can’t marry him.”
Chelsea was heartbroken. After eight months, she eventually started
dating again. A year later, she came home and very proudly announced,
“Robert asked me to marry him. We’re getting married in June.” Again her
father insisted on another private conversation and broke the sad news,
“Robert is your half brother, too, honey. I’m awfully sorry about this.”
Chelsea was furious. She ﬁnally decided to go to her mother with the
news. “Dad has done so much harm. I guess I’m never going to get married,” she complained. “Every time I fall in love, Dad tells me the guy is my
half brother.” Hillary just shook her head. “Don’t pay any attention to what
he says, dear. He’s not really your father.”

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
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Told to Lévy by his father, Baruch Israel, in Atlanta, Georgia, in
January 1965.
Estar en fuego: “to be in the middle of ﬁre/to be in trouble.”
Told to Lévy by his mother, Caden Lévy Israel, on several occasions
over a period of years. The quoted passages are from the version
told on 15 April 1984.
For the importance of the use of words, see the chapter on “The
Power of Speech,” in Lévy and Zumwalt 2002, 74–93.
Told to Lévy by his father, Baruch Israel, in Atlanta, Georgia, in
August 1969.
Darshar, Arabic: “to preach”; darsar, Hebrew: “to deliver a sermon.”
For a different version, see “Suegra” in Saporta y Beja 1978, 180;
AT 903C (Thompson 1973, 312). For a superb, scholarly annotation of this tale type, see Haboucha, “Not Even in Pictures” (1992,
379–80).
Told to Lévy by his mother, Caden Lévy Israel, in Atlanta, Georgia,
in 1965. See also Nehama 1977, 386; Perahya et al. 1994, 127.
Told to Lévy by his father, Baruch Israel, in Atlanta Georgia, in
December 1972. AT 980A, “The Half Carpet.” “A man gives his
old father half a carpet to keep him warm. The child keeps the
other half and tells his father that he is keeping it for him when
he grows old” (Thompson 1973, 344). See Haboucha for other
Judeo-Spanish variants (1992, 492–94). In a similar vein, but

“From One Act of Charity,

Elijah was old. One day, the son went with his father to the mosque in
order to see where he was going to bury him. The son showed the father
the corner where he was going to place him. The father told him to choose
another corner because he already placed his own father in the ﬁrst spot.
It is already known that they both are the same. As the proverb says, “Tal
padre, tal ijo” [Like father, like son].

18.

19.

20.

21.
22.

The World Is Saved”

without chagrin, the father could see himself reﬂected in his son.

Told to Lévy and Zumwalt in Ramat Gan, Israel, in May 1990 at Bet
Avot Recanati.
For more narratives, see Alexander and Noy 1989; Crews 1935;
Koen-Sarano 1986, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2003; Kolonomos
1978; and Molho 1960,118–33.
The proverb, “No mires lo ke te dizen, azi lo ke mejor saves” [Don’t
pay attention to what they say; do what you know best], which was
used to title one of our narratives, is rendered in similar fashion
by Don Juan Manuel in El Conde Lucanor for the folktale entitled,
“Lo que aconteció a un buen hombre con su hijo” [What Happened
to an Honest Man with his Son]. The proverb is, “Por miedo de las
críticas, no dejéis de hacer lo que más conveniente pareciere ser”
[For fear of criticism, don’t fail to do that which would seem to be
the most convenient] (1945, 17).
Told to Lévy by Regina Levy, originally from Antalya, Turkey, in
1951 in the Bronx, New York. For a different version, “Todo es relativo” [All Is Relative],see Koen-Sarano 1995, 148.
Here are some other elliptical sayings: “Una madre para sien ijos . . .
(i no sien ijos para una madre)” [A mother for a hundred children
. . . (and not a hundred children for a mother)], “Aharva kulo . . . (ke
no pedo)” [Strike the ass . . . (that did not fart)], “Kemar en la shorva
(for ‘ken se kema en la shorva’) ashopla en el yogurt” [He who gets
burned by the soup blows on the yogurt], “A gota a gota . . . (se
inche la bota)” [Drop by drop . . . (the barrel gets full)].
Told to Lévy and Zumwalt by Shaul Angel Malahi in Jerusalem, in
July 1985.
Told to Lévy by a resident of the Sephardic Old Age home in Brooklyn, New York, in 1968, and by his father, Baruch Israel, in 1972
in Atlanta, Georgia. This proverb is a variation of the one used by
Malahi’s grandmother: “Kuando krese tuguerto, grande no se puede enderechar” [When one grows up twisted, once grown, one cannot straighten up]. A popular saying used as sarcasm was, “direchu
komu il kuerno” [straight as the horn].
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Baseball as (Pan)America
A Sampling of Baseball-Related Metaphors in Spanish
Shirley L. Arora

B

aseball as America is the title of major exhibition of baseballrelated memorabilia organized by the Baseball Hall of Fame
and Museum in Cooperstown, New York, and currently touring
the United States, with stops at ten cities around the country. The
exhibition, which opened in New York City in March 2002 and will
end in Houston, Texas, in August 2005, offers an unprecedented
opportunity to view some ﬁve hundred artifacts that until now
could only be seen by people who could visit Cooperstown. The
ofﬁcial web site of the exhibition stresses the close links between
baseball and the cultural history of the United States, including
the broad claim that “nearly all Americans participate in our National Pastime [sic] . . . often without knowing it.” To back up that
statement, there is mention of certain baseball-related expressions (e.g.,”ballpark estimate,” “Three strikes, and you’re out”)
that are commonly used in everyday discourse, often by persons
who have no particular interest in or familiarity with the sport
itself.1
Many other examples come to mind: the assertion that certain
individuals will “never get to ﬁrst base” with a proposed undertaking, or that they are “way off base” in their claims or suggestions;
complaints by one person that someone else “threw him a curve,”
or that he—the speaker—“had two strikes against him” at the outset, and so on. It is only natural, given the position of baseball as
“our national pastime,” that its popularity and inﬂuence should
be manifested in our everyday speech. What is perhaps less expected is the extent to which baseball has become a source of
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popular metaphors in the Spanish speech of the Americas, a sign
that the game itself is no longer to be regarded as simply “American” but is indeed “Pan-American.”2
A detailed account of the origin of baseball and its subsequent
spread to other countries of the Western Hemisphere is not relevant to my purpose, which is to examine the linguistic result, not
the process, of its increasing popularity. A few benchmarks will be
useful, however. It was long held that baseball as we know it was
originated by Abner Doubleday, a respected Civil War veteran, in
Cooperstown in 1839, but further investigation has determined
that the rules governing the modern game were ﬁrst drawn up
in 1845 and that the following year saw the ﬁrst organized game
played under those rules. By 1856 baseball was being referred to
as our national pastime, and in 1869 the Cincinnati Reds became
the ﬁrst “professional” baseball team.
Baseball is also the “national game” of Cuba; its introduction
and development in that country followed fairly soon after its establishment in the United States and remained unaffected by political considerations. According to Roberto González Echevarría,
the ﬁrst baseball bat and ball arrived in Cuba in the luggage of
one of a trio of young men returning to Havana after six years of
study at Springhill College, Alabama (González Echevarría 1999,
90). The year was 1864, the American Civil War was drawing to
a close, and Cuba was still a colony of Spain. What is generally
(though inaccurately) recognized as the ﬁrst organized baseball
game in Cuba was played ten years later in the city of Matanzas between a team from that city and one that had traveled
there from Havana (pp. 75–77). By the mid-1890s, the game had
evolved from largely amateur to predominantly professional and
had become deeply rooted in Cuban popular culture (p. 105). As
González Echevarría observes, while noting the sporadic popularity of soccer (formerly in disfavor because of its association with
Spain), “. . . on the whole, growing up Cuban meant growing up
with baseball as an integral part of one’s life. Baseball was played
since the beginning of the nation; hence it was part of the nation”
(p. 110). It is not surprising, then, that—as we shall see—by far
the richest repertoire of baseball-derived metaphors and sayings
in Spanish is found in Cuban popular speech.
Cubans were also involved in spreading baseball throughout
the Caribbean area, whether as visiting teams or members of local

59

What Goes Around

Comes Around

60

clubs, to whom they passed on their skills as well as their knowledge of the rules and ﬁner points of the game. According to Alan
M. Klein, two Cuban brothers named Aloma introduced the game
to the Dominican Republic in 1891, and it was already being
played in Puerto Rico and Panama (1991, 16). Klein, who titles his
history of Dominican baseball Sugarball, observes that in Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic, baseball “grew up” in
the sugar reﬁneries (p. 6), and González Echevarría offers a fascinating description of “sugarmill baseball” in Cuba in the ﬁrst
half of the twentieth century (1999, 192–200). In some instances,
U.S. naval or military presence or U.S. commercial interests also
contributed to the establishment of the game.
Although Róger Matus Lazo, in his study of the use of baseballderived metaphors in Nicaragua, does not provide speciﬁcs about
the history of the game in his country, he refers to the “enormous
preference” for the sport there and maintains that metaphorical
language drawn from baseball “is in essence the speech of the
people, or rather its soul” (my translation) (Matus Lazo 1998, 9).
According to Tito Rondón, baseball in Nicaragua was given its
start in the 1880s by American businessman Albert Addlesberg
in Blueﬁelds, the capital of the Atlantic coastal region, then under British occupation. Addlesberg imported the necessary equipment from New Orleans and persuaded two cricket teams (cricket
being the dominant sport in the British-controlled area) to switch
to baseball.
In Venezuela, as in Cuba, baseball owed its inception to the
enthusiasm of young men returning from their studies in the United States, though the introduction took place in the early 1890s,
considerably later than in Cuba. By 1895 Caracas had a Baseball Club, started by four brothers and their socially upper-class
friends, and the ﬁrst ofﬁcial game was played in May of that year.
The Baseball Club ﬁelded both teams, and they included three Cubans who were living in Caracas. “Baseball talk,” consisting of the
essential terminology of the game, became something of a fad and
was soon picked up by the local press. In 1912 the sport received
an important boost from an American department-store owner in
Maracaibo, William H. Phelps, who imported baseball equipment
only to ﬁnd that it remained unsold because apparently no one
there knew how to play. He then set about organizing three teams,
and by 1920 there were at least ten ballparks in the city.3

Baseball as
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The introduction of baseball into Panama coincided with the
hiring of the ﬁrst workers on the Panama Canal project early in
the twentieth century, and there is even speculation that some, at
least, were hired for their baseball skills in recognition of the importance of providing recreation for the large population of workers. Baseball remains today the most popular sport in Panama,
Nicaragua, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and
of course Cuba. Elsewhere in Latin America, soccer—fútbol in
Spanish—dominates by a wide margin, although baseball is also
played.4
As can be seen, baseball’s popularity is greatest in the Caribbean area, and strong links have developed between major league
baseball in the United States and teams of various Caribbean
countries. In the years before the integration of the major leagues,
the Negro Leagues in the United States were an important source
of opportunity and experience for Latin American players, many
of whom are of mixed African descent. Klein, in his study of Dominican baseball, asserts that
to any of the tens of thousands of gifted players in the Dominican
Republic, pelota (baseball) is an opportunity to escape a life of poverty; while to the major league franchises there, the country is a
seemingly endless source of cheap and genuine talent. . . . There
is nothing comparable to it in the United States, nothing as dearly
held as baseball is for Dominicans. Americans may love the game
of baseball as much as Dominicans do, but they do not need it as
much (1991,1).

The same observation may apply, though not necessarily to the
same degree, to the other nations linked geographically to the
United States by proximity and the waters of the Caribbean. Indeed, approximately 30 percent of current major league players
in the United States are Latinos, most of them foreign born.5 The
list of outstanding Latino players includes Hall of Famers Roberto Clemente (Puerto Rico), Martín Dihigo (Cuba), Juan Marichal (Dominican Republic), Luis Aparicio (Venezuela), Rod Carew
(Panama), Orlando Cepeda (Puerto Rico), and Tony Pérez (Cuba).
Home-run record breaker Sammy Sosa, no doubt a future Hall of
Famer, is from the Dominican Republic.
The extent to which baseball has had an impact on everyday
Spanish speech is no doubt affected by such factors as the general
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popularity of the sport in the particular country; the length of
time the game has been part of the national culture; and the inﬂuence of various media, such as sports journalism and television and radio broadcasts. That impact is not easy to assess.
Relatively few examples of baseball-related expressions can be
found in dictionaries of “regional speech,” and even fewer studies
have devoted speciﬁc attention to them. (Cuba is, of course, the
great exception.) Nor do we have much information on who uses
such expressions, whether they are employed primarily by young
people, or by men and boys rather than by women, or in urban
environments as opposed to the countryside.
Initially, of course, baseball terminology in Spanish was strictly utilitarian, enabling sportswriters, broadcasters, and announcers, as well as fans, to describe and discuss the action of the
game. In a study published in 1954, Seymour Menton identiﬁes
three ways in which baseball vocabulary has been incorporated
into Mexican Spanish: adopted directly from English and written with English spelling, e.g., “ﬂy”; written phonetically so that
the Spanish pronunciation replicates or at least approximates the
English word (ﬂai); and translated using existing Spanish words
(elevado, an “elevated” hit). In some cases, all three processes
may be applied to the same term, as in the example just given,
although one or more of the three may eventually fall into disuse.
Menton points out that the process by which English words are
Hispanized is an oral one, based on the way a particular term
sounds to the speaker of Spanish; the written form of the word
does not enter into the process (1954, 478–79). His observation
is well illustrated by a term such as the Cuban ampaya, which
at ﬁrst glance seems undecipherable but which, when read with
Spanish pronunciation, achieves a fairly close approximation to
its English equivalent, “umpire.” Occasionally new terms are created in Spanish to translate some of the less common elements of
the game, e.g., tira-tira [literally, a “throw-throw”], a “rundown,”
when a runner is trapped between bases by two opposing players
who toss the ball back and forth as the runner tries to reach the
safety of a base (pp. 478–79).
I shall not concern myself with the literal vocabulary of baseball in Spanish but with the ﬁgurative use of certain baseball
terms and particularly with their incorporation into proverbial
phrases and proverbs. This article is, as the subtitle indicates,
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merely a sampling of baseball-related expressions in popular
speech and represents a portion of a longer study on which I have
been working for some time. The expressions fall into four general categories:1) single words (mostly verbs) that have acquired
a ﬁgurative meaning in addition to their literal use in relation
to baseball; 2) baseball-related phrases that have become part of
everyday speech; 3) full-ﬂedged proverbs; and 4) proverb parodies
that may or may not be used in actual discourse. For the annotations, I have used primarily published sources, with a few references to the Internet and items recorded in the ﬁeld, and I have
included multiple annotations when these come from different
authors or regions, since such references indicate the popularity
of the expression. The sources vary from the abundant publications of José Sánchez-Boudy, a Cuban now residing in the United
States, and Samuel Feijóo of the Universidad Central de Las Villas in Cuba—both of whom devote speciﬁc attention to baseballrelated expressions—to more typical compilations of regionalisms
or Anglicisms from various Spanish-speaking countries that include only a scattering of baseball terms or metaphors that have
become part of popular speech. Sánchez-Boudy’s collections of cubanismos are especially interesting because he frequently makes a
point of identifying expressions that have emerged in the community of exiled Cubans in the United States, thus providing a useful
time frame; and he speciﬁcally identiﬁes expressions as derived
from baseball, a helpful practice in cases that involve certain nonspeciﬁc terms such as bola and pelota (both of which mean “ball”
but not necessarily a baseball) or that refer to less familiar aspects
of the game. Feijóo’s work, based in Cuba itself, covers a wide variety of verbal folklore and includes material collected, at Feijóo’s
request, by a number of other individuals in various localities.
Feijóo was also the editor of the folklore journal Signos (1969–89),
in which a number of items included here were published.
The following list of sayings is arranged by keyword, using
the principal word speciﬁcally related to baseball. Thus, batear
trescientos, “to bat .300,” is under batear; coger a alguien fuera de
base, “to catch someone off base,” under base; and jugar en grandes
ligas, “to play in the big leagues” (to be very intelligent), under liga.
Although a good many collections list proverbial phrases in the
inﬁnitive form, I have chosen to use inﬂected verbs to provide a
better sense of how the phrase actually sounds. For each entry, I
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have provided ﬁrst a literal translation and then a ﬁgurative interpretation. Some expressions, such as estar en tres y dos (to be at
three and two, i.e., in a difﬁcult position) presuppose a familiarity
with at least the basic rules of baseball; others do not. However,
in Spanish as in English, once an expression has become ﬁrmly
established in popular speech, it can be used and understood by
speakers and listeners regardless of their knowledge of its background. Proverb parodies, on the other hand, can be fully appreciated only by those who are familiar with the original proverb. I
have included in the annotated list a number of parodies quoted
by Sánchez-Boudy from the exile periodical Zig-Zag Libre, published in Miami, Florida. Their precise status in Cuban popular
speech is not clear, although Sánchez-Boudy indicates that he
has heard them used within the exile community in Florida.6

Annotated List
ABANICAR (v.), to fan, strike out
1.

2.

Nunca abaniques la brisa aunque sea con majagua [Never fan the
breeze (strike out) even with a bat made of majagua (wood)]. Don’t
ever fail. Majagua is a hardwood used for baseball bats in Cuba; the
word often refers to the bat itself. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 81.
Prisa abanica la brisa [Haste fans the breeze]. Haste causes failure.
Compare to the English proverb, “Haste makes waste.” Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 80.

ALUMINIO (n.), aluminum
Partió el aluminio [He split the aluminum (i.e., the bat)]. Said of
someone who has performed any kind of task exceedingly well. Although more appropriate to bats made of wood, the phrase has carried over to modern metal bats. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 103.

AMPAYA (n.), umpire
Muerto el ampaya, se acabó el “strike” [Once the umpire is dead,
there are no more (called) strikes]. Once the cause is eliminated,
the effect ceases also. A parody proverb modeled on the widely used
“Muerto el perro, se acabó la rabia,” [Once the dog is dead, the
rabies is over with]. The Anglicism “strike” is often Hispanized as
estrai or estraik. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 52

AO/AUT (n.), out
1.
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Es un aut vestido de pelotero [He’s an out dressed as a ballplayer].
He’s a failure. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 269.
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3.

No es un ao fácil [He’s not an easy out.] Said of someone difﬁcult to
deceive. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 198.
No te atrevas, que eres aut [Don’t dare (run), or you’ll be out]. Don’t
take the risk because you’ll fail. The expression images an attempt
to steal a base without being caught by the pitcher’s throw. Cuba:
Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 426.
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2.

ÁRBITRO (n.), umpire
El que a buen árbitro se arrima, buena decisión le cobija. [He who
gets close to a good umpire is covered/sheltered by a good decision]. A parody of the well-known Spanish proverb, “El que a buen
árbol se arrima, buena sombra le cobija” [He who gets close to a
good tree is sheltered by a good shade]. Árbitro is the standard term
for someone ofﬁciating at a game (not necessarily baseball). Cuba:
Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 52.

BASE (n.), base
1.

2.

3.

4.

A veces hay que pasar a alguien con tres en base antes de que te
batee un “jonrón” [Sometimes you have to walk someone with three
men on base, rather than have him hit a home run off you]. Sometimes one has to accept an unfortunate situation to avoid a worse
one (in this case, it is better to walk in a run rather than risk a
four-run “grand slam”). Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 68. SánchezBoudy describes this saying as “very popular.”
En base, y próximos [sic] a home [On base, and close to home].
Said of a woman in an advanced state of pregnancy. Mexico: Gómez Maganda 1963, 2:120. The plural form used by the collector
appears to refer back to the term estados grávidos (pregnant conditions) in the preceding sentence. See also the next entry.
Hay seis hijos y uno en tercera base—con un jit sale [There are six
children and one on third base—a hit will bring him home]. He has
six children and another due any time now. A runner on third is
in scoring position and likely to reach home plate on any single.
Mexico: ﬁeld.
Lo cogieron/agarraron fuera de base [They caught him off base]. Said
of someone caught redhanded in some kind of wrongdoing. If a runner takes a lead off a base, ready to run to the next one, and the
pitcher throws the ball to the player covering that base so that the
runner is tagged before he can get back to the base, the runner is out.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 78; Espina Pérez 1972, 17; Oraá 1973,
94. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 36. Puerto Rico: Núñez
de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 40; García Santos 1997,
2297. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 59; Núñez and Pérez 1994, 58.
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6.

Tiene las bases llenas [He has the bases full]. A) He has a large
family. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 161. B) She already has plenty of
suitors. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 59.
Tú no llegas ni a primera base [You won’t even get to ﬁrst base]. A
prediction that the person addressed will fail in a proposed project.
Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 127;
García Santos 1997, 1275.

BATAZO (n.), a powerful hit
1.
2.

3.

¡Qué batazo! [What a huge hit!] Said when someone tells a big lie or
a fantastic story. Panama: ﬁeld.
Dió un batazo [He hit the ball hard]. He was/achieved a big success. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978:52. Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez
1994, 59. See also jonrón.
Ése da batazos como los de Ted Williams en los buenos tiempos
[That fellow hits the ball hard like Ted Williams in the good old
days]. He achieves one success after another in anything he undertakes. The late Hall of Famer Ted Williams of the Boston Red Sox
was considered one of baseball’s greatest hitters. Cuba: SánchezBoudy 1978, 52. See also the previous entry.

BATE (n.), bat
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
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A ése le gusta dar con el bate [He likes to hit with the bat]. Said of
someone who likes to eat or drink at the expense of others. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 19. The verb cachar (to catch) and the noun
ca[t]cher are used in a similar fashion.
Bate de fongueo no sirve para batear [A fungo bat is no good for
hitting (in a game)]. Every activity or situation has its own speciﬁc
needs or equipment. A fungo bat is a soft bat used to hit balls for
ﬁelding practice. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 23.
El que va al bate con tres en base puede tocar planchita aunque
sea “eslóger” [He who comes to bat with three men on base may
bunt even though he’s a “slugger”]. Always be prepared for the unexpected. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 66.
Es el dueño del bate, del guante, y de la pelota [He’s the owner of
the bat, the glove, and the ball]. He’s the chief, the one in command.
The order of bate and guante may be reversed. In baseball games
among neighborhood children, the one who owns the equipment is
the boss. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 52, 189.
Ése es un cuarto bate [He’s a fourth batter, i.e., a cleanup hitter].
He is extraordinary in any activity: working, studying, eating, etc.
The fourth batter in the lineup is typically a strong hitter who—it
is hoped—can clear the bases of any of his three predecessors who
may be there. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde
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1999, 52. Cuba: Santiesteban 1997, 126. Venezuela: Núñez and
Pérez 1994, 60. See also item 8.
Partió el bate [He split the bat]. He performed exceedingly well.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 103. See also aluminio.
¡Qué piernas! A la verdad Marquetti con ese par de bates . . . [What
legs! Truly, Marquetti with that pair of bats . . .]. A piropo or “street
compliment” voiced when an attractive woman passes by. The ellipsis leaves to the hearer’s imagination what Marquetti would do.
Cuba: Feijóo 1973, 47. Agustín Marquetti was an exceptionally
strong hitter and a star member of the Havana team in the late
1960s and 1970s (González Echevarría 1999, 373).
Se siente el cuarto bate [He thinks he’s the fourth batter, i.e., the
cleanup hitter]. He is vain or self-important; he thinks he’s indispensable. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 163. See also item 5.

BATEADOR (n.), batter
1.
2.

3.

Es bateador de largo metraje [He’s a long-distance hitter]. He has a
lot of children. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 53.
Es bateador designado [He’s the designated batter]. He’s the ofﬁcial
replacement for someone else (in a meeting, business appointment,
etc.). In the American League, the pitcher, who is seldom a strong
batter, is replaced by a designated hitter, who bats in his place in
the lineup. In the National League, the pitcher bats for himself. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 19.
Es bateador emergente [He’s a pinch hitter]. He’s substituting, especially on short notice, for someone else in any kind of situation:
work, social relationship, etc. Cuba: Santiesteban 1997, 57. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 19. Panama: ﬁeld (Estoy bateando de
emergente [I’m pinch hitting]).

BATEAR (v.), to bat, hit
1.

2.

3.

Batea cuatrocientos en la liga de los pesados [He bats .400 in the
league of the disagreeable]. He’s a most unpleasant person. This
batting average (.400), which represents the proportion of hits to
the number of times at bat is exceptional. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1978, 119.
Batea lo mismo en el Almendares que en el Habana [He hits the
same on the Almendares team as on the Habana team]. He’s very
knowledgable; he has a wide range of skills. Almendares and Habana were two leading teams and perpetual rivals throughout the
history of Cuban baseball. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 76.
Batea sobre trescientos [He hits over .300]. He eats a great deal. A
batting average of more than .300 is considered very good. Cuba:
Espina Pérez 1972, 17; Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 53.
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Bateó una y perdió el juego [He hit once and lost the game]. He did
something correctly but committed lots of errors. Cuba: SánchezBoudy 1978, 53.
Cuando el mal es de batear, no valen bases por bolas [When the
problem is batting, bases on balls don’t count]. When a player
is in a batting slump, getting on base because of a walk doesn’t
improve the situation. A parody of a well-known Cuban proverb,
“Cuando el mal es de cagar, no valen guayabas verdes” [When
the illness affects the bowels, green guavas don’t help]. Green
guavas have a constipating effect. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993,
52.
El que sabe batea solo [He who knows how bats alone]. He who is
really skilled or knowledgeable needs no assistance from others.
Attributed to a Havana bus driver known for his use of proverbs.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 75.
Está bateando/en el bate [He’s at bat]. He is triumphing, in power.
Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 109. He’s performing well.
Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994, 60.
No hay por donde batear [There’s no place to hit the ball, i.e., no
place where an opposing player can’t get it]. There’s no solution to
the problem at hand. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 53.

BOLA (n.), ball (both the object that is thrown and the pitch that is
not within the strike zone)
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
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Al que tiene buena vista no le tires bola mala [Don’t throw a bad
pitch to someone who has a “good eye” (for judging pitches)]. If your
opponent is an expert, don’t try to deceive him. Cuba: SánchezBoudy 2000, 82.
Botó la bola [He “booted” the ball]. He made an error in some kind
of enterprise. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 21. Note the contrasting
meaning given to this phrase in Puerto Rico (next two entries). See
also pelota.
Botó la bola [He hit the ball hard (walloped it)]. He was successful
in his undertaking. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de
Laborde 1999, 31; García Santos 1997, 2375. Dominican Republic:
Cruz Brache 1978, 27. See also pelota.
Botó la bola y rompió el bate [He hit (creamed, walloped) the ball
and broke the bat]. He was extraordinarily successful; an intensiﬁed version of the previous entry. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and
Delgado de Laborde 1999, 31.
Cantó la bola bien cantada [He called (literally, “sang”) the pitches
clearly]. He spoke the plain truth; he was outspoken. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 60.
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8.

9.

10.
11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Dió a la bola en la costura [He hit the ball right on the seam]. He did
things extremely well. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 61.
En el béisbol la bola es redonda, cualquier cosa puede suceder [In
baseball, the ball is round; anything can happen]. An observation
on the uncertainties of life in general. Puerto Rico: García Santos
1997, 1271.
Es una bola de humo [He’s a fastball (literally, “smoke ball”)]. A)
He’s very intelligent. B) You can’t trust him. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1978, 62. C) A difﬁcult question in a contest, exam, etc. Dominican
Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 27.
La bola se va . . . , se va . . . , se va . . . , y se fue! [The ball is going,
going, going, gone!] An indirect way of saying that someone is guilty
of a blatant falsehood. The words mimic the way in which a radio
or television announcer often describes a home run. Bola, a general
term for “ball,” is widely used with the ﬁgurative meaning of “rumor” or “false story” (Real Academia Española 1956, under bola).
The metaphor generates the image of a bola of major proportions,
“out of the ballpark.” Panama: ﬁeld.
Le pasó una bola de humo [He pitched a fastball (smoke ball) right
past him]. He took him by surprise. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 62.
Le tiró a / Se fue con la bola mala [He swung at/went for a bad
pitch]. He made a bad mistake; he was a failure. Cuba: Feijóo 1984,
121; Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 62, 346.
No tiene nada en la bola [He has nothing on the ball]. He is not
intelligent; he has no inﬂuence. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 20.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 61; 1986, 13.
Para el que tiene vista no hay bola rápida [For someone who has
a good eye (for perceiving the pitch), there’s no fastball]. If one has
the proper abilities for what he wants to do, he cannot be defeated.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 12.
Se llevó la bola y el bate [He took away with him the ball and
the bat]. Refers to someone who fails at a certain activity but will
not allow others to continue. The imagery is from neighborhood
games where the equipment is often the property of one of the
players. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde
1999, 231.
Tiene mucho en la bola [He has a lot on the ball]. He is very talented, very intelligent. Literally, the expression refers to a pitcher
who can make the ball behave so it deceives the batter and prevents
him from getting a hit. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 13.
Tocó la bola y se embasó [He bunted the ball and got on base]. He
took his opponent by surprise and defeated him. Cuba: SánchezBoudy 1978, 62.
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BOMBO/BOMBITO (n.), a fly ball that is easy to catch, a “pop fly” or
“pop-up”
Fue un bombo/bombito al pítcher [It was a pop ﬂy to the pitcher].
Said of something, e.g., an exam, that was extremely easy. Puerto
Rico: Claudio de la Torre 1989, 32; Deliz Hernández 1998, 325;
García Santos 1997, 2664. Claudio de la Torre also gives “bombo al
cátcher” with the same meaning.

BRAZO (n.), throwing or pitching arm
1.

2.

Cuidado con el que no tiene brazo que a lo mejor batea [Beware of
the one who does not have a good (throwing) arm; he is probably a
strong batter]. If someone has a weakness in one area, he may have
strengths in another. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 124.
Hace rato que estoy calentando el brazo [I’ve been warming up my
arm for some time now]. I’ve been preparing to take action. Cuba:
Batista Moreno 1973, 103.

BULL PEN (n.), bull pen (area where relief pitchers warm up before
going into the game)
Hay movimiento en el bull pen [There’s movement/action in the bull
pen]. Something (unknown but potentially important) is happening.
Action in the bull pen typically means that the current pitcher will
be replaced by a relief pitcher. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 241.

CÁ(T)CHER, QUÉCHER (n.), catcher
1.

2.

Ése es cácher [He’s a catcher]. He eats and drinks at the expense of
others but never pays the bill himself. A catcher receives the balls
thrown by the pitcher, hence the metaphorical meaning. Nicaragua:
Matus Lazo 1998, 23. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 60 (un tronco de
quécher [a great catcher]). See also pícher.
Es cátcher, pítcher, y ﬁelder [He’s a catcher, pitcher, and ﬁelder]. He
can do everything; he’s a one-man team. Mexico: Gómez Maganda
1963, 1:208.

CANTAR (v.), to call (said of the umpire); literally, “to sing”
Estoy cantándolas como las veo [I’m calling them as I see them]. I’m
giving my true opinion of the situation. The pronoun las refers to
bolas or pitches. Puerto Rico: García Santos 1997, 2033. The same
phrase is used in English.

CARGABATES (n.), bat carrier, batboy
1.
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En esa novena yo voy de cargabates [On that team, I’m just a
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2.

batboy]. In that group/company, I occupy a very lowly position.
Cuba: Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
Es un cargabates [He’s a batboy]. He’s second rate, not worth anything. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 85.

CERO (n.), zero
1.

2.

Cero y van dos [Zero (balls) and two (strikes)]. A warning that someone has made two mistakes, told two lies, had two narrow escapes,
etc., and is one strike away from being out. Panama: ﬁeld.
A mí nadie me da nueve ceros [No one gives me nine zeros]. No one
is going to defeat me. Nine zeros would indicate that throughout the
nine innings of the game, the individual has remained scoreless; in
other words, he has suffered a humiliating defeat. Cuba: SánchezBoudy 1978, 114.

COGIDA (n.), catch
Es como la cogida de Sagüita [It’s like Sagüita’s catch]. It’s an extraordinary accomplishment. Alberto “Sagüita” Hernández was a
player with the Havana ball club in the 1940s. According to Sánchez-Boudy, he was known for making an important catch that
gave his team the championship. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 400.
In this country, a 1954 World Series catch made by Willie Mays of
the New York (now San Francisco) Giants is similarly famous.

CURVA (n.), curve (ball)
Esas curvas no la[s] resiste nadie [No one can resist (swinging at)
those curves]. A statement about the effectiveness of curveballs
thrown by a pitcher is transformed here into a piropo, a street compliment, aimed at a young woman with an attractive ﬁgure. Cuba:
Batista Moreno 1973, 103.

EMBASARSE (v.), to get on base
1.

2.

Dile a tus puros [padres] que yo me embaso rápido [Tell your parents
I’ll get on base quickly]. Tell your parents I’m prepared to marry you
right away. As given by the collector, this serves as a piropo, or street
compliment, to an attractive female passerby. Feijóo 1973, 47.
Está embasado [He’s on base]. He’s in a stable job or relationship.
Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 25.

ERROR (n.), an error, a misplay
1.

Detrás del error viene el hit [After the error comes the hit]. A mistake is often followed by success. Puerto Rico: “500 dichos” 1997,
under baseball.
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Cero error, cero carrera [No errors, no runs]. Nothing important has
been happening. Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994, 122. See also jit.

ESTRAI(K), ESTRIKE (n.), strike (a ball pitched within the strike zone
and not hit by the batter)
1.

2.
3.

Le pasó un estraik [He threw a strike past him]. He deceived him/
did something unexpected. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 309. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 60.
Le tiraba sólo estraiks [He threw only strikes to him]. He controlled
him, would not let him advance. Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 29.
Se lo dije en estraik sin bola [I told him with a strike and no balls].
I told him straight out, straightforwardly. Panama: ﬁeld.

FAO (n.), foul ball, a ball hit outside the base lines
1.

2.

3.

El que da mucho “fao” batea jonrón [The one who hits a lot of fouls
can hit a home run]. The person who persists in trying will eventually succeed. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 124.
El que da mucho fao, se poncha o batea “jonrón” [The one who hits
a lot of fouls either strikes out or hits a home run]. A variation on
the previous entry. A batter who hits a lot of fouls has shown that
he can hit the ball hard, and one day he’ll hit it straight for a homer.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 12.
Ése me resultó un fao [That fellow turned out to be a foul ball]. He
turned out to be a disappointment (e.g., on a blind date). May be
applied also to events. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 60; Núñez and
Pérez 1994, 226.

FILDEAR (v.), to catch, to field
Se lo ﬁldeó la pelona [Death caught/ﬁelded him]. He died. La pelona, literally, “the bald one,” is a common slang term for death, often
depicted graphically as a skeleton. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 163.

FILDEO (n.), the act of fielding
Hay buenos en el ﬁldeo y malos en el bateo [There are some who are
good at ﬁelding and bad at hitting]. An individual who is good at one
activity may not be good at another; we all have our strengths and
weaknesses. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 79.

FLAI (n.), a fly ball, a ball hit into the air
1.
2.
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Cayó de ﬂai [He fell (on us) like a ﬂy ball]. He appeared unexpectedly. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 173.
El que no echa una llanta no coge un ﬂai [The one who doesn’t move
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4.

5.
6.

7.

(Pan) America

3.

fast doesn’t catch a ﬂy ball]. You have to be on your toes to succeed.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 76.
Me la tiró de ﬂai [He hit me a ﬂy ball]. He tried to deceive me. Cuba:
Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 99.
Me tiró un ﬂaycito [He hit me a little ﬂy ball]. He asked me an easy
question (e.g., on an exam). Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26. Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994, 230.
Se tiró otro ﬂai [He hit another ﬂy ball]. He broke wind again. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26.
Si el ﬂai es fácil no lo ﬁldees difícil [If the ﬂy is an easy one, don’t
make a difﬁculty out of catching it]. If a problem is easily solved,
don’t turn it into a major obstacle. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000,
80.
Yo no voy en ese ﬂai [I’m not going with that ﬂy ball]. I’m not joining
in that nonsense. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 30.

GOMA (n.), home plate
1.

2.

Está/Viene por la goma [He is/is coming right across the plate].
He’s performing admirably. Originally referring to a pitcher’s ability to throw strikes, its use has been broadened to include virtually
any activity. In the Dominican Republic, it is applied to someone
who is very strict, even severe in his actions. Cuba: Oraá 1973,
94; Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 185. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache
1978, 119. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde
1999, 87.
Partiste la goma [You split the plate in half]. Your performance was
excellent. Cuba: Batista Moreno 1973, 103.

GORRA (n.), cap.
Botó la gorra [He threw down his cap]. He lost his composure. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26. Matus Lazo adds that the adjective
gorrudo refers to someone who makes a habit of this gesture.

GUANTE (n.), glove
1.
2.

Colgó el guante [He hung up his glove]. He retired/left his job. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26.
Le dio el guante y la pelota [He gave him the glove and the ball].
He let someone else have a turn. The image suggests the pitcher
handing over the ball and glove to the relief pitcher who is about
to take his place, but the phrase can be applied to any situation in
which power or responsibility passes from one person to another,
whether temporarily or permanently. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978,
408.
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Guante sin grasa/Guante que no se engrasa no coge bola [A glove
that is not greased will not catch the ball]. Any job requires appropriate equipment, and the equipment must be properly maintained.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 80. Elsewhere Sánchez-Boudy identiﬁes castor oil as the substance used to grease the glove and make
it supple (1993, 67).
Si no la coge no es el guante sino el pelotero [If he doesn’t catch
it, it’s not the fault of the glove but of the ballplayer]. If someone
doesn’t succeed at doing something, he should not blame the equipment or tools but himself. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 80.
Tiró el guante [He threw down his glove]. He lost his temper. A
player may sometimes be ejected from the game for throwing equipment. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26.

HOME (n.), see JON
HUELGA (a surname)
1.

2.

Niña, estás como Huelga, encendida! [Baby, you’re like Huelga, really hot!] A piropo, or street compliment, directed at an attractive
female passerby. Cuba: Feijóo 1973, 46. José A. Huelga was a brilliant young pitcher in postrevolutionary Cuban baseball. He died in
an automobile accident in 1974 at the age of twenty-six (González
Echevarría 1999, 374).
Si te coge Huelga, te acaba [If Huelga catches you (leading off ﬁrst
base), he’ll ﬁnish you off]. A warning not to take chances. Cuba:
Batista Moreno 1973, 103. See the previous entry.

JIT (n.), hit
1.
2.

3.

Cero jit, cero carrera [No hits, no runs]. Nothing happened. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 35. See also error.
Dió un jit / La metió de jit [He got a hit]. He was a great success at
the conference, meeting, etc. Nicaragua: Mántica 1973, 64. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 59.
Dio un jit de dos/tres bases [He got a two-base/three-base hit]. He
became the father of twins/triplets. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 161.

JON, JOM (n.), home, home plate
1.

2.
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¡A morir a jon, Reñazco! [Home (plate) or die, Reñazco!] Try as hard
as possible; hang in there until the end. Reñazco is presumably
a Nicaraguan ballplayer, but the collector does not identify him.
Nicaragua: Peña Hernández 1968, 305.
El que se tira siempre en jon a la larga se cuela [He who always
slides into home will eventually score]. Persistence will win out in
the end. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 124.
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4.
5.

No pisa el jon [He doesn’t step on the home plate]. He consistently has bad luck; he never succeeds. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978,
279.
Pasó a jom [He advanced to home plate]. He died. Venezuela: Núñez
and Pérez 1994, 288.
Pícher que repite punta [d]e jon le dan jonrón [A pitcher who repeatedly pitches over a corner of the plate will get hit for a home run]. A
pitch on the corner may fool the batter once or even twice, but if repeated too often, it may be hit hard. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 82.

(Pan) America

3.

JONRÓN (n.), home run
1.

2.

3.

Bateó de/pegó un jonrón [He hit a home run]. He was a great success at the party, meeting, etc. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 206.
Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 59; Núñez and Pérez 1994, 288.
Bateó de jonrón con las bases llenas [He hit a home run with the
bases loaded]. He was a total success. A home run with three runners on base—a grand slam—is the ultimate scoring success in
baseball. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 28. Venezuela: Núñez and
Pérez 1994, 288.
Tres líneas de ron no batea jonrón. [A glass of rum won’t hit a home
run]. One who drinks a lot of alcohol won’t be able to perform well.
Tres líneas (three lines) is a measure used by bartenders. The saying involves a play on the words ron ‘rum’ and ron ‘run’ (as in home
run). Spanish pronunciation does not distinguish between ﬁnal m
and n. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 37.

JUEGO (n.), game
1.

2.

3.

Este juego lo picheo yo a la blandita [I’m pitching this game like
softball]. I’m proceeding carefully and gently in this matter. Cuba:
Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
Ha realizado un juego perfecto (cero jits, cero carreras, cero errores)
[She has achieved a perfect game: no hits, no runs, no errors]. Said
of a virtuous woman who has passed marriageable age without accomplishing anything good. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 165.
Hicieron un doble juego/jugada [They made a double play, i.e., two
outs on a single hit]. Said of any situation in which two objectives
are achieved simultaneously. In a typical double play, the player
who is on ﬁrst base is put out when he is forced to run to second,
and the batter is put out at ﬁrst. Mexico: Gómez Maganda 1963,
2:164.

JUGADOR (n.), player
Está como el mal jugador: ni pitcha, ni cacha, ni deja batear [He’s
like the bad ballplayer: He doesn’t pitch, nor catch, nor let anyone
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bat]. Said of someone who does nothing himself and keeps others from accomplishing anything, either. The pattern is the widely
known Spanish proverb, “Como el perro del hortelano, ni come
(las berzas) ni (las) deja comer” [Like the vegetable farmer’s dog,
he doesn’t eat (cabbages) and won’t let anyone else eat (them)]. In
current usage, it is usually shortened by omitting the words in parentheses. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 163 (second part only); ﬁeld (also
with ni deja cachar [nor let anyone catch]).

JUGAR (v.), to play
Dime con quién juegas y te diré si pierdes [Tell me with whom you
play, and I’ll tell you whether you’ll lose]. A parody of one of the
commonest proverbs in Spanish, “Dime con quién andas y te diré
quién eres” [Tell with whom you go around, and I’ll tell you who you
are]. Although the wording is generalized ( jugar can apply to any
game), the collector groups it with other parodies that almost all
refer speciﬁcally to baseball. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 53.

LANZADOR (n.), pitcher
Ven con nosotros; José está de lanzador [Come with us; José is
pitching]. Come along, José is buying the drinks. Nicaragua: Matus
Lazo 1998, 28. Lanzador (thrower) from the verb lanzar (to throw)
is the Spanish term often used instead of the Anglicism pítcher or
pícher. Cf. the use of cátcher noted earlier.

LIGA (n.), league
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

Ese juega en grandes ligas [That fellow plays in the big leagues]. He
is very intelligent. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 24.
Está quemando la liga [He’s burning up the league]. Said of someone who is triumphing in any sort of endeavor. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 119.
No batea en liga fu [He doesn’t bat in a bad league]. He’s a good
person. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 397.
Quiere batear en la liga grande [He wants to bat in the big league].
He wants to be a star in whatever he does. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1986, 106.
Ese es de grandes ligas [He’s a big leaguer]. He’s outstanding. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 52.

MAJAGUA (n.), baseball bat (made of majagua wood)
Me dejó con la majagua al hombro [He left me with the bat on
my shoulder (waiting for the pitch)]. He left me waiting and never
showed up. Cuba: Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
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El libro es bueno pero aprende a darle a la «nokolbol» [A book is
good but learn to hit the knuckleball]. A book can provide helpful
information, but practical experience is necessary also. The knuckleball is a difﬁcult pitch to hit. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 81.
El que tira «Nokel bol» [sic] siempre se embasa [He who hits the
knuckleball always gets on base]. He who goes slowly will succeed.
The knuckleball is a slow pitch. Sánchez-Boudy considers this to be
the equivalent of “El que va despacio va lejos” [He who goes slowly,
goes far]. Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 81.

(Pan) America

NOKOLBOL (n.), knuckleball, a type of pitch

NOVENA (n.), team (of nine players)
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

Batean/juegan en la misma novena [They bat/play on the same
team]. They are much alike, have the same defects, share the same
opinions. Cuba: Pérez López 1968, [27]; Oraá 1973, 95; SánchezBoudy 1978, 247.
Ése batea/juega en las dos novenas [That fellow bats/plays on both
teams]. Said of someone who is bisexual. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1978, 53; Paz 1996, 96.
Ése juega en dos novenas al mismo tiempo [He plays on two teams
at the same time]. He doesn’t take sides; he doesn’t compromise
himself. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 248.
Está jugando contra una novena que tiene diecisiete ﬁles y la cerca
corrida [He’s playing against a team that has seventeen ﬁelders and
the fence moved farther out]. He’s playing against impossible odds;
he can do nothing. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 248.
No juego en esa novena [I don’t play on that team]. I don’t agree with
those individuals. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 248.
Están poniendo una novena con deiciocho ﬁelders [They’re putting
up a team with eighteen ﬁelders.] They’re making it impossible to
win, to achieve anything. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 172.

PALOMÓN (n.), a pop-up, an easily caught fly ball
Ése tipo es un palomón al cuadro [That fellow is an inﬁeld ﬂy]. He
is easily deceived or defeated. If applied to a situation, something is
easily achieved. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 115.

PELOTA (n.), ball; baseball; ball game
1.
2.

Ahí sí es verdad que dan a la pelota [There they really hit the ball].
They really know how to do things right. Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 25.
Botó la pelota [He hit the ball (hard)]. A) He made a mistake (cf., in
English, “he booted the ball”) or he told a big lie. B) He did something extraordinary or unexpected. The two contrasting meanings
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8.

9.

10.

11.
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coexist; context is the determining factor. Cuba: Pérez López 1968,
[7]; Batista Moreno 1973, 103; Oraá 1973, 94; Sánchez-Boudy
1978, 269. Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994, 383.
Botó la pelota y estilló el bate [He hit the ball hard and shattered the
bat]. He performed extremely well. Puerto Rico: “500 dichos” 1997,
under baseball.
El que sabe tirar pelotas no necesita que nadie le caliente el brazo
[He who really knows how to throw the ball doesn’t need anyone to
warm up his arm]. The expert in any ﬁeld performs well without assistance from anyone. Before entering the game, a pitcher normally
warms up by throwing balls to a teammate. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1993, 75.
Esa pelota ni la viste [You didn’t even see that ball]. You didn’t
anticipate what was going to happen. Cuba: Batista Moreno 1973,
103.
Ése juega con pelota de poli [That fellow plays with a hardball]. The
situation is serious; he doesn’t fool around. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1978, 269.
La pelota es redonda y viene en caja cuadrada [The ball is round
and comes in a square box]. Anyone may experience a setback.
Pelota is a general term for “ball,” and the proverb may or may
not have been derived from baseball. Sánchez-Boudy, however, includes it among baseball-related sayings. Cuba: Feijoó 1984, 82;
Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 80. Puerto Rico: Fernández 1991, 2204.
Le puso la pelota para que la bateara [He pitched the ball to him so
that he could hit it]. He treated him gently. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1984, 74.
Más vale pelota en mano que árbitro cantando [Better a ball in the
hand than an umpire calling (literally, “singing”)]. A parody of the
widely known Spanish proverb, “Más vale pájaro en mano que cien
volando [Better a bird in the hand than one hundred ﬂying]. Compare to the English version, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the
bush.” Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 79.
No ataja la pelota [He can’t stop/cut off the ball]. He can’t do his
work properly, carry out his assigned task. Mexico: Jiménez 1970,
163.
Pelota que no has de coger, déjala correr [If you aren’t going to catch
the ball, let it roll]. A parody of the well-known proverb, “Agua que
no has de beber, déjala correr [If you aren’t going to drink the water,
let it ﬂow], often used to mean “If you aren’t going to use something,
let someone else enjoy it” or “If you’re not serious about the girl, let
her alone.” Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 52.
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Pichea ﬂojito [Pitch a slow/soft one]. Take it easy on me. Cuba:
Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 120.
¿Quién va a pichar esta noche? [Who’s pitching tonight?] Who is
paying (e.g., for drinks or food) tonight? Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960,
60.
Pichea y cachea al mismo tiempo [He pitches and catches at the
same time]. He is bisexual. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 50.

(Pan) America

PICHAR, PICHEAR (v.), to pitch

PÍCHER (n.), pitcher
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Al pícher que tira rectas siempre le batean la pelota [The pitcher
who always throws straight will have his pitches hit regularly]. If
one always does things the same way, opponents will soon catch
on. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 12.
Con pícher que batea duro ándate con disimulo [With a pitcher
who hits hard, proceed cautiously]. Be careful when you are facing a highly qualiﬁed opponent. As a general rule, a pitcher is not
a strong hitter, but there are exceptions. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1993, 12.
Cuando el pícher se vira, en vez de correr es mejor volver a base
[When the pitcher whirls (toward ﬁrst base), instead of running,
it’s better to return to the base]. Don’t take unnecessary or unwise
risks. The runner on ﬁrst base typically takes as much lead toward
second as he dares, and the pitcher may turn quickly and throw
the ball to put him out. The runner must dive for the base to reach
it before the ball does. If the runner continues to second, he runs
the risk of being tagged out or caught in a rundown between two
opposing players. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 66.
El que es pícher no necesita que por él tiren pelotas [He who is a
pitcher doesn’t need anyone to throw the ball for him]. A person
who is qualiﬁed for his work doesn’t need anyone to do it for him.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 75.
Pícher que mucho se vira sorprende [A pitcher who often whirls (to
throw to ﬁrst) will (eventually) take the runner by surprise]. Perseverance wins. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 23.
Si el pícher no se descuida, ni el venado se le escapa [If the pitcher
is not careless, even a deer won’t get away from him]. If you keep
an eye on your enemies, they won’t take you by surprise. Cuba:
Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 12.
Son pítcher y cátcher [They are (like) pitcher and catcher]. Said of
two people who aid or support one another. Puerto Rico: Núñez de
Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 237.
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PISAR (n.), to touch base
Pisa y corre [He touches base and runs]. Said of someone who is in
a great hurry. Panama: ﬁeld.

PLANCHITA (n.), a bunt (a short, downward hit that touches the
ground not far from the batter)
El que toca planchita también batea [The one who bunts also hits
the ball hard]. One can never fully know another person’s capabilities; therefore, one should always be alert. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1993, 22.

PONCHAR(SE) (v.), to strike out, be struck out
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

Ahí te ponchaste tú [That’s where you struck out]. That’s where you
failed/made your mistake. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978,
6. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 60. Rosenblat considers the term
ponchar(se) to have reached Venezuela via Cuba.
Combinando lanzamientos se poncha el bateador [By combining
pitches, you strike out the batter]. The person who uses various
strategies to get ahead will always win out. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
2000, 83.
Cuidado con el que se poncha pero le tira duro a la bola [Be careful
of the one who strikes out but swings hard at the ball]. Be careful
of the one who makes mistakes but is also capable of great success.
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 68.
Está ponchado en el trabajo [He has struck out at work]. He has
been ﬁred or laid off. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 30.
Está ponchando en casa de la novia [He is striking out in his girlfriend’s house]. He’s making a poor impression with his girlfriend’s
family. Puerto Rico: García Santos 1997, 2030.
El que se va con la mala se poncha [The one who goes after a bad
pitch will strike out]. The one who goes after something false will
end up a failure. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 81.

POSICIÓN (n.), position
Está en posición anotadora [He is in scoring position]. He is on the
verge of a triumph (e.g., in his career). A runner on second or third
base is said to be in scoring position because a hit can bring him
home. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 122.

PRIMERA (n.), first base; first baseman
1.
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Ése no llega ni a primera [That fellow won’t even get to ﬁrst base].
He will have no success in what he is attempting to do. Puerto Rico:
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Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 127; “500 dichos”
1997, under baseball. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 286.
La primera que no se estira no coge bola [The ﬁrst baseman who
doesn’t stretch (exert himself) doesn’t catch the ball]. You get out of
anything (e.g., a task or job) what you put into it. The person who
doesn’t do his best doesn’t succeed. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 67.
Lo cogieron entre primera y segunda [They caught him between
ﬁrst and second]. They took him by surprise. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1978, 286. See “Lo cogieron fuera de base” under BASE.
Lo importante es llegar a primera base [The important thing is to
reach ﬁrst base]. Initial success is necessary for further accomplishments. Puerto Rico: García Santos 1997, 758.
Tira a primera base a ver cómo te sale [Throw to ﬁrst and see what
happens]. Try a certain strategy and see whether you succeed or
not. Instead of pitching to the batter, the pitcher may throw to ﬁrst
base to try to put out a runner who has taken a big lead. Cuba:
Batista Moreno 1973, 103.

RILÍ (n.), release (from a contract)
Ella le dio su rilí [She gave him his release]. She (his wife, girlfriend)
left him. Also used to refer to someone who has been ﬁred from his
job. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 58.

SEGUNDA (n.), second base
1.

2.

3.

El que roba la segunda lo agarran fácil en tercera [He who steals
second is easily caught on third]. The person who takes a risk and
succeeds will be watched more closely from then on. Cuba: SánchezBoudy 1993, 12.
Político que roba segunda te tumba [The politician who steals
second will deceive you]. The politician who is underhanded will
defraud the public. Stealing second (running from ﬁrst to second
when the ball has not been hit) is perfectly legal in baseball but entails a certain amount of deception as well as the ability to run fast
and a willingness to take risks. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 25.
Si no corres como un venado, no robes la segunda [If you can’t run
like a deer, don’t steal second]. Don’t try to do something for which
you do not have the necessary qualiﬁcations. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy
1993, 12.

TRES

Y

1.

El que está en tres y dos puede tocar planchita [He who is at three
and two may bunt]. The person who is in a difﬁcult situation may

DOS (adv.), three and two (i.e., three balls and two strikes)
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do something unexpected. A batter who has reached a count of
three balls and two strikes will walk with one more ball or be out
with one more strike. A bunt (a very short hit that lands close to
home plate) is an unexpected, but not unheard of, strategy in such
a situation. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 66.
Está en tres y dos [He is at three and two]. He’s in a difﬁcult situation, at a crucial point. Cuba: Pérez López 1968, 37; SánchezBoudy 1978, 324. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 116.
Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 33. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and
Delgado de Laborde 1999, 166. Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994,
467.

WILSON (adj.), Wilson, a brand of baseballs considered superior to
others
1.

2.

Ése es Wilson [or] Wilson Wilson [He’s a Wilson]. He’s the best.
Puerto Rico: Claudio de la Torre 1989, 235; Núñez de Ortega and
Delgado de Laborde 1999, 164.
Ése es Wilson Wilson Willie May[s]. (See previous entry.) He is absolutely the best. A superlative created by combining the Wilson
brand of baseball with a reference to Hall of Famer Willie Mays of
the Giants, considered by many to be one of the ﬁnest players in
the history of baseball. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado
de Laborde 1999, 164.

Notes
1.

2.
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See the exhibition Web site www.baseballasamerica.org, in particular the section entitled Sharing a Common Culture. A book designed
to accompany the exhibition, bearing the same title and subtitled
Seeing Ourselves Through Our National Game, was published by National Geographic in 2002. A number of other Web sites describe or
comment on the exhibition, such as the one mounted by the Field
Museum of Natural History in Chicago, the venue of the exhibit
from February to July 2003.
The term americano is often applied by speakers of Spanish to residents of the Americas as a whole, the more speciﬁc term for a
citizen of the United States being norteamericano, “North American.” Baseball can therefore be described as un deporte americano
in Spanish, but to convey its popularity in the Spanish-speaking
Americas, speakers of English need to resort to a term such as
“Pan-American.”
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4.

5.

6.

A summary of the history of Venezuelan baseball can be found on the
Web site iml.jou.uﬂ.edu/projects/Fall02/Landino/ThePast.html.
George Chevalier, the author of a series of reminiscences of early days in the Canal Zone, includes in his “When the Canal Zone
Played Baseball” some brief references to the history of the game in
that region (www.pancanalsociety.org/Articles/GC/Chevalier131
.html).
The Web site www.internationalbaseball.org/southamerica.htm includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and
Venezuela as regions where the game is played, at least on an amateur and in most cases very-limited basis.
www.zonalatina.com/Zldata230.htm. The Web site includes a list
of Latino players and their salaries, which surely appear astronomical to most Latin American readers. According to another Web site,
among slightly more than 14,000 major league players over the
years, 340 have been born in the Dominican Republic, 206 in Puerto Rico, 148 in Cuba, 140 in Venezuela, 90 in Mexico, 43 in Panama, 8 in Nicaragua, and 7 in Colombia (www.baseball-reference
.com/bio). At the beginning of the season in 2000, there were 170
major league players from Latin America:71 from the Dominican Republic, 33 from Puerto Rico, 31 from Venezuela, 14 from
Mexico, 9 from Cuba, 8 from Panama, 3 from Colombia, and 1
from Nicaragua (www.latinosportslegends.com/LatinsinMLB_2000
.htm).
A number of parodies attributed speciﬁcally to the humorist Membrillo, published in Zig-Zag Libre in April 1982, appear in SánchezBoudy 1993, 52–53. They are also included, without attribution,
with numerous other examples of “baseball proverbs” in a separate
section of the same author’s recent Diccionario de refranes populares cubanos (Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 79–85). I have incorporated
some sample parodies into the annotated list.
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“You Can’t Kill Shit”
Occupational Proverb and Metaphorical
System among Young Medical Professionals
Stephen D. Winick

ntroduction

I

During the 1990s, I observed several folklore forms at work
among young medical professionals in New York City and Philadelphia. Among them were the proverb “You can’t kill shit,” and
its variants “Shit never dies” and “Scum never dies.” These proverbs proved fascinating not only in themselves but as a theoretical window into the workings of occupational proverbs, both as a
subset of the proverb genre and a subset of occupational folk culture. On the one hand, the existence of such proverbs suggested
that mainstream proverb theory needed some reﬁnement. On the
other, the speciﬁc meanings of these proverbs, and their situation
within a system of metaphorical folk speech, indicated that the
prevailing understanding of medical folklore also required some
revision.1

“You Can’t Kill Shit,” Occupational Proverbs, and Proverb Theory
At the time I ﬁrst encountered “You can’t kill shit,” occupational proverbs were sadly neglected within the ﬁeld of proverb studies; only recently (e.g., Dundes, Streiff, and Dundes 1999) have
proverbs restricted to an occupational community been widely
studied.2 Indeed, until quite recently, the prevailing deﬁnition
of proverbs, and its attendant methodology, precluded the existence of speciﬁcally occupational examples. Archer Taylor (1985,
15), writing in 1931, concluded that “the trades and mercantile
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pursuits have coined almost no proverbs,” and the reason for this
conclusion lies in his assumptions about what constitutes a proverb in the ﬁrst place. Proverb scholars of Taylor’s era insisted that
a saying be generally disseminated among the population before
they called it a proverb. Most proverb scholars were students of
literature and looked there ﬁrst for the evidence of an expression’s
proverbiality; compilers of the generally accepted proverb dictionaries used literary references as their foremost means of conﬁrming proverbiality. But occupational proverbs are often too esoteric
to migrate into the general population. They are unlikely to be
found in literature (at least the literature proverb scholars usually read) and therefore were rarely represented in the dictionaries Taylor perused as he wrote his classic text. This explains his
impression that very few occupational proverbs existed.
How much has modern proverb scholarship changed since
Taylor? On the one hand, as I have indicated, scholars have begun to recognize occupational proverbs as an important category.
On the other hand, many modern proverb scholars still insist on a
certain degree of “age and currency” for any text to be considered
a proverb and in practice, therefore, still restrict their analyses to
proverbs that they can ﬁnd in many different places and times.
Reading through general literature, advertising, newspapers and
other sources, they compile dictionaries of proverbs that have occurred frequently in writing (e.g., Whiting 1989), or they use survey data that solicits proverb texts from a broad sample of the
population (e.g., Mieder, Kingsbury, and Harder 1992). They then
use these dictionaries as guidelines to decide which expressions
are proverbs and which are not. These methods of deﬁning the
proverb will always fail to apprehend a good proportion of proverbial speech, namely whatever is not found in “general” readings or
known to the “general” public.
Why do scholars insist on age and currency as characteristics
of the proverb? Wolfgang Mieder (1993, 42) writes that “any proverb must ‘prove’ a certain traditionality and frequency to be considered verbal folklore,” suggesting that this view of proverbiality
relies on a deﬁnition of folklore as traditional material repeated
from the past. But as a discipline, folklore has moved away from
variant-distribution models and toward a paradigm of analyzing
emergent verbal performances. Since the 1970s, the discipline
has for the most part rejected deﬁnitions of folklore based on age
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or currency, and the notion of tradition has expanded to include
much more than repetition from the past.3 Therefore, few folklorists today would claim that the only way for a segment of discourse
to be considered folklore is for it to be repeated many times.
The restriction of proverbs to generally known sayings also
begs another question: Which population must know and use the
proverb? It was long ago established that any complex society
is divided into innumerable overlapping social groups, each of
which uses folklorically patterned communication. These groups
were dubbed “folk groups” by Dundes (1980, 8) and include families, occupational groups, hobbyists, church or religious groups,
ethnic or national groups, and many other potential congregations.
Do small folk groups have proverbs? Indeed, it is surprising to
me how many friends have spontaneously shared proverbs known
only to their families, hobby groups, or professions. Among singlelens reﬂex photographers, for example, it is customary to note that
“If you saw it, you missed it.”4 Among medical doctors, a common
admonition runs, “When you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not
zebras.”5 There are even proverbs restricted to students writing
doctoral dissertations, including “The only good dissertation is a
done dissertation.”6 The medical proverbs I introduced at the beginning of this article fall into precisely this category.
Because of the small numbers in these folk groups, and
because the efﬁcacy of these statements is restricted to these
groups, it is unlikely that any of these esoteric proverbs will be
widely cited in the literature searched by proverb scholars. But
they share the forms and functions of proverbs and thus are, by
almost any deﬁnition, proverbs among the relatively small communities which use them. Taylor’s statement about the absence
of proverbs originating in certain occupational groups therefore
stands as an example of the inadequacy of a variant-distribution
model, or a model based on age and currency that uses a list of
many citations as its primary form of evidence. This is simply too
limiting to encompass the multiplicity of proverbs that are spoken in the innumerable folk groups of the world. I have elsewhere
suggested another possible model for deﬁning proverbs, removing
the age and currency requirements retained by such scholars as
Mieder (Winick 2003); however, models other than mine that better account for occupational and other groups’ proverbs are also
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certainly possible, and this is an important direction for proverb
studies to take. Considering proverbs like “You can’t kill shit,”
then, can prove important in advancing proverb scholarship into
new areas of theory and practice.

“You Can’t Kill Shit” in a System of Medical Filth Metaphors
I ﬁrst encountered the proverb “You can’t kill shit” in the context of other medical metaphors. Describing an experience he had
had in the hospital, a friend whom I will call Dr. X mentioned the
acronym SHPOS (pronounced shpoz, to rhyme with the plural of
“spa”), which he said stood for “subhuman piece of shit.” (Dr. X
and others also used SHPOS as a plural; following them, I will
use the same acronym in this article for the singular and plural
forms.) Describing his experience with a patient that he referred
to as “a real SHPOS,” he summed up his attitude toward the encounter with the statement that “You can’t kill shit.”
As a folklorist with a keen interest in proverbs, I was intrigued
by the appearance of what was clearly a proverb restricted to a
small occupational group, whose meaning was not immediately
obvious. This drew me into researching the use of proverbs and
other metaphorical speech among doctors.7
It is generally accepted that folklore pervades the world of modern professional medicine. Among others, David Hufford (1989),
Anne Burson-Tolpin (1990), and Kathleen Odean (1995) have
noted mnemonics, proverbs, photocopy lore, jargon and pseudojargon, euphemisms, practical jokes, dramas, songs, legends,
and slang collected from medical practitioners. Among these, the
genre that has probably received the most attention is doctors’
derogatory slang terms for their patients—for example, SHPOS.
Folklorists, linguists, and sociologists have all examined these
expressions of hostility, and scholars have informally collected
terms of abuse (e.g., George and Dundes 1978; Scheiner 1978;
Monteiro 1980; Taller 1981; Gordon 1983; Liederman and Grisso
1985; Burson-Tolpin 1990; Odean 1995).
Among these terms, the single word gomer has been studied more than any other. In concentrating on this word, scholars
have neglected an important aspect of medical slang, one which
connects slang terms to medical proverbs. This neglected area is
the crucial place of ﬁlth in the metaphorical system of doctors.
Terms such as “dirt”, “shit” and “scum” appear repeatedly in the
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metaphorical speech of young doctors, showing their proverbs to
be deeply connected to a wide-ranging system of metaphor and
belief about ﬁlth and pollution.
Indeed, gomer seems to be a brief and anomalous exception
to an otherwise common rule: The most insulting medical slang
terms employ ﬁlth metaphors. In a personal communication with
Anne Burson-Tolpin (1990), Renée Fox, an expert in the sociology
of medical students and young doctors, expressed the opinion
that gomer was merely the latest in a series of derisive terms.
It had replaced crock as “the ultimate expression of hostility toward the patient” (p. 50 n. 9). Crock, according to almost all the
relevant ethnographers as well as nonﬁction authors like Melvin
Konner (1987, 382) and all of my informants, is short for “crock
of shit,” although that full phrase is never voiced in the hospital.
After gomer replaced crock, Burson-Tolpin believes that it was in
turn replaced by dirtball, which, along with its variant, dirtbag, I
myself encountered among medical students and doctors during
both formal interviews and informal socializing. Since that time,
SHPOS appears to have gained the dubious honor of “most hostile epithet.”8 This reveals a clear pattern: Among the four terms
that have probably held sway between the 1960s and the late
1990s—gomer, crock, dirtball, and SHPOS, gomer is anomalous
because it does not compare the patient to dirt or ﬁlth.9 Thus, by
concentrating on gomer, scholars have missed the importance of
ﬁlth in medical folklore.10
Mary Douglas, Barbara Babcock, and Victor Turner have contributed to our understanding of ﬁlth as a symbol, and their work
has important implications for this article. Douglas points out
that our general societal ideas about dirt predate the discovery
of pathogenic organisms. In modern hospitals, however, the consciousness of the pathogenic theory of disease is higher than it is
anywhere else, and the pathogen is included within the pollution
system of the culture. Indeed, the pathogenic organism is forcefully stamped out and therefore by all rights should not even be
present in the hospital. Rooms, instruments, and personnel must
be sterile to avoid spreading infection. Doctors’ ideas of dirt are
often bound up with infectious diseases. Thus, doctors speak of
the dirty case, one in which a serious infection has occurred, and
the dirty room, a hospital room that has housed seriously infected
patients and must be thoroughly sterilized (Monteiro 1980, 56).
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This equation of dirt with potential infection is a serious side of
the symbolic system of ﬁlth addressed in this article. It helps explain why dirt and ﬁlth are such powerful symbols among the
community of medical professionals.
However, it is clearly not only the fear of the infectious that
dominates this symbolic system. If it were, the most infectious patients would be the ones to whom ﬁlth metaphors were assigned.
In fact, this is not the case. To get to the root of hospital rules of
ﬁlth, we, like Douglas, must go beyond the pathogenic model of
disease.
According to Douglas (1966), dirt, ﬁlth, and pollution (including exudations of the human body such as excrement) are to be
understood symbolically as the contravention of a system of order.
Thus, those items that do not fall within the categories prescribed
by society, items that exist but violate the rules of order in a culture, are frequently tabooed, labeled abominations, and avoided.
Douglas’s theories, as outlined in her book Purity and Danger,
apply to what she calls “primitive societies,” in which ideas about
dirt are highly structured. Although the modern hospital is not
a primitive society in Douglas’s sense, some of her insights also
relate to hospitals.
The connection between dirt and the “shit” of “You can’t kill
shit” may itself not be obvious, for dirt and feces are not the same
thing. Douglas explains this as a symbolic connection. Dirt, she
says, is “a kind of omnibus compendium which includes all the
rejected elements of ordered systems. . . . In short, our pollution
behavior is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely
to confuse or contradict cherished classiﬁcations” (1966, 35–36).
Dirt, seen in this light, is metonymically linked to feces and
any bodily exudation by its quality of anomaly or ambiguity. Feces,
blood, mucus, and other bodily products, at once part of the body
and removed from it, “of and not of the self” (Babcock-Abrahams
1975, 174), are profoundly ambiguous, anomalous phenomena
that are practically always subject to taboo, or, as in our culture,
considered “disgusting.”
Given that dirt and ﬁlth are such negative concepts, is it likely
that people would be compared to ﬁlth simply because they evaded easy categorization? Indeed, according to Turner (1967, 97),
this is a widespread, cross-cultural phenomenon. People in the
transitional, liminal phase of rites of passage, whose “condition
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is one of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all customary
categories,” are “nearly always and everywhere . . . regarded as
polluting.” Because of this, he points out, they are often forced
to go literally ﬁlthy and symbolically compared to dirt, decay,
and such bodily exudations as menstrual blood (p. 96). In other
words, these people are treated much like the crock and SHPOS
in the modern hospital.
As a demonstration of the way in which Douglas and Turner’s
ideas may apply to our medical proverbs and phrases, let us look
ﬁrst at the term crock, short for the metaphorical or proverbial
phrase “crock of shit.”11 Most scholars who have analyzed this
term have found it has the following consistent meanings: “a patient who complains continually of multiple symptoms, many of
which are either imaginary or of psychic origin” (Monteiro 1980,
56); “has no organic disease, but has constant physical complaints” (Gordon 1983, 175); or, more succinctly, “patient with
nothing physically wrong” (Konner 1987, 382). Dr. X deﬁned
crock similarly: “If somebody comes in, complaining of abdominal
pains, and comes to the emergency room every other night, and
they get the full work-up, and it’s always negative . . . they may
have something, or it may totally be psychiatric; who knows? But
eventually someone says, oh, he’s just a crock. . . .” (tape-recorded interview by the author, 1995).
What we see here is that the crock or “crock of shit” is a patient who has symptoms, or who claims to have symptoms, but
who cannot be diagnosed by his physician. Diagnosis is itself the
most important way in which doctors categorize their patients.
As Burson-Tolpin (1990, 100) notes, “Diagnosis can be viewed as
a process of imposing order on disorder.” There is nothing natural or acultural about diagnosis; indeed, Burson-Tolpin stresses
“the order-imposing aspects of the diagnostic process and its socially constructed nature” (p.102). Like the taxonomies of Douglas’s primitive societies, diagnoses are socially constructed ways
of categorizing the chaos of experience. Using diagnoses, medical professionals neatly categorize their patients and thus reduce
the chaos in the hospital environment. Those who do not ﬁt into
this scheme, i.e., those for whom doctors cannot ﬁnd any organic
cause of symptoms, are assigned to the category of crock.
As a clue to how crock ﬁts into this environment, it is interesting to note that the diagnosis, converted to a noun, often becomes
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the name for the category of patient. Patients with stab wounds
are frequently referred to as “stabs,” those who overdose are referred to as “O.D.s,” etc. Thus, in conversational speech, the term
crock ﬁlls the same syntagmatic slot as the diagnosis. Indeed, two
of my informants used the term “diagnosis” to describe the term
crock.12 Even if not a diagnosis, crock is certainly a category that,
like an individual diagnosis, preserves the integrity of the diagnostic system as a whole; patients who seem to have symptoms
but no diagnosis, thus those who threaten the system, are called
crocks.
Like “dirt” in Mary Douglas’s analysis, then, crock (of shit) is
“a residual category” that contains those outcast and ambiguous elements “rejected from our normal scheme of classiﬁcation”
(1966, 36). Indeed, one fascinating facet of the term crock is that
its lexical meaning mirrors its social function. As a residual category, it is a container for the ﬁlth that might otherwise pervade
and destroy the system. Like a literal “crock of shit,” a crock keeps
the pollution inside, containing it and rendering it harmless to
the outside environment.
It can be argued that the metaphorical phrase “crock of shit”
is simply borrowed from nonmedical folklore, where its meaning
is “a lie.” Indeed, it is likely that that is the ultimate source of the
expression. However, two things indicate that the medical community has adapted this term and applied it in a new way. First,
while the nonmedical usage of “crock of shit” refers to an utterance, as in “That’s a crock of shit,” the medical use refers to the
person who makes the complaint, not the complaint itself. Also
crock does not necessarily express an intent to deceive or a lie. As
Dr. X points out in the interview quoted earlier, “They may have
something . . . who knows?” It is the inability of the doctor to ﬁnd
the problem, the uncertainty of “who knows?,” that is the root of
the term crock.13
Some doctors use pot as a synonym for crock. It is tempting to
explain this merely as the extension of crock to “Crock-Pot,” but
this overlooks the fact that pot is sometimes used as a synonym
for toilet. (This could easily have originated with the chamber pot
and been transferred to the toilet. Indeed, a “crock of shit” most
plausibly refers literally to a chamber pot.) This metaphor is extended when crocks are said to have “high serum porcelain” (Taller 1983, 39). The word “porcelain” in American folklore is often
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a code word for toilet, as in “worshipping the porcelain God” and
“driving the porcelain bus,” both of which refer to throwing up
in the toilet. Thus the crock (of shit) has become the basis of an
extended metaphorical system referring ultimately to containers
that prevent the spread of bodily ﬁlth.
Having demonstrated that crock is a case of a ﬁlth metaphor
being applied to a patient who “breaks the rules” of classiﬁcation,
let me pause to examine more ﬁlth metaphors, using the work
of David Paul Gordon, who provides us with succinct deﬁnitions
of several of the terms, consistently using his deﬁnition of gomer
as a point of reference. This deﬁnition (quoted almost verbatim
from George and Dundes’s earlier article (1978)) is “an alcoholic
or derelict with extremely poor personal hygiene and a record of
multiple admissions to the hospital. Symptoms are predictable,
and illness is often feigned. When sick, shows lack of interest in
recovery; is often disoriented or hostile” (Gordon 1983, 175).
Most of the terms in Gordon’s sample comparable to his use
of gomer are ﬁlth or pollution metaphors. A blivet is “ten pounds
of shit in a ﬁve-pound bag (=a gomer),” a dirtball is “much worse
than a gomer,” and a SHPOS is a “subhuman piece of shit; a
gomer.” Also intriguing is the term grume, which is here deﬁned
as “patient dirtier and in worse condition than usual gomer. (See
dirtball)” (Gordon 1983, 175–76). The grume was ﬁrst noted by
George and Dundes and is descended from the Latin term grumus,
meaning “little heap.” In medical terms, this usually refers to a
blood clot, a bodily exudation and therefore a profound ambiguity in Douglas’s sense. Furthermore, blood clots occur most often
when blood gets where it does not belong, i.e., when, in Douglas’s
analysis, blood itself becomes a pollutant (1966, 35–36). According to George and Dundes (1978, 572), the only other common
usage of grumus is as part of the expression “grumus merdae,”
or “pile of shit.” Thus, in either of its common uses, it refers to a
by-product of the body removed from the body, a powerful form
of pollution.
Why is the type of patient in question so frequently referred
to by a ﬁlth metaphor? A deﬁnition of SHPOS given by Dr. X is
“slimy, skanky, drug-abusing, nasty personalities who come into
the hospital and then don’t let you do anything” (interview, 1995).
In this hostile but almost poetically vivid description, several
dimensions to SHPOS are apparent. First of all, they are called
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slimy and skanky. This refers to their physical state: They are
dirty, smelly, and practice poor hygiene. Thus, the ﬁrst level at
which these patients are ascribed ﬁlth is a literal one; they are really ﬁlthy and so are metaphorically compared to a piece of ﬁlth.
SHPOS also demonstrate the conceptual link between pathogenic infection and dirt that I mentioned earlier. These patients
are almost always infected with something, and the most common treatment for them is antibiotics. Thus, just like the dirty
case and the dirty room, the SHPOS is either the known or the
suspected carrier of infection.
After the SHPOS’s literal ﬁlthiness, Dr. X also mentions their
unwillingness to undergo treatment or to follow the doctor’s orders. It is in this sense that they “don’t let you do anything.” Typically, they refuse to allow blood samples to be taken or antibiotics
to be administered. Contrasting SHPOS with other patients, Dr.
X states, “Other people have genuine problems, and they come
in, and you ﬁx ’em, and they try and keep ’em ﬁxed, and they try
and stay out of the hospital, whereas . . . SHPOS don’t care. You
know, if they end up back in the hospital, what the heck? It’s a
nice warm bed and free meals.” On the other hand, if a visit to the
clinic is suggested by the doctor, Dr. C tells me that “the SHPOS
never come back because they go back out on the street and shoot
up again. . . . it becomes a joke even giving them an appointment”
(tape-recorded interview by the author, 1995).
The unwillingness of the SHPOS to fulﬁll what doctors see as
their part in the doctor-patient role relationship is also a deﬁning
characteristic, at least for some doctors. Dr. X states, “Even the
drug abusers who come in with pneumonia . . . and say, ‘Been
coughing up this green stuff; help me out,’ and you say, ‘Okay,
you’re going to need IV antibiotics, and I’m going to have to draw
cultures,’ and they say, ‘Okay, doc, go ahead. . . .’ That’s not
SHPOS.”
Another characteristic for which SHPOS are reviled is that,
while other patients are the victims of circumstances beyond
their control, the SHPOS’s illness is entirely self-inﬂicted. The
typical diagnosis for a SHPOS, according to several of my informants, is “drug overdoses complicated by infections.” While normal patients suffer from accidents or violence or illness through
no fault of their own, SHPOS are usually responsible for their
own conditions. One clear indication of this is that, no matter
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self-inﬂicted, children, who are usually considered too young to
be responsible, are never called SHPOS. “There’s really no such
thing,” Dr. W told me, “as pediatric SHPOS” (tape-recorded interview by the author, 1995).
It is important to note that the “shit” of the proverb “You can’t
kill shit” and the metaphorical phrase/acronym, “subhuman
piece of shit/SHPOS,” refer to the same patients. The proverb
also emphasizes the self-abusive nature of this type of patient and
his or her unwillingness to comply with the doctor’s recommendations. Asked to give me a sample context in which this proverb
may be used, Dr. C reports,
These real hard-core drug abusers come in . . . when you’re trying
to treat ‘em, a lot of times you’re nervous when you’re just starting
out as an intern: ‘Since he’s not letting me draw any blood cultures,
what if I hang the wrong antibiotic? What if I do this, what if I do
that?’ and the response from the more senior residents who have
dealt with this before is always, ‘Don’t worry; there’s nothing you
can do to these people that they haven’t done worse to themselves
already.’ And that’s basically the meaning of [‘You can’t kill shit’].
They’ve abused themselves so badly they’re indestructible! (interview, 1995)

The unwillingness of the patient to allow cultures, the description
as “hard-core drug abusers,” and the suggestion that they have
done “worse to themselves already” are all characteristic of all of
my informants’ descriptions of SHPOS, and part of most explanations of “You can’t kill shit” and “Shit never dies.”
For some doctors, frequent visits to the hospital are also a
deﬁning characteristic of SHPOS. Scheiner (1978), in fact, notes
two acronyms, POS for “piece of shit” and SHPOS for “subhuman
piece of shit.” The former refers to “patients medically ill because
of their failure to care for themselves” and the latter to “a chronic
POS. A patient who, after intensive medical care and rehabilitation, fails to follow medical instructions, and is readmitted to the
hospital in his previous critical condition” (p. 69).
While I never encountered POS on its own in my research since
1993, most informants agreed that the SHPOS was a repeat visitor to the hospital. As Dr. J noted, “Your goal when you treat them
is that you want to get them out and not have them come back”
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(tape-recorded interview by the author, 1995). SHPOS continually
thwart this attempt. Thus, while there are more literal levels at
which these patients are worthy of ﬁlth metaphors, it seems that
two of the most important are responsibility for their own illnesses and an unwillingness to get better.14
The SHPOS and his ilk can be considered the worst violators
of the hospital’s classiﬁcation system. Dr. X, when confronted
in 1994 with an older doctor’s dislike of terms like dirtball and
SHPOS, commented that for the older physician, anyone who
comes into the hospital for treatment automatically earns the title
of “patient.” For many of the younger staff members, however,
dirtballs and SHPOS never achieve that honor; they are only referred to as patients when senior staff members are present.
For about half of my informants, SHPOS and dirtball were
100 percent synonymous. The others expressed a sense of gradation, with dirtbags or dirtballs being slightly less repugnant than
SHPOS. But the basic features of the two groups were always
the same. Dirtballs and SHPOS, then, are self-destructive people
with no concern for getting better. They defy the very category of
patient, which to these doctors means a sick person who wants
to get better. These are the most antistructural people in the hospital because it is unclear whether they should be considered patients at all. At this deep level, then, the dirtbag and SHPOS (and,
I expect, the grume and blivet as well) disrupt the categorization
attempts of the hospital in the severest way possible.
Contrasting dirty case and crock with the more caustic dirtball and SHPOS, we ﬁnd a number of interesting differences. First
let us note that crock and dirty case, while both metaphors of pollution, are mitigated by their wording. Crock, by eliminating the
overtly ﬁlthy part of the metaphor, suggests ﬁlth without saying
it outright. Dirty case, while mentioning dirt directly, connects it
with the case rather than the patient, a subtle difference but one
that any medical practitioner will appreciate; a “difﬁcult case” is
by no means the same as a “difﬁcult patient,” as my informants
readily conﬁrmed. Furthermore, while crock and dirty case are
straightforward terms relating to a fairly simple type of patient,
SHPOS and dirtball are deﬁned by much more complex clusters
of physical and behavioral characteristics.
It has become clear that the metaphors of ﬁlth in the case of
the more severe terms are overdetermined, meaningful on more
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than one level; they are appropriate because of the patients’ literal
ﬁlthiness, because of their penchant for infection, and because
they seriously violate the rules of order that govern patient behavior. Any one of these characteristics would be enough to earn
them a ﬁlth metaphor, as crock and dirty case demonstrate. All
three characteristics make a ﬁlth metaphor almost inevitable.

Filth Metaphors in Medicine: Function and Meaning
The observation that ﬁlth metaphors apply mainly to antistructural patients who violate the system of order in the hospital environment suggests certain reﬁnements to the accepted
wisdom about such language. One reason often given for the existence of such derogatory metaphors is the young intern’s and
resident’s position near the bottom of the hospital hierarchy. This
unenviable position, it is argued, causes this group to seek ingroup cohesion as well as direct hostility down to the patients,
the only people lower than themselves in the hierarchy. Because
the hostility is frequently expressed in scatological terms, Odean
(1995, 149) calls this the “shit rolls downhill” model. This theory
is certainly valid and does explain to some extent why patient-directed pejoratives, including proverbs such as “Shit never dies,”
exist. However, it overlooks the fact that not all patients are the
objects of hostility. In fact, many of the young doctors I know try
their best to empathize with patients and reserve their hostility
for a chosen few. This explanation thus fails to account for a signiﬁcant feature of hospital life: the selectivity with which epithets
and pejorative proverbs are deployed.
Like the “shit rolls downhill” model, the generally accepted
“stress-relief model” of medical folklore also doesn’t account for
this selectivity. It observes that the hospital is a very high-pressure environment and produces a lot of stress, particularly among
the younger doctors. It offers this stress as the primary reason for
the existence of hostile patient-directed pejoratives. In one of the
ﬁrst analyses of doctors’ slang for patients, for example, Victoria
George and Alan Dundes (1978) argue that the derogatory term
gomer is used by doctors and nurses to refer to patients whose
“personal hygiene and habits . . . are so repugnant and distasteful
as to prove offensive even to the most hardened and dispassionate staff member.” In explaining this phenomenon, the authors
foreground anxiety and stress as the factors that cause doctors
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to become frustrated with certain patients: “The inevitable stress
in any doctor-patient relationship resulting from the anxiety
which accompanies illness is greatly exacerbated by the wretched
and foul conditions of the gomer.” This frustration, they believe,
causes the doctors to retaliate by using derogatory slang. “The
greater the stress,” they argue, “the greater the need for folklore
to relieve the pressures created by that stress” (p. 580). In George
and Dundes’s estimation, these factors all contribute to giving
gomer “pre-eminence as a term” of abuse (p. 572).
I agree with George and Dundes that the stress of being responsible for the lives of others—and the extra pressure created
by “professional patients” like the gomers they describe—is certainly one overarching reason for the existence of medical professionals’ derogatory speech about patients. This is supported by
my ﬁeldwork; my older informants, who cited their own commonsense version of the stress-relief model when discussing their
younger colleagues’ behavior, all pointed out certain facts: Stress
tends to be greatest when doctors ﬁrst begin to take responsibility
on themselves, that is, during internship and residency, a liminal
period when doctors are qualiﬁed to practice medicine but not
yet considered fully functioning specialists.15 During these years,
doctors typically make the ﬁrst life-and-death decisions of their
careers. They work long, grueling hours, often skipping meals and
missing sleep. They are, quite simply, under constant pressure
and stress. It is during these years that doctors are most often
observed using pejorative epithets and proverbs. Furthermore,
the younger doctors with whom I spoke also used the stress-relief
model as an explanation and justiﬁcation for their own behavior.
However, like the “shit rolls downhill” model, the stress-relief
theory does not account for all the evidence. As David Paul Gordon (1983) was the ﬁrst to point out, George and Dundes’s logic
—that the stress experienced by doctors making life-and-death
decisions is the cause of medical slang—would lead us to the conclusion that the patients who are the most severely ill, and thus
cause the doctors the most stress, get tagged with these derisive
nicknames. In fact, that proves not to be the case. Furthermore,
as Odean (1995, 144) has noted, and my informants conﬁrmed
in interviews, the use of these expressions is often fundamentally against the young doctor’s principles but encouraged by peer
pressure. This suggests that the use of these terms is the cause
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of anxiety and stress. Indeed, both Odean’s informants and my
own reported urban legends about doctors being sued for writing
SHPOS or dirtball on a patient’s medical chart (see Odean 1995,
144). Urban legends most frequently express a group’s anxieties,
and this legend suggests that these slang terms are the source of
worries as well as an outlet for them. Gordon thus rejects stress
as an explanation and points to empathy. He states that patients
with whom it is difﬁcult to empathize are the ones who receive
pejorative nicknames: “For patients likely to produce empathy,
slang terms will be rare; for those with whom it is difﬁcult to empathize, slang is more likely” (1983, 177).
Gordon’s argument against George and Dundes’s explanation appears convincing, and his empathy model appears to hold
true in many cases. Indeed, the empathy model provides another
reason why SHPOS and dirtballs have earned themselves metaphors of ﬁlth. However, although these strongest pejoratives are
reserved for the most unpleasant patients, not all ﬁlth metaphors
are restricted to patients with whom doctors cannot empathize.
My informants often expressed empathy for their crocks, whom
they believed to be experiencing real pain and symptoms, even
if only psychosomatic ones. Indeed, some were convinced that
crocks were sometimes suffering from genuinely unknown syndromes, but they still used the term crock without any apparent
resentment. Thus, empathy alone, I think, is not the answer.
The solution, I believe, is that a certain kind of stress causes
ﬁlth metaphors to be applied to patients; George and Dundes are
quite correct that stress is the major force behind these terms, but
they fail to specify what type of stress. The stress of caring for a critically ill patient who urgently needs help does not cause doctors to
use ﬁlth metaphors. Doctors’ medical training has prepared them
to deal with this stress; that is the whole point of being a doctor.
It is the stress that results from a loss of control that ultimately translates into ﬁlth metaphors. The dirty case and dirty
room represent a failure to keep the hospital antiseptic and thus
to control infection. The crock, dirtball, and SHPOS, similarly,
represent violations of the system of categorization through which
doctors control their environment. This can result in feelings of
powerlessness and futility. The crock makes doctors powerless by
taking away their ability to diagnose, their ability to assign people
to meaningful categories and thus order the universe neatly; their
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ability to heal the patient is likewise hampered by the crock. The
dirtbag, dirtball, grume, or SHPOS makes doctors powerless by
directly or indirectly thwarting their efforts and by being a nonpatient, a person who has no desire to be helped by the doctor in
the ﬁrst place. All of these types of patients cause stress by being
outside the doctors’ control and thus thwarting the doctors’ attempts to be doctors.
Only now does it become clear how ﬁlth metaphors help to
relieve some stresses, even as they create others. Doctors do not
generally feel good about calling patients SHPOS or commenting
that “Scum never dies.” As already stated, their fears of getting
caught and their own moral squeamishness cause them unease
that surfaces in contemporary legends and rumors in which doctors are punished for using these terms. Nevertheless, the stress
of disorder in the basic system of categorization that deﬁnes hospital life, and from the resulting powerlessness of doctors to do
their job, is much greater. Through proverbs, proverbial phrases,
and epithets, doctors can create new categories to hold their uncategorizable patients—patients who “may have something . . .
who knows?” (crock). They can also express their outrage at those
who are not even patients and “don’t let you do anything” (dirtbag,
SHPOS, “You can’t kill shit”), and who, like the infection in a dirty
room, do not belong in the hospital at all. Because it reorders the
hospital environment, this form of stress relief is greater than the
residual anxiety caused by the terms themselves and the fear of
being caught using them.
This structural argument takes away some of the sting of the
ﬁlth metaphors themselves, for these emerge, at least in part, as
a common cross-cultural way of handling anomaly. Still, one issue raised by this metaphorical system is essentially ethical: Is
it unethical or otherwise inappropriate for doctors, charged with
the care of patients, to think and speak of them in these terms?
Among many older physicians, the answer is often yes; stories
abound of older physicians chastising younger ones for using
these terms. The urban legends already alluded to suggest that
younger doctors, too, worry about the ethics of stating that “Scum
never dies” in reference to their patients. Although they feel some
shame and certainly worry about getting caught, however, they do
not generally think of themselves as unethical even though they
clearly know their statements are derogatory.
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It is on the subject of ethics that David Gordon’s article makes
the strongest argument. Gordon asserts that “hospital slang for
patients principally expresses frustration and irritation at having
to provide care when it is not felt to be needed or useful” (1983,
179). Based on my own experience with doctors, I agree with Gordon. In the case of crocks, the time and resources spent testing the
patient are not justiﬁed by any results, and although the patient
cannot be considered culpable, the doctor’s frustration is understandable. In the case of those considered dirtbags, dirtballs, or
SHPOS, the doctors believe the patients to be the unethical ones,
consuming precious hospital resources until they are well enough
to leave, then returning again and again, never attempting to get
better. Dr. W, recounting a story in which a SHPOS was competing for his attention with a severely injured but very cooperative
woman whose frightened child was outside waiting for her, shook
his head in anger and said, “They just suck up medicine, take up
space, and tire you out with annoying whining while you have real
patients to treat” (interview, 1995).
In this sense, as in the societies described by Mary Douglas
and Victor Turner, the ambiguous or anomalous item is credited
not only with pollution but with danger. By sapping the hospital’s resources and the doctors’ strength, the dirtball and SHPOS
threaten to wreak havoc. From the doctors’ point of view, then,
the use of these insults takes on a quality of righteous indignation against dangerous invaders, rather than unfair deprecation
of sick people.
Gordon even implies that, far from being unethical, the derogatory slang employed by doctors reinforces their strong sense
of ethics. For the doctors, “Frustration over giving care to patients
who do not need it implies concern for other patients . . . and a
wish to care for the most needy” (1983, 179). Again, I agree with
this conclusion. My own informants’ stories of the competition
between SHPOS and “real patients,” like the one already quoted,
make it clear that their concern is not only for themselves but
also for their genuinely sick patients.
An alternate meaning for one of the proverb’s variants is interesting in this regard. Ms. L, the only registered nurse among my
informants, revealed that “Scum never dies” or “Shit never dies”
can be used in two different contexts. On the one hand is the
situation already described, namely the inexperienced doctor who
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worries he will harm the patient. “Don’t worry, shit never dies,”
the resident may say. On the other hand, the proverb can also be
used to express regret or exasperation when a genuine patient, a
good patient, dies, but a SHPOS recovers. In these cases, “Scum
never dies” or “Shit never dies” is used almost with regret and carryies a connotation of injustice: “Why do good patients die when
shit never dies”? In this sense, the proverb points us directly to
the issue of compassion for one’s other patients.
The proverb “You can’t kill shit” has thus led us into a fascinating and complexly organized system of metaphors. Phrases
like “crock of shit,” “piece of shit,” “pile of shit,” and just plain
shit, grume, dirtball, scum, and dirtbag, and their related observations that “You can’t kill shit” and “Scum never dies,” are not
randomly applied to patients, nor are they assigned according to
who creates the most stress. Although they are hostile, and perhaps hurtful, they are not unethical. Instead, they can be seen as
both the underbelly of a highly developed system of categorization
that seeks to impose order on the frequently chaotic world of the
hospital, and as the product of a code of ethical behavior by which
physicians attempt to heal themselves as well as others.

Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

Among other lessons, Wolfgang Mieder taught me to build upon the
solid work of previous generations of scholars. I offer this paper in
that spirit and dedicate it to him.
It has long been common to speak of Medical Proverbs and Legal
Proverbs. However, these are not disseminated mostly within occupational communities. They are, rather, proverbs dealing with
medical or legal knowledge disseminated among the general population.
For a famous deﬁnition of folklore utilizing this new paradigm, see
Ben Amos 1972. For a discussion of new meanings for tradition, see
Ben Amos 1985. For analysis of these ideas and their impact on the
deﬁnition of proverbs, see Winick 1998, 44–55; 2003.
This proverb refers to the fact that while the ﬁlm is being exposed
to light, the camera’s shutter interrupts the photographer’s view
of his subject. Therefore, anything that the photographer actually
sees through the lens, he fails to capture on ﬁlm, and vice versa.
The metaphorical or extended meaning is that in the profession,
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6.
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8.

9.

10.
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nothing can be taken for granted until the ﬁlm is developed and
examined. This proverb was pointed out to me by Jeff Benton.
I ﬁrst heard this proverb from my brother, Jonathan Winick, who is
a neurologist; it has also been noted by Dundes, Streiff, and Dundes
(1999). It means that when confronted with a set of symptoms, a
doctor should consider the more likely or common causes ﬁrst.
Clearly, this is a variation on the older proverb, “The only good Indian is a dead Indian” (see Mieder 1997). It was pointed out to me
by folklorist Xan Griswold.
My primary source data includes formal interviews and informal
conversations with both young and older doctors—i.e., fourth-year
medical students, interns, residents, established professionals, and
retirees. Formal interviews were conducted with students and younger professionals (those who use these proverbs and metaphors), and
more informal checking was undertaken with older physicians, who
were asked either to remember such expressions from their younger
days or give their reactions to them. The most formal parts of my
ﬁeldwork consisted of a series of interviews conducted with seven
main informants: three fourth-year medical students, three young
M.D.s, and one registered nurse. Five were resident in Philadelphia,
the others in New York. None wish to be identiﬁed by name.
These terms were not necessarily new when they rose to prominence. SHPOS was noted at least as early as 1978, the same year
that George and Dundes announced gomer’s preeminence.
Although most scholars reject the folk etymology that gomer is an
acronym for “get out of my emergency room” or “grand old man of
the emergency room,” a satisfactory alternative has yet to be found;
certainly there is no reason to think ﬁlth enters into gomer’s etymology, however.
It would also be possible, of course, to treat SHPOS and crock as
instances of speciﬁcally anal folklore, another realm pioneered by
Alan Dundes in such works as Life Is Like a Chicken Coop Ladder.
Such an approach has been taken by Odean (1995). Her approach
and mine do not preclude each other; it is certainly possible for the
meanings of these terms to be multiple, at once part of a system
of anal folklore and another system of ﬁlth folklore. Since SHPOS
and dirtball mean the same thing, and since “Shit never dies” and
“Scum never dies” mean the same thing—in other words, since both
nonanal and anal ﬁlth metaphors can be used in identical situations—I consider these examples of ﬁlth folklore rather than anal
folklore.
While “crock of shit” itself must be classiﬁed as a metaphorical
phrase or idiom, “to be a crock of shit” qualiﬁes by most deﬁnitions
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as a proverbial phrase. This shows, among other things, how difﬁcult it is to distinguish between such categories as traditional metaphor, idiom, proverbial phrase, cliché, etc.
One informant, Dr. M, was equally explicit in saying that crock was
“not a real diagnosis, just a general description.”
Interestingly, although some commentators have considered crock
a term of hostility, my informants did not think of it that way. To
them, a sweet old lady whose disease could not be diagnosed would,
if she persisted in her complaints, be called a crock.
Gordon (1983, 177) noted that “patients who demand more attention than warranted by physical condition” were often the recipients of pejorative epithets. Perhaps this should be expanded to “patients who take up time and resources unnecessarily”; although the
infections themselves may warrant serious attention, because they
are self-inﬂicted, it can be argued that patients are unnecessarily
making themeselves sick.
It is the residency that prepares a doctor for specialization. The
internship generally precedes it. Both together are liminal for the
doctor who intends to specialize.
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“Cheaters Never Prosper” and
Other Lies Adults Tell Kids
Proverbs and the Culture Wars over Character
Jay Mechling

W

e rarely think of proverbs as “ﬁghting words,” but the neoconservative camp in the “culture wars” that began brewing
in the 1980s has appropriated proverbs and their folklore cousins—moral maxims—as ammunition in the very public rhetoric
aimed at bringing morality and “common sense” back into American life. Folklorists know all too well the sorry history of the political uses of folklore in totalitarian regimes, but who would suppose
that in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, proverbs would be taken up
as a weapon to promote an ideological cause in the United States?
Writers of advertising copy, certainly, have used proverbs for decades in their attempts to associate certain commodities with the
common sense of the folk (e.g., Mieder 1993), so perhaps it is
not so strange that the persuasive powers of proverbs should be
tapped in ideological campaigns.
In a departure from the usual scholarly approach, I intend
to focus on the ideological use of proverbs in the current culture
wars. The usual scholarly gambit is to show how people use proverbs strategically in their communication with others who are
presumed to understand their meanings. People usually trot out
proverbs in response to a social situation, such as a criticism of
someone’s behavior (e.g., “A fool and his money are soon parted”).
As Abrahams (1968) points out, the great value of folklore, especially genres like proverbs and jokes, is that they are impersonal,
which means that they can assume a strategy of indirection when
a direct communication would seem so personal as to threaten
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the social solidarity of the group. Even using proverbs in forms
other than the usual oral communication—in advertising or literature or cartoons, for example—follows these principles. The
hucksters and authors and cartoonists (Gary Larson, especially)
choose a traditional proverb or some variant proverbial form to
invoke folk ideas, knowledge, and wisdom in making meaning.
I depart from this usual approach because I am not examining the contextual uses of individual proverbs but the very idea
that adults want to teach children proverbs as an element in their
character education. This remarkable development demonstrates
a misunderstanding of both proverbs and children’s cultures, as I
shall show. This inquiry actually will bring me full circle to make
a point about proverbs in context.
First, I need to provide some background on the culture wars
that seem so salient in our public life and on a particular issue
in those wars, the putative “character crisis” in American culture
and, especially, in the socialization of our children. Next, I examine the particular idea and strategy of teaching folklore (including
proverbs) to children to increase their cultural literacy and uplift
their characters. That strategy contains some highly problematic
ideas about culture and individual behavior. Finally, I show what
this all means when you take the child’s point of view, as do children’s folklorists who actually study children’s folk cultures in
their natural, everyday settings.

The Culture Wars and the Crisis in Character
The phrase “culture wars” crept into public discourse in the
United States sometime in the 1980s during the Reagan era. Neoconservatives, especially those who grounded their defense of traditional values in religious faith, embraced the term because they
felt that they were involved in a holy war against the forces that
were deserting and denigrating traditional values. These people
saw feminism, multiculturalism, gay rights, and related ideas and
social movements as sources of threats to traditional American
values and institutions. The other side, usually labeled “liberals,”
also had a sense that they were in a culture war against rightwing forces of the 1980s. These culture wars have continued into
the ﬁrst years of the twenty-ﬁrst century and show no sign of
abating.
In a series of thoughtful books, sociologist James Davison
Hunter (1991, 1994, 2000) has mapped the contours of these
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wars. Hunter rightfully points to shifting ideas about knowledge
and truth as key elements in the differences between the “orthodox” camp, as he calls the neoconservatives, and the “progressive” camp, as he calls the cultural left. For the orthodox, moral
authority relies on a transcendent source of truth (usually God),
whereas for progressives (even among the religious progressives)
moral authority is emergent, conditional, tentative, and relative.
This distinction perhaps summarizes too neatly Hunter’s much
longer and nuanced analysis of the worldviews of the two sides,
but this issue of the sources and nature of moral authority lies at
the heart of the matter, especially when I consider the campaign
to teach children proverbs.
Hunter looks at the actual skirmishes in the culture wars
that take place in politics, in the schools, in courtrooms, and in
the mass media. Those defending “traditional values” see public
schooling as an especially important arena for ﬁghting the culture
wars, seeing in feminism, multiculturalism, pluralism, gay rights,
and assorted experiments in “progressive education” a conspiracy
to capture the hearts and minds of America’s children and convince them that morals are relative and the measure of all things
is individual satisfaction. When psychology replaces religion as
the cultural foundation for everyday behavior, reason these critics, then the therapeutic sensibility elevates a “real self” or “authentic self” apart from social roles and norms and mistakes individual liberation from social responsibilities and obligations for
political freedom. In the minds of the orthodox camp, the public
culture visible in the mass media aimed at children only serves to
reinforce progressive schooling’s message that there are no absolutes in matters of right and wrong.
The result of this progressive control over the socialization of
children, argue the orthodox, is that people in the United States
face a profound character crisis. Those who claim that children
face a character crisis point to a string of school shootings, the
most dramatic of which was the slaughter at Columbine High
School in 1999. But even beyond the most extraordinary outbreaks of violence, the orthodox see everyday evidence of the loss
of values and morality in the ways young people dress, talk, pierce
and tattoo themselves, and engage in premarital sex.
The orthodox antidote to this infection is the “charactereducation” movement in the schools and the parallel curriculum of youth organizations outside of school. Thomas Linkona, a
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developmental psychologist and professor of education, for example, created the Center for the Fourth and Fifth Rs (respect and
responsibility) at the State University of New York at Cortland,
and the Josephson Institute of Ethics, based in Marina del Ray,
California, has organized a Character Counts! coalition of organizations and educators with training programs based on the “six
pillars” of character—namely, trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness. caring, and citizenship (www.josephsoninstitute
.org). Even the Boy Scouts of America, while not an ofﬁcial member of the Character Counts! coalition, has used the movement’s
name in some of its materials and on its Web site.
Some ﬁgures in the character-education movement advocate
the use of folklore and mythology in building curricula to teach
children traditional morals and values. A notable example is Arthur
J. Schwartz, who earned an Ed.D. from Harvard and who is a vice
president at the John Templeton Foundation, a nonproﬁt organization with a mission “to pursue the insights at the boundary between theology and science through a rigorous, open-minded and
empirically focused methodology” (www.templeton.org). Schwartz
directs the foundation’s character-development programs, and in
an essay he contributed to a volume on the “new era” in character
education, he makes an explicit case for using folklore in teaching children right from wrong. Schwartz sees in the grassroots
efforts by parents in numerous school districts evidence that the
question for debate no longer is “Whose values?” but “How should
educators transmit these core values to our children?” (2002, 1).
One way, argues Schwartz, is to teach our children “maxims to
live by.” “For the past several years,” he writes,
I have asked literally hundreds of people of all ages to share with
me a maxim or “wise saying” that has been passed on to them. For
example, my best friend told me that as he grew up his father said
to him repeatedly, “A job worth doing is a job worth doing well.” To
this day, my friend still hears the voice of his dad as he approaches
an important project. (Schwartz 2002, 5)

Schwartz deﬁnes a maxim as “a concise formulation of a fundamental principle or rule of conduct” (2002, 6), and it is clear
from his examples that what he has in mind is a class of proverbs.
These maxims are “civilization’s ‘memory bank’,” he says, and he
notes (correctly) that children tend to hear and learn a maxim in
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some speciﬁc context, often within a communication act aimed by
an adult at the child. His example is a mother citing “Two wrongs
do not make a right” when a child defends hitting a sibling with
“he hit me ﬁrst” (2002, 6–7). Schwartz approvingly cites Anand
Prahlad’s African-American Proverbs in Context (1996) to show both
how proverbs work in context and the universality of proverbs as
means for the everyday moral education of children (2002, 8–9).
Recognizing that maxims live in oral performance, Schwartz
proposes traditional memorization strategies—oral recitation and
writing in a copybook—for transmitting them to children (2002,
9). “Drill and practice are essential components of a successful
performance,” he notes, and such rote practice is the necessary
foundation before the teacher can help the children connect a
particular maxim to “their own experiences, feelings, and motivations” (2002, 9). Schwartz is eager to make it clear that the pedagogy he recommends is not “indoctrination” but an interactive
strategy that can be employed once the kids can recite the maxims. He then goes on to show how high schools with honor codes
experience less student cheating than schools without them (a
point to which I shall return later).
Now, folklorists have recommended using folklore in the classroom for a long time, so Schwartz’s recommendations may seem
welcome news. In fact, the most thoughtful and authoritative proverb scholar in the United States—Wolfgang Mieder—himself participated in a project aimed at teaching proverbs to fourth graders
(Mieder and Holmes 2000), and I’ll also discuss that project. My
concern is that all these efforts somehow miss the actual, living
folk cultures of children, especially children out of the surveillance of parents and teachers. Before I get to that critique, however, we should look brieﬂy at proverbs and why they are such an
attractive folk genre for the character-education movement.

“Common” Sense in Proverbs
For educators like Schwartz, the attraction of proverbs and
maxims lies in the seeming universality of folklore. People think
of folklore as common sense, a form of understanding that is
“common” in its everyday nature but also “common” because it is
shared widely in the society. If proverbs really express common
sense, they offer promise as a body of knowledge (folk knowledge)
and everyday, folk morality agreed to by “everyone.”

111

What Goes Around

Comes Around

112

Recall that the orthodox camp in the culture wars is reacting against cultural diversity and its ideology, “multiculturalism.”
The orthodox dispute the claims by progressives that reality is
plural and value systems, including moral systems, are relative.
Because the progressives do not believe we have access to an absolute reality, they are forced to see beliefs and values as culturally speciﬁc, and some progressives would add that even within
speciﬁc cultural systems, behavior may be very contextual.
However, progressive philosophers like Rorty (1989) and West
(1989) and social scientists who work in the postpositivist tradition are the ﬁrst to explain that the “everything goes” sort of relativism attributed to them by the orthodox camp is not the relativism progressives espouse. Progressives acknowledge that there
may be widespread social agreement on some matters of value
and morality, but anthropology holds little promise for those
seeking a human consensus to replace the religious source the
orthodox camp relies upon for distinguishing right from wrong.
Human common sense agrees on few absolutes, if you ask the
anthropologists, so progressives are stuck trying to sort out how
to “do the right thing” when what seems absolutely true to two
groups leads each to behavior that appalls or disgusts the other.
Schweder (2003), for example, attempts to sort out the dispute
over female genital circumcision in the United States, where one
group (including progressive feminist women) ﬁnds immoral a
custom practiced by another group (in this case, African women
from some cultures).
In the chaos of this plural messyness, some of the orthodox
have realized that an appeal to religious values may not work
as the best available strategy for reinvigorating American society with an agreed-upon set of moral principles for governing everyday lives. While plenty in the orthodox camp still cling to the
Judeo-Christian tradition as the source of the common morality
system in American culture, others claim that there really is a
basic, core, agreed-upon (hence, common, shared) set of beliefs
and values in the United States, even if most of them remain unspoken.
Articulating shared values and beliefs, therefore, becomes for
the orthodox (but also for some progressives) an important task
in restoring morality to everyday lives. One of the most famous
early statements in the culture wars was Hirsch’s 1987 book,
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Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know. In that
book, Hirsch simultaneously bemoaned the loss of a common cultural knowledge in the United States and claimed to be able to
specify what elements in that common cultural knowledge needed
to be relearned to bring us back to some halcyon days (never
speciﬁed, but one suspects it was the 1950s) when everyone understood everyone else because we had a common body of knowledge (expressed in English, to be sure).
Part of the orthodox camp’s complaint is that we used to be
able to count on the schools to provide children with a common
body of knowledge. Part of the “Americanization” of immigrant
children was their compulsory schooling in English and a curriculum aimed at teaching them the common body of knowledge.
“Progressive” ideas in education, feminism, multiculturalism,
teachers’ unions, and a host of other developments destroyed
this important function of public schooling, argue the orthodox,
resulting in the loss of common knowledge Hirsch and others
claim to chronicle. If schools can’t or won’t do the job, reason
Hirsch and his colleagues, then we need to put into the hands
of parents, willing teachers, youth workers, and even children
themselves the road map and tools for acquiring cultural literacy.
Hirsch and his coauthors followed up Cultural Literacy with The
Dictionary of Cultural Literacy (Hirsch, Kett, and Treﬁl, 1988),
with updated editions, and A First Dictionary of Cultural Literacy:
What Our Children Need to Know (Hirsch, Rowland, and Stanford, 1989).
Progressives often ridicule the efforts by Hirsch and others,
saying they treat knowledge as if it is preparation for a game of
Trivial Pursuit, a board game that became widely popular in the
1980s. It is tempting to implicate this trivia approach to knowledge in the distressing trend toward “teaching for the test” rather
than teaching critical thinking in schools, but in any case by the
1990s, it became clear that the orthodox camp had mounted an
effective counteroffensive against so-called progressive education.
Hirsch’s notion of cultural literacy ﬁt well the “back to basics”
movement in education, and although these battles are still being fought in the ﬁrst years of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the tendency of state governments to link school funding to scores on
standardized tests means that, at least for a while, the cultural
literacy approach to knowledge will remain dominant.
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Here, ﬁnally, is where we get to folklore and, speciﬁcally, to
proverbs as indispensable expressions of common cultural knowledge. In their Introduction to the 1988 ﬁrst edition of The Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Hirsch and his colleagues explain the basic premise of the project, namely, that,
although it is true that no two humans know exactly the same
things, they have a great deal of knowledge in common. To a large
extent this common knowledge or collective memory allows people
to communicate, to work together, and to live together. It forms the
basis for communities, and if it is shared by enough people, it is
a distinguishing characteristic of a national culture. The form and
content of this common knowledge constitute one of the elements
that makes each national culture unique. (p. ix)

This remarkable opening paragraph begins simply enough
with the idea, familiar to folklorists, that a group with a great deal
of “common knowledge” and “collective memory” has (though they
don’t use this phrase) “high context,” making their communication highly connotative. It is when the authors attempt to argue
that the nation/state can be seen as a high-context folk group
that progressives begin to worry.
I must pause here brieﬂy to clarify the ways the orthodox and
progressive camps in the culture wars are talking past each other about such fundamental concepts as “culture” and “shared.”
(These incommensurable positions, by the way, seem to contradict claims that the society enjoys a reasonably high level of common knowledge.) Long ago anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace
(1961) noted that there are two broad approaches to culture, approaches he called “the replication of uniformity” and the “organization of diversity.” The ﬁrst represents an approach Wallace
and others have discredited because it posits an unrealistic view
of socialization as a process that reproduces the same set of values and beliefs in all its members. Even by the time Wallace was
writing about this, the discovery of considerable variation in beliefs and behavior within seemingly homogeneous groups meant
that anthropologists could no longer talk about culture as something shared among individual minds as if there were some sort
of uniform national character that led to a common culture. By
the 1960s, there was plenty of evidence that Americans (to keep
to this example) did not share the same set of beliefs, values,
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motives, and customs, even though it was in the interests of those
in power to believe that everyone saw the world as they did.
Given the strong evidence of intracultural diversity, Wallace
and others preferred instead to view culture as a mechanism for
the “organization of diversity,” recognizing that social systems do
manage to hang together somehow because systems can work
without the participants’ sharing internal attitudes and values;
participants merely need to know what is expected of them in
social interactions. In fact, Wallace argued, large, complex social
systems, like that of the United States, probably actually require
that not everyone share the same set of experiences, values, beliefs, and motives. Such sharing is quite impossible, but what
the members of the society can share is an understanding of the
system (a sort of “cognitive map” of the “mazeway,” as Wallace put
it) and the competence needed to negotiate the system. It is in
this special sense that Wallace and others say Americans share a
common culture.
Note that from Wallace’s perspective it is not necessary that
people in the society share a body of common knowledge deﬁned
by content, though in a society with large-scale public schooling
and mass media there may be some relatively common knowledge. This is why the orthodox camp targets schools and the mass
media as the realms needing reform, needing to return to important content as the measure of common knowledge.
Enter Hirsch and like-minded intellectuals who seek to restore the content of our common knowledge, if not through the
school curriculum (though they are trying), then through the inﬂuence parents and other custodians have on children. The explicit aim is to create “cultural literacy” in the citizenry of the
United States, beginning with the children. Hirsch’s dictionaries
attempt to put into writing the minimum body of knowledge that
Americans should have. “It is this shifting body of information,”
write the editors, admitting that things do shift, “that our culture
has found useful, and therefore worth preserving. . . . This shared
information is the foundation of our public discourse” (Hirsch,
Kett, and Treﬁl 1988, ix). In choosing this information, the editors were guided by three principles:1) that the information lie
between the overly general and the overly specialized, 2) that the
knowledge be widely known (as measured by its appearance in national periodicals), and 3) that the information have some lasting
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signiﬁcance (Hirsch 1988, ix–x). Hirsch sees the Dictionary as a
ﬁrst, tentative, unﬁnished attempt to chart this knowledge.
In a separate introduction, entitled “The Theory behind the
Dictionary: Cultural Literacy and Education,” written by Hirsch
alone, it becomes clear that he sees this body of common knowledge as essential for reading and learning. Without shared background knowledge, argues Hirsch, people cannot understand
what they read and hear. Like classic liberals, Hirsch sees the
ability to read and understand public discourse as the foundation of a democratic, prosperous society. He excoriates “multicultural antielitism” as an ironically paternalistic practice bound
to continue the suffering of disadvantaged students who need to
acquire cultural literacy to work their way out of their disadvantaged state (Hirsch, Kett, and Treﬁl 1988, xiv–xv). Here emerges
the concept of “cultural capital” introduced by Bordieu (1984) and
others, though Hirsch would not be caught uttering the ideas of
so radical an intellectual. Still, the concept is the same; people
need cultural capital to become socially mobile.
Most remarkable from the folklorist’s point of view is Hirsch’s
creating sections of “Mythology and Folklore” and “Proverbs” (ﬁnally to the topic of this essay) early in the Dictionary, just following “The Bible.” By “Mythology and Folklore,” Hirsch means, it
seems, stories of lasting signiﬁcance. “For purposes of communication and solidarity in a culture,” writes Hirsch in the paragraph
introducing this section, “myths are just as important as history”
(1988, 27). He continues, “The myths that are shared by literate
Americans are worldwide in their origins, and embrace both ancient and modern cultures” (p. 27). The mythological characters
and stories in this section come from Greek, Roman, and British sources, with only “John Henry” and “Washington and the
Cherry Tree” representing American folklore. For someone worried about the survival of American culture, Hirsch’s massive neglect of American materials (to say nothing of the odd choices of
John Henry and the Parson Weems story) seems to contradict his
announced intentions.
In an insightful chapter on “the problem of tradition” in American culture, particularly the “politics of tradition,” Bronner (1998,
67–68) notes how efforts like Hirsch’s lead inevitably to battles over
“whose tradition?”—despite Schwartz’s conﬁdent claim that this
question has been settled. The reader of Hirsch’s dictionaries of
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literacy and Bennett’s (1993, 1995) books of “virtue” notes quite
quickly the almost exclusively Western sources of the folklore reproduced for its universal wisdom. The reasoning seems to be (notwithstanding expressions, like Schwartz’s, for example, of appreciation for African American proverbs) that, since proverbs and the
“old stories” express a universal wisdom, then we may as well use
a body of folklore from Anglo-American traditions as our access.
The American folklorist is tempted to offer a catalogue of what
characters and stories Hirsch could have included in this section of the Dictionary, many of which well might have bolstered
the larger claims and intentions of the project, but let’s move on
to the section in the Dictionary on “Proverbs,” since my article
means to examine and extend Mieder’s and other folklorists’ careful research on the texts, textures, and contexts of people’s uses
of proverbs to manage their social relations, allay anxiety, and
persuade others to take some action.
“Proverbs represent the accumulated wisdom, prejudices, and
superstitions of the human race,” writes Hirsch in the paragraph
introducing the “Proverbs” section (1988, 46). He notes that the
folk ideas expressed by proverbs “are often common to many nations” (he quotes the German version of “many hands make light
work”), that part of the power of proverbs lies in the poetry of their
expression (e.g., the proverb rhymes in German, “Viele Haende/
Bringt’s gleich zu Ende”), and that the appropriateness of a proverb is wholly contextual, so that “Many hands make light work”
speaks to some situations, while “Too many cooks spoil the broth”
speaks to others. Hirsch argues that Americans need to know this
body of common proverbs because people often say or write truncated versions, and the meaning will be unclear if the reader or
listener does not know the full proverb. Hirsch also warns against
necessarily believing proverbs (e.g., “Boys will be boys”); he just
wants “to give everybody the chance to be an insider in American
literate culture” (1988, 46).
Again, the folklorist reading these entries wonders why Hirsch
and his fellow editors chose some proverbs and excluded others.
The proverbs in A First Dictionary of Cultural Literacy: What Our
Children Need to Know (1989), written for children, has an even
shorter list of proverbs (of “lasting signiﬁcance,” one presumes).
There is no point in offering an extended list of proverbs he could
have included, but let me make two points. First, given the goal of
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uplifting the morality of America’s children, why did Hirsch omit
“Cheaters never prosper [or win),” a proverb I have something to
say about later?
Second, I note that he misses completely one quality of proverbs that Geertz (1975, 26) says characterizes everyday knowledge—namely, its “earthiness,” its sometimes-obscene quality,
which helps pack its power. My mother was raised by her ScotsIrish grandmother in western Pennsylvania, and I remember from
my childhood numerous proverbs my mother learned from Granny and used when appropriate. “Shit or get off the pot” was an
all-purpose proverb meant to criticize indecision and urge action.
There are many of these. One lovely example came from one of
my university students in a folklore class. She recalled her father warning her just before dates that “A hard prick has no conscience,” a proverb that made a powerful impression on her. Her
adolescent boyfriend’s father or friends might have offered him
some advice from the other angle: “If she’s old enough to bleed
[i.e., menstruate], then she’s old enough to breed [get pregnant].”
In other words, avoid intercourse or use a condom.
You won’t ﬁnd these common proverbs in The Dictionary of
Cultural Literacy. Hirsch gives us the Disneyﬁed version of proverbs, just as Disney gives us the Disneyﬁed version of European
and American fairy tales and folktales. This is important to understand because whether or not the Dictionary has its intended
inﬂuence depends a lot on how children and even adults acquire
and use proverbs (or mythology and folklore, for that matter).
Because Hirsch, Bennett, and others put so much importance on the home and the school as sites where children and
adolescents acquire the cultural literacy they need to participate
knowledgeably in public discourse, to be comfortable “insiders” in
American culture, it is worth asking this question: How do children actually acquire cultural competence in folklore and mythology? Narrowing this question even more to the genre of proverbs,
is there any reason to believe that children acquire competence in
using proverbs by reading dictionary entries on proverbs, writing
the proverbs in copybooks, memorizing the proverbs, and showing
adults that they can recite the proverbs from memory (“by heart,”
as the interesting vernacular phrase has it)? The children’s folklorist’s answer to this question leads, I think, to some bad news
for Hirsch, Schwartz, and their colleagues.
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When, as a children’s folklorist, I look at the existing scholarship on proverbs, I am amazed to notice for the ﬁrst time that
proverbs really are not a children’s genre of everyday communication. Folklorists working on proverbs gather their materials
from adults and printed or electronic sources created by and for
adults. Some adolescent uses appear now and then (see the earlier proverbial advice about hard pricks and menstruating women),
but judging by scholarship, proverbs seem exclusively adult in
their uses and appeal.
Getting at this from the other direction, the scholarship by
children’s folklorists leads one to draw the same conclusion. Look
in vain in the usual places—e.g., Opie and Opie (1959), Bronner
(1988), Sutton-Smith et al. (1999)—for children’s uses of proverbs. The only example I could ﬁnd in Opie and Opie (1959, 137)
was “ﬁnders keepers/losers weepers,” but (like some examples
drawn from ﬁeldwork later) such a proverbial sort of rhyme seems
much more like an aggressive, combative claim—a taunt, really—
than an offered bit of wisdom.
Moreover, children’s acquisition of competence in expressing
oral and customary lore often depends on developmental forces
and schedules. Young children, for example, are incompetent
storytellers, jokers, and riddlers until they reach certain developmental stages, at which point they can perform competently,
which is to say that they can perform like adults. Learning to play
with language—a requisite skill for telling jokes and riddles competently—is an important developmental achievement. Similarly,
the metaphorical elements of stories provide practice in moving
competently between literal and ﬁgurative uses of language.
Psychologists and sociolinguists recognize these same elements in proverbs, observing how developmental stages coincide
with the child’s ability to understand their metaphorical quality.
Mieder points to that research in the book he and Deborah Holmes
(2000) wrote describing their experiment in teaching proverbs to
fourth graders. Mieder and Holmes developed their project in response to a Call for Proposals (CFP) from the John Templeton
Foundation for projects that would “increase scholarly and
pedagogical understanding of an approach to character education which involves the learning and employing of practical
moral principles encapsulated in the form of maxims, proverbs,
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aphorisms, and wise sayings” (Templeton Foundation CFP, quoted in Mieder and Holmes 2000, 7). Awarded a grant, Mieder and
Holmes executed their thoughtfully designed experiment. Mieder
provided the scholarly expertise on proverbs, chose the proverbs
to be incorporated into the curriculum, and about twice monthly
visited Holmes’s fourth-grade class, where he introduced some
new proverbs, showed how they were used in oral settings, literature, and mass media (cartoons, advertising, etc.), and had,
by his report, genuinely lively and fun conversations with these
nine-year-olds about proverbs. Holmes and Mieder designed a series of classroom activities around proverbs, including having the
students keep journals, write stories, draw illustrations, create
puppet plays, design illustrative posters, and more.
Classroom experiments, of course, require some assessments
of the “added value” of the educational exercises, and the authors
used a range of qualitative and quantitative measurements (standardized tests) to see how many of the proverbs were now part of
the children’s familiar knowledge and what the children thought
was the result of the project. The authors were quite satisﬁed
with the experiment and published their book to encourage other
teachers to incorporate proverbs into their instruction.
Mieder seems well aware of the pitfalls of this approach. In an
earlier essay (1994), he explores the notion that in any given society there may be a “minimum” body of proverbs familiar to a large
portion of the population. In reviewing the limited research on
the familiarity of proverbs to American students, he ﬁnds pretty
discouraging results, and he calls for broader, interdisciplinary
cooperation in establishing questionnaires and sampling procedures that will help establish empirically the minimum body of
widely shared proverbs in a society. Meanwhile, Mieder (1994,
308–9) notes that the “cultural literacy” project of Hirsch and his
colleagues seems to be getting at the same notion of a minimum
shared knowledge members of a society need to have. He comments that the Cultural Literacy (1987) book “added a controversial appendix,” providing an early, tentative list of “What Literate Americans Know,” a list later expanded into the Dictionary of
Cultural Literacy (1988). Mieder is troubled by Hirsch’s failure to
explain how he arrived at his list of “265 essential proverbs” and
his lack of any evidence about how frequently these proverbs have
appeared. Mieder faces Hirsch’s problem in his own scholarship,
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he acknowledges, whenever he creates lists of proverbs for dictionaries or other uses, as in the educational experiment he launched
with Holmes. Mieder (1994, 312) holds out hope that “scientiﬁc
demographic research” will answer, ﬁnally, the question both he
and Hirsch are posing—namely, can we identify the minimum
body of proverbs that we think Americans should know?
While I think the matter of common knowledge is a plenty interesting question, one worth asking in relation to Wallace’s ideas
about what it means to share culture, for example, the troubling
complication I bring to this discussion arises out of the fact that I
have done extensive ﬁeldwork with preadolescent and adolescent
boys in the natural setting of their summer encampments as a
Boy Scout troop (Mechling 2001). Amazingly, we do not have a
lot of ethnographic studies of children’s folklore in these natural
settings, but what scholarship exists suggests strongly that kids
do not use proverbs and proverblike expressions in their everyday lives. In my twenty-ﬁve years of ﬁeldwork with the troop I
studied, I never once heard a boy (ages eleven to seventeen) use a
proverb. It might have happened out of my hearing, but I doubt
it. The scoutmaster and other adults, for that matter, used proverbs and proverbial sayings only sparingly, and in any case the
kids did not seem to add those proverbs to their repertoire of folk
speech. Bronner (1988 and personal communications) has not
found children using proverbs, nor do proverbs come up in the
standard collection of essays on children’s folklore (Sutton-Smith
et al. 1999). Nor did the ethnographers Fine (1987) and Goodwin
(1990) discover any proverbs in their ﬁeldwork with kids. Look
as I may, I simply cannot ﬁnd in these standard ethnographies
of children’s folk cultures any examples of children’s spontaneous uses of proverbs. Just about every other genre is represented
except proverbs.
So why do children eagerly appropriate the genres of stories,
riddles, jokes, puns, and other wordplay and still not show much
interest in proverbs? The answer, I think, lies in the authority of
the proverb. Children’s folklore resists adult power. Children use
their folklore to manage their own psychological anxieties and
social relations within the friendship group, including power relations. But children also use folklore to undermine adult power,
very often in the form of parody. Mieder notes that “proverbs often
are too rigorous in their moral or ethical message” and that they
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have been “quoted too often as ultimate wisdom,” which gives rise
to parodic versions of proverbs, “twisted wisdom” and “antiproverbs,” as Mieder and Litovkina (1999) call them. Some of these
joke forms of proverbs—like “Wellerisms”—require wordplay that
is probably beyond most children’s and even adolescents’ abilities. Other joke forms of the proverb—such as changing just a
letter or word (Mieder 1996, 600) may be easier for young people
to understand.
Thus, I suspect but cannot prove that kids as young as eleven
or twelve probably can understand and appreciate joke versions
of proverbs, such as “If at ﬁrst you don’t succeed, give up. There’s
no sense being a fool about it” (a parody version of “If at ﬁrst you
don’t succeed, try, try again”), and I have seen Boy Scout patrols create long skits with a parody of a proverb as their punch
lines, such as “People who live in grass houses shouldn’t stow
thrones” (a parody of the proverb, “People who live in glass houses
shouldn’t throw stones”). Even early adolescents enjoy this sort
of punning and wordplay. But recognizing that adults sometimes
pontiﬁcate with proverbs does not mean that children actually believe and acquire the proverbs as part of their strategic repertoire
for communicating with their peers.
Hirsch is right that kids would not understand the humor of
the parodies and joke versions if they did not have some previous experience with the original proverbs. But what is gained for
“character education” if the kids learn to recognize the proverbs
and immediately make fun of them, thereby draining them of their
power as moral advice?
So Hirsch, Schwartz, and other like-minded teachers and parents who want a curriculum explicitly teaching proverbs, maxims,
and other folklore genres for the character development of children have things wrong in two ways. First, divorcing proverbs from
their everyday, performance contexts robs them of any meaning.
As Mieder observes, “Proverbs in collections are almost meaningless or dead” (1996, 597); they need to be acquired in living performance. The project he and Holmes designed tried to provide
kids with experiences in living performance, but the problem I see
is that the children’s performances were always for adults. I have
no doubt that the children in Holmes’s class thoroughly enjoyed
the curriculum built around proverbs, but we still lack evidence
(apart from self-report, notoriously unreliable in such cases) that
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the children actually acquired a living repertoire of proverbs that
they used in their everyday lives. I think these children performed
well and wisely to please the adults, but I am still skeptical about
what happened away from that classroom context.
Second, even when kids do acquire proverbs, they tend to use
them in parody or joke forms and not the ways adults want them
to. In this regard, proverbs resemble the Pledge of Allegiance and
other formulas that adults take very seriously. Until they are developmentally ready to understand the words and meanings of
the phrases, children merely memorize the pledge and often get
things wrong. Once they are old enough to actually understand
the words, they create parody versions they recite to each other
(usually out of the earshot of adults). Children’s folklorists ﬁnd
parody versions of many “sacred” texts, from “The Battle Hymn
of the Republic” to the “The Star-Spangled Banner.” The moral
seriousness of proverbs, as Mieder says, puts them in this class
of texts that adults take seriously and children parody to take at
least a little power away from the adults.
If those advocating character education through the memorization of moral maxims are willing to take recall and recognition
as a sign of good character—an educational strategy not unlike
teaching for the standardized tests in schools—then I suppose
they have improved some children’s characters in this narrow
sense. If, rather, we consider good character to mean more than
the mere recitation of moral maxims, to mean that a child or adolescent makes wise choices when confronted with a complex moral dilemma, then I believe we have to look elsewhere for the ways
children actually acquire everyday morality for living.

“Cheaters Never Prosper”
There is one other problem with treating proverbs as the cache
of cultural knowledge and wisdom—sometimes they lie. Conspicuously absent from Hirsch’s dictionaries of cultural literacy, both
the dictionary for adults and the one for children, is the wellknown “Cheaters never prosper” (also “Cheaters never win”). This
proverb and a very few others—“Sticks and stone may break my
bones/But words will never hurt me” and “ﬁnders keepers/losers
weepers,” for example—are the exception to my earlier generalization that children don’t use proverbs in their own folk groups
except in their parody and joking forms. Children do use proverbs
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like “Cheaters never win,” but the contexts do not suggest that the
children view these proverbs as folk wisdom. Quite the contrary,
children use these proverbs like charms meant to ward off a bad
eventuality or taunts to make another child unhappy. One child
telling another in a midst of a game that “Cheaters never prosper”
is not uttering a truth but an almost desperate hope in the face of
reality: cheaters actually prosper quite nicely in the world, judging from most evidence. Similarly, the child who responds to hurtful words with “Sticks and stones . . .” is really hurt and merely
trying to undermine the satisfaction the hateful kid is enjoying.
Children do acquire a moral or ethical system to use in everyday life, but they don’t learn such a system by memorizing the
Ten Commandments or twelve points of the Scout Law or a list of
proverbs. Those who have engaged in ﬁeldwork actually studying
the everyday behavior of children in their natural settings ﬁnd that
their ethical behavior is very situational. Most children come to understand that circumstances and contexts affect how one follows
a general principle to always tell the truth, for example, despite
the moral of the Parson Weems fanciful story about George Washington and the cheery tree. Making children memorize proverbs
like “Cheaters never prosper” or “Cheaters only hurt themselves”
invites cynicism. Surveys of student cheating regularly ﬁnd little
difference in cheating rates between religious and secular schools
(Mechling 1988), and a series of cheating scandals at the United
States service academies—the army’s at West Point, the navy’s at
Annapolis, and the air force’s at Colorado Springs—reveals that
even the most rigid and traditional of school honor codes are not
much defense against highly motivated cheaters.
So, as I said at the outset of this inquiry, advocates of character training who want to enlist traditional folklore, like proverbs,
in the project seem ignorant about the nature of children’s folk
cultures. These cultures are very rich (even if short on proverbs),
and they got that way not because adults provided them with
traditional folklore and customs but because they are dynamic, creative systems that appropriate materials from everywhere.
No symptom in children that adults see as evidence of a crisis
in character—from the most horrible events like the Columbine
shootings to the most mundane gestures like a dirty joke told to
shock parents—will be addressed by character education created
by adults for children. Even if there is a character crisis among
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America’s children—a claim I doubt very much—a better approach would be modeling good character in our own adult lives.
That we cannot even agree as adults about what constitutes good
character possibly makes us poor preachers to children. Maybe
the best course is to heed the wisdom of a traditional American
proverb: Leave well enough alone.

References
Abrahams, Roger D. 1968. A rhetoric of everyday life: Traditional conversational
genres. Southern Folklore Quarterly 32:44–59.
Bennett, William J. 1993. The book of virtues: A treasury of great moral stories.
New York: Simon & Schuster.
———. 1995. The children’s book of virtues. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Bordieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of taste. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Bronner, Simon J. 1988. American children’s folklore. Little Rock: August House.
———. 1998. Following tradition: Folklore in the discourse of American culture. Logan: Utah State University Press.
Fine, Gary Alan. 1987. With the boys: Little League baseball and preadolescent
culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Geertz, Cliford. 1975. Common sense as a cultural system. The Antioch Review
33:5–26.
Goodwin, Marjorie Harness. 1990. He-said-she-said: Talk as social organization
among black children. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Hirsch, E. D., Jr., 1987. Cultural literacy: What every American needs to know.
Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin.
Hirsch, E. D., Jr., Joseph F. Kett, and James Treﬁl, eds. 1988. The dictionary of
cultural literacy. Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin.
Hirsch, E. D., Jr., William G. Rowland, Jr., and Michael Stanford, eds. 1989. A
ﬁrst dictionary of cultural literacy: What our children need to know. Boston:
Houghton Mifﬂin.
Hunter, James Davison. 1991. Culture wars: The struggle to deﬁne America. New
York: Basic Books.
———. 1994. Before the shooting starts: Searching for democracy in America’s culture war. New York: Free Press.
———. 2000. The death of character: Moral education in an age without good or evil.
New York: Basic Books.
Mechling, Jay. 1988. On the relation between creativity and cutting corners. In
Adolescent psychiatry, edited by Sherman C. Feinstein Vol. 15, 346–66. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2001. On my honor: Boy Scouts and the making of American youth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mieder, Wolfgang. 1993. Proverbs are never out of season: Popular wisdom in the
modern age. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 1994. Paremiological minimum and cultual literacy. In Wise words: Essays on the proverb, edited by Wolfgang Mieder, 297–316. New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc.

125

What Goes Around

Comes Around

126

———. 1996. Proverbs. In American folklore: An encyclopedia, edited by Jan Harold Brunvand, 597–601. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.
Mieder, Wolfgang, and Deborah Holmes. “Children and proverbs speak the truth”:
Teaching proverbial wisdom to fourth graders. Burlington: University of Vermont.
Mieder, Wolfgang, and Anna Tóthné Litovvkina. 1999. Twisted wisdom: Modern
anti-proverbs. Burlington: University of Vermont.
Opie, Iona, and Peter Opie. 1959. The lore and language of school children. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Prahlad, Anand. 1996. African-American proverbs in context. Jackson: University
Press of Mississippi.
Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Schwartz, Arthur J. 2002. Transmitting moral wisdom in an age of the autonomous self. In Bringing in a new era in character education, edited by William
Damon, 1–21. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.
Shweder, Richard A. 2003. Why do men barbecue? Recipes for cultural psychology.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Sutton-Smith, Brian. 1981. The folkstories of children. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Sutton-Smith, Brian, Jay Mechling, Thomas W. Johnson, and Felicia R. McMahon, eds. 1999. Children’s folklore: A source book. Logan: Utah State University
Press.
Wallace, Anthony F. C. 1961. Culture and personality. New York: Random House.
West, Cornel. 1989. The American evasion of philosophy. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press.

The Proverb and Fetishism in
American Advertisements
Anand Prahlad

I

n 1977, Mieder and Mieder called our attention to the uses of
proverbs in American advertisements. Undoubtedly, many of
the same observations they make about proverbs are still applicable twenty years later. For example, they note that proverbs are
“the most popular folklore item used by Madison Avenue” (1977,
309). A perusal of contemporary magazine advertising reveals this
is still the case. The Mieders also mention some of the reasons
for this, including the brevity of the genre, the poetic qualities
of proverbs that draw attention to them and make them stick in
the reader’s mind, and their ability to inspire “trustworthiness in
the advertised product by awakening positive traditional feelings
in the consumer” (p. 309). They discuss further the “particular
love for changing proverbs” (p. 310) that heightens the appeal of
the advertisement. For example, the proverb, “Different strokes
for different folks,” becomes in a Volkswagen advertisement, “Different Volks for different folks.” Just as exciting as the insights
provided by Mieder and Mieder’s article are the possibilities that
their study invites for more theoretical analysis of proverbs in
advertising.
A focus on folklore in the world of advertising takes one immediately into an interdisciplinary realm, where elements of
popular culture, economics, politics, gender, and race become
as important to our understanding of how the traditional items
function as the folklore itself. Furthermore, an actual survey of
proverbs in magazine advertisements leads to some general observations that, in turn, suggest speciﬁc analytical directions. It
becomes apparent, for instance, that some theorizing about the
nature and content of advertisements is necessary to frame a
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discussion of proverbs within this particular context. For instance, what is the relationship between advertisements and the
economic system out of which they arise? What societal values
and social issues are reﬂected in advertisements, and what commentaries on these issues are offered? As for proverbs, what roles
do they play in these commentaries, and what further insights
can be gained into the relationship between elements of traditional and commercial culture through a study of proverbs in advertisements?
I would like to advance the idea that American advertising
operates as a system of signs reﬂecting what can be called the
“religion of capitalism.” I am using the term religion loosely to
refer to a system of beliefs, rituals, and dogma that guides behavior, offers answers to the most profound philosophical questions
of life, and provides a structure in time and space that helps to
order existence on both cosmic and day-to-day levels. Within this
religion, the god is capital, and the focus is ardently this-worldly.
There is an extreme emphasis on material wealth, accumulation
of objects, and an ongoing demonstration of power.
Tenets of this system, in many cases, are antithetical to those
of Christianity, the proclaimed religion of American society. For
example, material wealth takes priority over matters of the soul,
and objects are worshipped as passionately as the heavenly
Judeo-Christian God. This is evidenced by the amount of time
devoted to acquiring objects in comparison to the time devoted
to ensuring a seat in heaven. Rather than extolling humility, this
system celebrates displays of power and self-aggrandizement.
Hence, fame and being in the limelight become almost as important as being wealthy, and those who have “made it”—meaning,
basically, have become wealthy, but also including connotations
of being coldhearted, ruthless, and single-minded—are celebrated
as heroes (e.g., Donald Trump).
Ultimately, popular culture feeds off of the public’s seemingly
insatiable obsession with stars and stardom. In spite of the public
protest sparked by John Lennon’s comment that the Beatles were
more popular than Jesus, one must acknowledge it contains an
element of truth. It is interesting that lately such icons are offered
roles closer to that of priests with power to induct initiates into the
inner circles of their domain (e.g., the recent reality television series, The Apprentice). But just as major religions have historically

The Proverb and Fetishism
in American Advertisements

felt compelled to signal their conquest of territories by literally
or ideologically ﬂying their ﬂags and banners, so, too, does the
system of capitalism seem obligated to exhibit its dominance constantly.
Advertising is one among many other forms of exhibition. The
most fundamental reason for advertisements is to generate sales,
to get consumers to spend their money; however, their function
extends beyond the behavioral realm and reaches into the region
of beliefs and values. Those invested in the buying habits of consumers are not just interested in their behaviors; they are equally
determined to inﬂuence their value system because the consumer
who reasons that he/she needs a new car because the old one is
no longer functional is nowhere near as desirable as the person
who is convinced that he/she needs a new car because it will
somehow magically transform him/her into someone else.
Drawing on the idea of a capitalist religion, I consider advertisements as ad/altars. The terminology suggests a number of
important points. First, it proposes that advertisements sell not
just the commodities depicted but also a complete system of values. Furthermore, the term forwards the notion that as visual
displays, advertisements provide us with inventories of those objects that are most valued within the society and have the greatest
symbolic meaning within the capitalist system. Additionally, the
term recognizes the religious overtones characterizing the way in
which consumers relate to commodity culture. In other words,
there is a kind of reverence not just for speciﬁc commodities but
also for the system that places such an emphasis on buying power
and an endless acquisition of objects. There is also a disquieting
passion among American consumers that often mirrors what one
expects to ﬁnd among religious devotees. Hence, advertisements
can be read as paying homage to revered objects, persons, and
ideas, as visual displays of icons and power objects. Finally, the
term signiﬁes the complexity of relationships between the speciﬁc items within an advertisement and their potential to reﬂect
the dynamics among groups and social forces operating within
American society.

The Fetish: From Freud to Marx to Advertising
It is at this juncture that the concept of the fetish becomes
useful, and I can begin to explore the roles of proverbs within the
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context of advertisements. The term fetish here encompasses the
core elements of this phenomenon from a number of diverse discourses, including psychoanalysis, cultural studies, gender and
Marxist theory, and anthropological writings. Elements common
to all of these are summarized by McClintock, who writes, “Fetishes can be seen as the displacement onto an object (or person)
of contradictions that the individual cannot resolve at a personal
level. . . . By displacing power onto the fetish, then manipulating the fetish, the individual gains symbolic control over what
might otherwise be terrifying ambiguities” (1995, 184). Thus, “fetishes can be any object under the sun,” including objects from
the natural or manufactured worlds, items from private or public
spheres—for instance, a locket, photograph, etc., or nationalistic
and religious signs like ﬂags, crowns, maps, crosses, etc. (p. 185).
The idea of a fetish as a “power object” is common to most uses
of the term, whatever the particulars may be. But perhaps more
important are the reasons that make the fetish necessary or that
inﬂuence the choice of this particular object over others.
Fetishism can be viewed as a response to trauma, particularly
one that presents incongruities that are difﬁcult to rationalize or
resolve. In Freudian theory, the young man is traumatized by the
discovery that his mother does not have a penis—by the overwhelming presence of her biological difference—and thus seizes
upon an object as a substitute for the female genitalia. The particulars of Freud’s scenario aside, the essential points are 1) the
fetish functions as a symbolic signiﬁer of what is desired but too
overwhelming to confront or interact with directly (thus, the fetish negotiates between the imagined and the real, enabling the
fetishizer to have a sense of control over that which terriﬁes him);
and 2) At the core of fetishistic impulse are both trauma and a potentially disabling sense of loss. The fetish object is thus compensatory. This is best seen by comparing an alternate mechanism,
melancholia, which is also a response to trauma. In the case of
melancholia, the individual suffers a paralyzing ennui, whereas
fetishists continue to be high-performance individuals with no
noticeable signs of social dysfunction. For this reason, some
scholars have lauded the merits of the fetish impulse, considering it a creative solution to potentially crippling events as well as
a critical means for understanding the modern age. One author
suggests that “fetishism is at the heart of modernity” (McCallum
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1999, xi) and that “fetishism is a form of subject-object relation
that informs us about basic strategies of deﬁning, desiring, and
knowing subjects and objects in Western culture” (pp. xi–xii).
Even the term “commodity fetish” from Marxist theory relies
upon the same basic notions. The disjunction or irresolute elements from the Marxist perspective are the use value of objects
versus their market values. While the use value is determined
simply by factors such as the cost of production, the market value depends on a diverse set of social factors. The use value of a
music CD may be ﬁfty cents; however, its market value may be
twenty-ﬁve dollars. Factors such as the celebrity status of the
singer, the age of the CD, and the reviews it garners inﬂuence its
market value as along with speciﬁc group-determined values. For
instance, it may be fashionable among particular groups to wear
certain articles of clothing, and doing so may be critical to one’s
status within these groups. Hence, the inﬂated market value of
these articles of clothing bears little relation to the use value. Although Marxist theorists deemphasize the psychological level, the
intersection between this approach and the perspectives already
discussed is apparent. For example, capitalist societies have obsessions with particular objects—commodity fetishes. These objects are invested with “magical” power; they negotiate between
disparate realities and, arguably, function as signiﬁers for what is
desired but also feared.
As confounding as the concept of the fetish may seem, and
in spite of the diverse nuances ascribed to the term by differing
ﬁelds of study, a fetish comes down to a power object, an object
with which an individual or group is obsessed and one that becomes a symbolic Band-Aid for an extreme emotional wound. Although the stereotypical image of fetishes is sexually related, the
concept extends far beyond the sexual realm. Stereotypically, we
may imagine someone who cannot achieve sexual function without the presence of a particular object, for instance, a hairbrush.
The hairbrush then becomes simultaneously a sign of the man’s
inability to confront the overwhelming and terrifying difference
of the female body and his method for negotiating this terror to
have at least some kind of interaction and experience a degree
of sexual pleasure. In the case of proverbs, a shy and introverted child may become ﬁxated on a particular proverb spoken by
a parent and use the proverb as a method for interacting with
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peers. At the point when the child can only interact with peers
if he/she uses the proverb, it can be considered fetishistic. As
with the man and his hairbrush, the child uses the proverb as
a tool to negotiate between his fear and his desire to be close to
peers. The proverb becomes a power object for the child, something that he/she relishes and holds closely and obsessively to
traverse dangerous emotional territory. Similarly, at the point
when someone, hypothetically, can only ﬂy on an airplane if he/
she has brought a lucky nickel, or can only socialize with others
if he/she is wearing a cruciﬁx, then these objects have become
fetishistic. Fetishes console and empower; they make their bearers fertile and virile, and without them the fetishist is impotent,
inarticulate, and disempowered by an overwhelming sense of inadequacy and even confusion about personal identity relative to
others.
My contention, then, is that to the extent that ad/altars contain inventories of objects with which Americans are obsessed as
well as provide insights into the relationships among these items,
they offer abundant glimpses into common American fetishes. As
William Pietz notes, objects carry meaning far beyond their pragmatic uses: “In postmodern society (so it is said), it is no longer
the material use of products that is the object of our consumption
so much as their commodiﬁed meanings” (1993, 124). In fact, if
one of our goals in looking at proverbs in advertisements is to
understand better the diverse elements present in ads, I cannot
think of a more appropriate theoretical model for looking at these
proverbs than through the lens of fetishism.
Because proverbs occur in contexts I have identiﬁed as fetishistic ad/altars, this essay will investigate the relationship between
proverbs and these other elements. I will endeavor to show that
the fetishistic display of ad/altars typically reveals anxieties and
power issues relating to the dominant, white, male relationship
with women, nature, and minorities, and to explore ways in which
proverbs play roles in conveying messages about these issues and
relationships. Through my analysis, I hope to demonstrate that
proverbs are far more than simply whimsical, charming catchphrases that attract attention and invite humorous and familial
responses from consumers. While they do do these things, proverbs also function on a less apparent level as ad/altars to reﬂect
ongoing struggles with gender, class, and race.
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A number of elements immediately become apparent from a
survey of magazine advertisements that include proverbs. One is
the extent to which women’s bodies are fetishized. As consumers,
we are so accustomed to the sexualized images of women as integral components of advertising that we practically take them for
granted. As the proverbial adage says, “Sex sells.” But a close inspection of advertisements reveals some of the more speciﬁc elements of this commercial truism. It is apparent that young, seemingly available, white women are one of the dominant fetishes
in American advertisements. This suggests a sense of impotence
in the absence of such women, and their role in the white, male
imagination as objects that negotiate between fears and desires.
What then may some of those fears and desires be? Some possible fears include an inability to enjoy intimacy and connection
with women, men, nature, and “othered” groups, nationally and
internationally; and the desires are to actually have such relationships. Hence, another fetish revealed in advertisements is the
image of women, rather than a real woman. There is an overlap
between advertisements and pornography as an idealized fantasy, embodied in photographic images; both become the means of
obtaining satisfaction. As such, advertising becomes a gateway to
dreams, two of the most pervasive, popular fantasies being wealth
and sexual pleasure (Williams 1991, 221).
But beyond the idea that sexualized images of women constitute a pervasive fetish in American advertising, it’s clear that
ads also contain a plethora of speciﬁc, commonly identiﬁed male
fetishes. Fetishized female body parts include legs, feet, hair, lips,
breasts, necks, ears, backs, shoulders, navels, bellies, and buttocks. In addition to body parts, fetishized articles of clothing and
materials are common (e.g., jewelry, shoes, silks, furs, undergarments, and gloves). Although I have found no instances of corsets
in advertisements—an item that has been described as “one of the
most important fetish fashions” (Steele 1996, 58)—the popular
aesthetic of the small waist that dominates images of women in
American mass culture appears to allude to this fetish.
While my argument is not that every man who views or creates advertisements, is in the literal sense, a fetishist, I am suggesting that objects commonly known to be obsessions of extreme
fetishists are key elements in ads. Furthermore, I am proposing
that, although these objects may not be necessary for consumers
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them a kind of psychological pleasure. This pleasure derives from
possessing these objects and the wealth, social status, and other
signiﬁers of upper-class membership (either through fantasy or
symbolically) that accrues to those purchasing the objects. As
Steele notes, “Although fetishism narrowly deﬁned appears to be
distinctly a minority practice, a degree of fetishism appears to be
extremely common among men—normative, in other words, if not
‘normal’” (1996, 12). Hence, it seems safe to assert that advertising is largely a male medium.

Proverbs and Ad/Altars
Having discussed some of the common fetishes in ad/altars,
as well as the ways they reveal psychological and social issues, I
turn now to uses of proverbs in advertising. Overall, proverbs reinforce the messages communicated by the advertisements, which
seems obvious, given that the major reason for the advertisement
is to sell particular commodities and values. In the Mieder and
Mieder (1977) essay referred to earlier, a number of reasons are
given for why proverbs are effective tools in advertising (e.g., their
brevity, familiarity, and association with tradition and wisdom),
but they are also successful because they rhetorically negotiate
between the real and the imagined. Abrahams (1968) describes
this characteristic of proverbs by saying they address a current
conﬂict by presenting a hypothetical resolution. Thus, the ad/altar is a negotiation site. As I have mentioned, one negotiation is
between the fetishist’s fears and his desires. Another is between
the fetishist and the consumer, and this happens on a number
of levels. For example, the advertiser/fetishist is attempting to
entice the consumer to enter the gateway of dreams, to adopt
the advertiser’s values and, at least symbolically, to share in the
wealth and lifestyle of those at the top of the food chain. He is
trying to convince consumers that what they could have is better
than what they do have, that who they could be is preferable to
who they are.
Given the prevailing context for American advertising, one predominant function of ad/altars is to negotiate between capitalist
and Christian value systems, and the proverb is a key element in
this mediation. While advertisers are driven by capitalist values,
they understand that effective advertising must be careful not to

134

The Proverb and Fetishism
in American Advertisements

appear dismissive or critical of Christian ideals. The negotiation is
a tricky one. Advertisers must anticipate the extent to which extolling capitalist values is permitted by an audience that at least
publicly subordinates that value system to Christianity. The need
for coded signiﬁers is great, both for those who nod toward traditional, conservative values and those who proselytize capitalism.
When we consider what some of the values of capitalism are, the
tension between these two systems becomes abundantly clear.
Within the capitalist system, for instance, making money is the
most important value. Thus, humanitarian values typically associated with religion, religious mandates drawn from such sources
as the Ten Commandments, notions about goodness, fairness,
and oneness, and more culture-speciﬁc notions that emerged out
of American’s puritanical roots are all dismissed in the interest of
amassing and exhibiting wealth. The proverb is one of the most
reliable and persistent markers of traditional, conservative values
and a humanitarian and Christian attitude appearing in American
advertising. At the same time, it must assist the advertiser’s most
important mission—the perpetuation of the capitalist system.
While many ad/altars offer abundant material for extended
analysis of proverbs in advertisements, I would like to consider
initially a few that demonstrate simply the close connection between proverbs and fetishes. One such ad consists almost completely of a woman’s feet. She is apparently sitting down, wearing
ﬁshnet stockings, with one shoe on and the other shoe off. Beside
her feet is a picture of an American Express card, and across one
foot is the expression, “Two is better than one.” The central theme
of foot, shoe, and stocking fetishes is quite evident here. Another
example contains a full-body photo of a woman in high heels,
wearing low-cut blue jeans and a shirt that leaves her stomach
area bare. Her hand is on her hip, which is jutting out provocatively to the side. Beside the woman in huge red letters are the
words, “WAIST NOT,” followed by a paragraph of smaller print and
a picture of a Triple Lean diet-formula container. The ad clearly
draws our attention again to the shoe/foot fetish, as well as to fetishes of bellies/navels, large breasts, and small waists that evoke
practices of corsetry. A Cointreau liquor ad consists of a full body
shot of a woman holding liquor bottles in both hands, dressed in
an orange peel that covers only her breasts and pubic area. The
proverbial text is contained in the line, “Be Cointreauversial to
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the beat of a different drummer,” and the fetishes are the same as
the ones in the previous example, with the exception of legs and
feet. Examples of ad/altars coupling proverbs and fetishes are
undeniably commonplace, but what are some of the more complex meanings in these advertisements?
One advertisement appears in Penthouse, a men’s skin magazine that probably ranks next to Playboy in its efforts to appeal
to a highly educated, professional, male readership. Hence, the
magazine features ﬁction, essays, and interviews by (and with)
acclaimed authors, artists, and others of note. The advertisement
under discussion consists of a side view of a woman lying on her
back, her hips and buttocks raised by her hands, with her legs in
the air. She is lying on a white sheepskin, wearing silver stilettos
and her pink underpants, which are presumably in the process
of being removed (they are almost through one foot and near the
ankle of the other). She wears red lipstick and has red nails; pearl
earrings, bracelet, and necklace; and a purple silk robe that covers only her shoulder. Her face is turned toward the camera, and
her eyes are closed and her mouth open, suggesting that she is
uttering sounds that may accompany sexual activity. On the left
top of the page, against the black background that covers the entire page, in large,capital letters and the same pink color as the
woman’s underwear is the phrase, “PENTHOUSE BENDS OVER
BACKWARDS.” Below this phrase in white lettering is a blurb
touting the wonderful things about the magazine, and a box to ﬁll
in basic information if one desires to subscribe.
A number of fetishes coalesce in this ad to convey multiple
meanings. For example, all the articles of dress, as well as each
of the woman’s body parts, are common American fetishes. The
proverbial expression is connected most obviously to the underwear fetish by its lettering sharing the identical pink color. The
positioning on the page encourages the eye to move at an angle downward from the proverb to the underwear, and down the
woman’s leg to her bottom, making the proverb meaning difﬁcult
to miss. The reader is invited to take his pick of fetishes because
the ad conveys the message that the magazine offers fetishes for
all tastes. As a literary counterpart to the panties, the proverb
conveys to the reader that, true to the values of the capitalist
system, traditional culture is also commodiﬁed, eroticized, and
as willingly at the disposal of the male voyeur as is the naked
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woman. These messages about the proverb are reinforced in the
accompanying text through such language as “hard-hitting investigative journalism that gets to the truth”; “ﬁction that absorbs the
mind”; “fashion that reﬂects a unique sense of style”; “satire that
bites”; and “women that inspire the imagination to run wild.”
Through these descriptions, the reader is depicted as an intellectual male who has a fashion sense and a proper reverence
for tradition, and is sexually aggressive and entitled to “cut loose”
through leisurely exhibitions of dominance over women and nature. Interestingly, the image invoked does not vary too greatly
from that of a colonial explorer. In a clever twist, the magazine
identiﬁes itself as someone submissive, who “bends over backwards,” an allusion that verbally conjures up a servant and visually evokes notions of a derrière. In either case, the proverb helps
create the sense that the reader is in charge while the magazine
is, like the woman depicted, at his service. “Being a man,” “taking
charge,” or “taking” the woman become equated with spending
money, with subscribing to the magazine. The proverb works in
tandem with the visual image to entice the reader to enter the
gates of the dream.
Many other ad/altars routinely include these same messages,
and the proverbs in them function in much the same fashion. A
Liz Claiborne ad depicts a blonde woman sitting on a beach with a
crystal blue ocean in the background. She wears a short-sleeved
shirt and a pair of shorts, both on the conservative side, and her
head is turned as if she is looking out to sea, her neck open and
exposed. The sand where she sits looks more like a sheepskin
than real sand. There are white clouds in the sky behind her, with
one small patch of blue, and a white sandbar. At the very bottom of the page are the words, “Live for the moments: LIZ CLAIBORNE.” While the ad/altar plays down sexualized messages, it
does not avoid them. The message conveyed is that women need
not ﬂaunt their sexual appeal; in fact, even in the midst of the
most sexualized contexts, they should maintain a measure of
modesty. Hence, the voyeur is invited to be more reﬁned, to focus
on fetishes such as the neck, arms, and bare feet and remember
that “she,” the white woman, remains an angelic character in the
master narrative.
As Dyer writes, this representation is consistent with the use of
light and whiteness in ancient European and American visual art:
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The angelically glowing white woman is an extreme representation,
precisely because it is an idealization. It reached its apogee towards
the end of the nineteenth century and especially in three situations
of heightened perceived threat to the hegemony of whiteness. British ideological investment in race categories increased in response
to spectacular resistance to its Empire. . . . The white woman as
angel was in these contexts both the symbol of what virtuousness
and the last word in the claim that what made whites special as
a race was their non-physical, spiritual, indeed ethereal qualities
(1997, 127).

Through the image of the pristine seaside, the messages of white,
and upper-class, privilege are conveyed. The proverb, which is a
form of command, invites the working class and nonwhite consumer to experience the peace and calmness depicted and reminds the consumer for whom the image is already a reality to
revel in her privilege. More present here than in the preceding
example is the suggestion that a beachside image can function as
fetishistically as the image of a white woman. Just as the scene
becomes a fetishized reﬂection of anxieties arising from a nostalgic longing for not just a place but also a time removed from the
pressures and horrors of modern life, the traditionalness of the
proverb becomes an element in this fantasy.
A third altar also alludes to leisure-time play and carries many
of the same meanings. In this ad/altar for Jantzen, a tall white
woman in a bathing suit poses against the background of a lush
waterfall. She is perhaps thirty-ﬁve and wears a pink head wrap,
a one-piece bathing suit with bright pink ﬂowers and green leaves
and pink slippers, and holds a towel or beachwear of the same
material as her bathing suit. At the bottom of the altar is a black
box with the words “SHAPE insurance,” the two words separated
by what seems to be the shape of a woman’s body with a classic,
hourglass ﬁgure. The small waist is exaggerated in the logo ﬁgure,
recalling some of the extreme instances of corsetry in the annals
of fetishism. Below the logo are the words, “When the suit ﬁts,
wear it.” This altar offers a third variation on the common theme.
The woman here is more sexualized than in the second example,
but less than in the ﬁrst. The focus is on her very long legs, which
are positioned the way models in fashion shows stand, with one
leg in front of the other, slightly bent. Also like fashion models,

138

The Proverb and Fetishism
in American Advertisements

she has her hand on her hip, one shoulder turned slightly toward
the camera, emphasizing her shoulders and neck.
The proverb on this altar can be read in a number of ways.
The most obvious is that if a woman is lucky enough to ﬁt one
of Jantzen’s suits, she should ﬂaunt it (the suit and her body).
But this message is complicated by other elements encoded into
the altar, for metaphorically, the suit includes whiteness, a thin
ﬁgure, and class privilege. Hence, the proverb takes on the commanding tone of the previous example, giving women the imperative to ﬂaunt their literal and metaphorical attributes. In other
words, one should not feel guilty or bashful about having a body
that inspires voyeurs and fetishists, nor should one hesitate to
exhibit one’s political, racial, and economic advantage over lessfortunate groups of people. At the same time, the proverb conveys a strong message that women should accept their roles as
fetishized objects—suit, in this case, being equated to role within
the power system.
Two additional ad/altars advertising diamonds further illustrate these points. In addition to the fetishistic aspects of proverbs
in the previous examples, the ones in these two ad/altars more
speciﬁcally negotiate between capitalist and Christian values. In
the ﬁrst example, a tall woman leans provocatively against a giant
perfume bottle, her hands on her hips, again in the exaggerated
pose of a fashion model. She is wearing an elegant black dress
that reveals her legs and her chest, arms, and shoulders; she
also has on long black gloves and black stilettos that tie around
her ankles. Around her wrist is a diamond bracelet, and an enormously thick diamond necklace (reminiscent of the necklaces
worn by women in certain African tribes to stretch their necks)
adorns her neck; in addition, she is holding what seems to be
another jeweled necklace in her hand. She stares directly into the
camera, and beside her head is written, “Woman cannot live by
diamonds alone.” At the bottom of the page, below the perfume
bottle is “BILL BLASS, PERFUME FOR WOMEN: at the Ultima II
counter.”
The juxtaposition of the original proverb (which suggests the
importance of attending to one’s spiritual life as well as one’s
material needs) and the version here (which emphasizes material extravagance) captures diametrically opposed perspectives.
However, through the creative manipulation of the proverb and
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its proximity to the visual image, the consumer is more apt to be
lulled by the familiar ring of the expression into the fantasy world
of the altar than be disturbed by its message. Upon further scrutiny, however, one must ask, “What can possibly be equated to
spiritual riches if diamonds are merely ‘bread’?” The answer supplied by the ad—perfume—elevates the sensory world of scents
to the level of spiritual rapture. The ostentatious celebration of
material wealth here is particularly disturbing when we consider
the source of the diamonds and the colonial context in which the
Western world came to own most of the diamonds that it has. Diamonds are inherently exoticized, not only because of their innate
natural qualities but because they are colored by the social and
political contexts out of which they become our property—they are
literally extracted from the bowels of the earth by dark and sweaty
hands. One may read the proverb as, “A white woman cannot live
solely on the appropriated riches of colonized people—diamonds;
she must also have those things that are derived from the white
man’s ingenuity and reﬁned taste—perfume.”
The second ad/altar advertises diamonds by Friedman’s and
consists of a close-up photo of a white woman’s face, drawing
special attention to her eyes and lips. Her skin has a soft, ﬁltered
glow and appears more olive colored than white. She has dark
eyebrows and eyeliner and an inviting, romantic smile. In the
foreground are three ﬁngers of her hand, lighted to make them
whiter. On one of the ﬁngers is a large diamond ring. Across one
of her cheeks, just below her eyes, is the phrase, “You have to see
it to believe it,” and at the bottom of the page in larger print: “The
Lovecut Diamond: Twice the size, four times the sparkle, half the
price.”
The question that the proverb invites here is “What is it?” for
certainly this altar, like the others, is advertising more than just
the commodity. The woman becomes as much or more the object
of the gaze and focus of the advertisement than the diamond,
and she is no less a fetish than the Aunt Jemima on the cereal
box (see Deck, 2001). One clear subject here is the hidden “jewel”
of white womanhood that is teasingly alluded to in the proverb
and the descriptive text that follows. Both the diamond and the
proverb are cast as fetishes negotiating between this irresistible
jewel and the fetishist’s relentless desire for it. The ad/altar furthermore comments on the institution of marriage, and as such,
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implicitly involves Christianity. Here the sacredness of the marriage bond—depicted through the placement of the diamond ring—
is juxtaposed with the extravagant display of material wealth. The
ad seems to be conveying the message that marriage is about the
material symbols, whether those symbols are read literally as the
diamond or metaphorically as the jewel of white womanhood.
Another kind of ad/altar where the commodity by its very nature seems to conﬂict with Christian values is liquor advertising.
Liquor falls, by some standards, automatically into the realm of
sin and evokes images of sexuality that run counter to conservative Christian values. Liquor ads, which are among the most
male-oriented types, promote partying and glorify male privilege.
Two such ads emphasize the idea that men should ritualistically
celebrate their hedonistic impulses, which generally involves rites
that reinforce the objectiﬁcation and commodiﬁcation of women.
A José Cuervo tequila ad/altar illustrates these points. The altar contains a large image of the upper half of a smiling, young
blonde woman’s body against a white background. She is dressed
in a shirt that exposes her arms, parts of her chest, and her neck.
At the bottom of the ad is a sea of yellow liquid (tequila), a bottle of
tequila, and the words in large letters, “Viva Cuervo.” The proverb
is written in yellow, like the tequila, across the chest and arms of
the young woman. It reads, “All work and no play is totally missing the point.”
This revised proverb offers important insights into the capitalist system being celebrated. What, one may ask, is meant by
“work” and “play” within this ideological context? The restricted
deﬁnition of work being alluded to involves man’s obligatory service as a labor drone in the capitalist hive. It is this labor that
certiﬁes one’s claim to manhood. Play refers speciﬁcally to activities that may be grouped under the heading “partying.” Thus, the
ad/altar positions the advertiser as someone who believes that
enjoying life, rather than making money, is “the point” of it all.
More speciﬁcally, partying with a young, sexy blonde woman is
the point. This message is driven home by the pastiche of fetish
imagery—the angelic, sexy, eager-to-please, young white woman
and the bottle of tequila. The proverb gives a nod to the Christian
work ethic by suggesting that work is, in fact, important and one
should engage in it most of the time. At the same time, the proverb gives license for one to step outside of that ethic and do so
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by engaging in behaviors condemned by Christian conservatives:
drinking and casual sex.
A second liquor ad/altar positions the bottle in exactly the
same spot on the page, at the bottom, right corner. Against a red
background is a black-and-white photograph on the left-hand side
of the page. In the photograph, a blonde woman in a black thong
is jumping out of a cake while a group of men smile broadly and
cheer. One gets the impression that this may be a bachelor party,
an occasion when this ritual is often enacted. There are eight
men; one is African American, and the other seven are white. One
of the smiling men in front is holding a garter presumably thrown
by the woman. Surrounding the photograph are very large, oversized letters that read, “A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND
WORDS, AND THESE GUYS WILL DENY EVERY SINGLE ONE.”
The proverb operates on a number of levels. First, it validates
the idea that the men are engaged in a secretive, male-centered
ritual. The ritual is one where men are willing to publicly expose
their sexual fantasies through the fetish object of the stripper. As
is often the case with such rituals, the possibility exists that the
ritual mediates homoerotic desires by focusing the male gaze and
aroused desire on the female fetish object.
The proverb, then, is not only a signiﬁer of the “beast” in men
that may only surface in secretive rituals but submerged homoerotic desire as well. The beast spoken of here is one that leads
men to give in to their sexual urges, even if it involves broken
promises and inﬁdelity. The whisky bottle, the stripper, and the
proverb are all testimonies to white male entitlement that makes
savoring the fruits of the empire more important than rhetorical admonitions against such behavior—those found in religious
texts. The proverb, in particular, mediates between a Christian
value system that scorns these men’s behavior and the capitalistic encouragement to act this way. In this context, the proverb
promotes secretiveness and dishonesty as ways to evade the system of Christian norms, rewards, and punishments. The multiple fetishes conjoin to undermine the supposed sanctity of the
soon-to-be consummated marital union by recognizing the man’s
inability to experience the profound intimacy expected of marriage partners. This impotence is conﬁrmed by the importance of
gaining “real” pleasure through fetishistic representations. The
ad/altar furthermore attests to the primacy of the prospective
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groom’s relationship with his male friends and his fetishes over
his relationship with his ﬁancée: “Real Friends. Real bourbon.”
The most fundamental vows that will govern his life, then, are silence and loyalty to his male friends and their world of vice rather
than commitment to his partner. The proverb can thus be completed, “A picture is worth a thousand words. Good thing she’ll
never see any of them.”
Aesthetics of whiteness seem to be the explicit focus of some
altars, so much so that the visual image could easily be part of
a museum exhibit on white female beauty. One such altar consists simply of a black-and-white, close-up photo of a young woman looking directly at the camera. Her hair is long and blowing
around her face. Above the photo are the words, “What hair care
goes above and beyond?” The altar is advertising Aveda shampoo,
and the printed text emphasizes its natural ingredients—hence,
the more “natural” (black-and-white) photo. However, the altar is
also, like any art, an advertisement of aesthetics.
Another altar is almost entirely ﬁlled by a photograph of a
woman’s neck, shoulders, upper chest, and most of the side of
her face. The only disruption in the display of her body is a black
dress on which are two large, decorative (diamond) broaches.
She is wearing elegant earrings and dark glossy lipstick. Right
above her shoulder and beside her exposed neck is written, “The
more things change, the more they stay MONET.” But what are
“things?” What are the changes mentioned, and what does Monet
signify? May “things” refer to the continued domination of a Eurocentric aesthetic? May the altar be reafﬁrming the empire’s criteria for beauty, purity, and that which is presumably the ultimate
object of desire? And may one of the things that have remained
Monet be the submissive posture of women and their continued
subordination within the structure of this empire?
The allusion to European aesthetics is also central to an altar
devoted to Caswell-Massey’s Beauty Nectar. In contrast to the visual images in most altars, this one consists of a painting, “Beautiful Awakening,” by American artist Skip Liepke. The painting is
rendered in the style of European nudes of the Renaissance period. A redheaded young woman is sitting on a bed, or in a chair,
her lower torso draped in a colorful towel or blanket. She looks
to be just arising but captured in a moment of contemplation.
She is leaning forward, an elbow on her leg, a hand under her
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chin, and her eyes are closed. The viewer’s eyes are drawn to her
unclothed back, shoulders, and arm. If the viewer does not make
the association between the painting and European civilization,
the text advertising the product makes it clear. Written in poetic
form, the text reads, “The indulgence for all over skin beauty/
Overﬂowing with moisturizers./Enriched. . . ./With three alphahydroxy fruit acids./ Healing Vitamin E./Encased in apothecary
glass/For once-upon-a-time luxury, style, beauty.” Across the top
of the altar, beginning in the woman’s hair, is the proverb: “To be
beautiful or not to be, is no longer the question . . .” The remolded
Shakespearean lines make an obvious link to European aesthetics and further suggest that the question of beauty, of aesthetics
has been answered once and for all: Are you beautiful?—“you”
being the woman in the painting and those she symbolizes.
When we consider this ad/altar in the larger context of American society, the question takes on greater signiﬁcance, for one
must ask why the question exists in the ﬁrst place. Who questions the Eurocentric standard of beauty? Can the message here,
this reafﬁrmation of what has historically been the dominant aesthetic for beauty, be motivated by a period of social movements,
e.g., multiculturalism, which are seen by some as assaults on the
single, dominating standard of beauty in American society? The
phrase, “For once-upon-a-time luxury, style, beauty,” certainly
suggests a reactionary reclamation of a fairy-tale-like world, peopled by white princes and princesses.
A number of other altars also address this tension, providing reassurance that the white standard of beauty is secure. An
Olay altar depicts a white woman’s face, shoulder, and part of her
neck. She is giving herself a facial, and the ad is for facial cleansers. In the lower right-hand corner of the altar is the Olay logo (a
circle with a woman’s face inside), the word “Olay” in large letters,
and the proverblike phrase, “Love the skin you’re in.” Although
not a traditional proverb, the phrase is formulaically similar to
“Love the one you’re with” and is designed to function proverbially here.
As much as anything else, the ad encourages white women
to love their whiteness. As with the Caswell-Massey altar, I propose that this one is in dialogue with social movements and tensions arising from challenges to the dominant standard of beauty
in late-twentieth-century America. This tension results not only
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from declarations of pride and arguments for diverse standards of
beauty emerging from people of color but from movements such
as multiculturalism—and to some extent, feminism—that erode
hegemonic values by insisting on diversity and relativity in the
standards by which people are measured. The rising incidence of
biracial children and more widespread acceptance of interracial
relationships are additional social factors that threaten to undermine ideologies of white supremacy. We may imagine the messages in these advertisements as responses to assaults on white,
male fetishes, as commands and pleas to white women to remain
loyal to the system from which these values spring.
A Bulova altar separates the page into two halves. The top
half has a blue background, two pictures of watches, a list of
upper-echelon stores that carry the watches, the word “Bulova”
in huge letters, and below it, “Keeping America’s time for generations.” The bottom half is divided into two sides—one with a
photograph of an older woman, the other with a photograph of a
younger woman. Both are dressed conservatively with little effort
to sexualize them. Beside the older woman is written, “Foaming
Cleanser/Handwritten Letters/String Quartets/Bulova.” Beside
the younger woman is “Kiwi Mudmask/E-mail/String Bikinis/
Bulova.” And at the top of the photograph, across both, is “Like
Mother, like Daughter.”
While on one level, the altar is advertising the watches, it also
comments on the idea of racial purity. The daughter may be more
adventurous than her mother (string bikinis) and may live in a
world that is more technological, but just as the watch signiﬁes
the perpetuity of Eurocentric, upper-class values and aesthetics, so does the proverb. The daughter is, like her mother, white,
blonde, conservative, and “beautiful”—read “uncontaminated by
othered inﬂuences.” One can read the altar against the background of social changes that ﬁnd young, white women depicted
often in the media as sexually provocative and culturally hybrid.
The proverb then ends with a sigh of relief, uttered by a middleaged, upper-class, white male who is thankful that his family remains racially/culturally pure. In contrast to most of the altars
we have considered, the images here imply that the commodity is
equally important—if not more so—than the women. The watch
as fetish leads us to the world of business, and this, coupled with
the absence of sexualized images, ironically reinforces the role of
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women as accessories. The altered proverb reverberates with the
nuances of the original, in which we imagine a son who “follows in
his father’s footsteps” by superﬁcially engaging elements of popular “alternative” culture but ultimately maintaining his grounding
in upper-class values.
The understated fears of cultural contamination in the last
few examples are addressed more directly in several other advertisements. Some time ago, Grand Marnier ran a series of full-page
ads that consisted of boxed collages of images, all related to some
folklore motif. One page has these images in separate boxes: Eve
offering the apple to Adam; Cinderella’s slipper; and the birds
and the bees. The middle row of boxes has ﬁrst, a butterﬂy with
the proverb, “What love unites, let no one divide”; second, a white
woman’s face with dark lipstick, lips open, about to kiss the ear of
a darker-skinned man; and third, a visual depiction of the proverb “two ships passing in the night.”
The two proverbs here can be read as commenting on the
possible interracial tryst depicted in the middle picture, posing
two conﬂicting outcomes and points of view. One suggests an acceptance of interracial unions and accords them the same sacredness that any union held together by true love deserves. The other
proverbial allusion suggests the impossibility for such unions to
work out. Although negative, the second proverb allusion identiﬁes the source of difﬁculty not as racism, but rather the difﬁculty
for two persons from differing backgrounds to ﬁnd the common
ground necessary to make such a union last. Positioning the racially explicit part of the ad in the center invites the consumer
to reﬂect on the difﬁculties of love from an interracial perspective. For instance, how does this perspective cast a different light
on such deeply embedded American motifs as Adam and Eve,
Cinderella, and the birds and the bees? What if the prince were
black? The idea of tragedy in love comes across most strongly in
the picture of someone failing to place a wedding band on another’s ﬁnger; in this case, the ﬁnger joint is so greatly enlarged that
there is no possible way for the ring to go on. Contrary to the preceding example, Grand Marnier’s ad/altar celebrates the tension
created by social changes and therefore promotes an image that
its product is for those who enjoy change and even danger.
A Hard Candy altar has a close-up of a white woman’s face,
gazing up as if she is daydreaming. Her lips have dark red lipstick,
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and the blurred surrounding background beside her face is reddened as well. Her face is freckled, and she wears sparkling blue
eye shadow. On her bottom lip is a miniature spoon, and beside
her lip is a cup and saucer; the saucer is ﬁlled with coffee. Above
the cup is a miniature coffeepot held by normal-sized ﬁngers, out
of which the coffee pours into the cup. The proverbial message
at the bottom of the page is “Wake up and smell the lipstick,”
and a variety of coffee-inspired names for this lipstick are listed:
“Cappuccino—badge brown,” “Cafe o Lip—Neutral Caramel,” and
“Latte Lip—Golden Vanilla.”
The ad focuses our attention on color, employing words and
phrases that have often been used in the context of race and even
mixed ancestry; in fact, using food-related language to signify
black people is long established, e.g., chocolate, brown sugar, coffee, cocoa, caramel, etc. Moreover, the ad depicts a very young,
“hip” woman lying down, in a less than fully conscious state. As
with the previous proverb, a hint of danger is suggested. “Wake up
and smell the coffee” is a cautionary alarm to someone who is on
the verge of misfortune. Here, the alarm is being sounded so that
the woman can appreciate what is about to happen, rather than
so she can avoid it. If we read such phrases as “Caution: Caffeine
Lipstick may be addictive, apply and re-apply as needed,” along
with the list of colors mentioned earlier, as signiﬁers of interracial
mixing, then the altar becomes an endorsement of such social
changes. The visual image supports this reading. The woman’s
mouth is open, invitingly, as if she is willingly receiving the liquid
that will be poured into it, not to mention her heavily freckled
face. The ad serves as an invitation for the woman to consume the
symbolic “other,” to mark herself with it. Although the altar offers
a very different image of woman than many others, it still relies
on fetishism to convey its message. In this case, however, the fetishized woman is marked with inﬂuences from othered groups.
A VISA advertisement also departs from the image of whiteness in most altars. At the top of the ad in a purple rectangle is a
list of expressions: “It’s dog eat dog,” “It’s survival of ﬁttest,” “It’s
them or you,” “You know, a shoe sale.” At the bottom of the page
in a yellow rectangle are the phrases, “From kickboxing classes to
strappy sandals,” and “It’s everywhere you want to be,” along with
the VISA logo. In the middle is a large rectangle containing the
visual texts. A young, casually but professionally dressed, Asian
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American woman is seated on the bench of a shoe store. She
has on a black miniskirt and white blouse and has long, ﬂowing,
straight black hair. Prominent in the photo are her legs and feet—
she has high heels on both feet, but the shoes come from different
pairs. A number of shoes and opened boxes are on the ﬂoor, and
she is leaning over looking at one foot. On the walls behind and
around her are shelves of boots and shoes. The two elements that
are most striking in this altar are that the woman is Asian—this
is the only ad that I have come across where the woman is not
white—and there is an extreme portrayal of shoe fetishism.
The proverbs address the issue of “making it” and “coming out
ahead” in a competitive world (perhaps the business world is the
intended reference). But centering these messages on an Asian
American woman changes the implications considerably, for it
seems to recognize the extra difﬁculties encountered by a nonwhite woman in making it professionally. The woman’s character
is further developed by the phrase alluding to kickboxing, suggesting that she has taken martial-arts classes and is capable of
the kind of aggressiveness necessary to succeed in the business
world. VISA initially comes across as supportive of minorities and
their efforts to compete and integrate into the mainstream.
At the same time, however, the message also contains many
of the elements found in other ads. For example, the woman is a
fetish along with the other fetishes, contained within the sphere
of corporate reality. This is visually symbolized by designing the
page as the enlarged replica of a VISA card—purple stripe at the
top, gold stripe at the bottom, and a lighter color in the middle.
By visually surrounding the Asian American woman with boots
and shoes, the ad/altar inseparably conﬂates the two dominant
fetishes presented—shoes and Asian women. However, because it
is generally accepted that most, if not all, shoe fetishists are masochists (Steele 1996, 102), the messages conveyed by the altar are
complicated. At the same time that the altar seems to sympathize
with the Asian American woman’s struggle to succeed, it takes
a voyeuristic delight in the prospect of watching her ﬁght. The
proverbs, in combination with the reference to kickboxing—which
conjures images of martial arts and intensiﬁes the fetish by enhancing the woman’s Asian-ness—and “strappy sandals,” contribute to the sense that the observer is goading the woman on, the
way one encourages a player in competitive sports. And, while on
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the one hand, the woman is conﬁned and captured, some of the
pleasure gained from her conﬁnement includes her inﬂicting pain
on the voyeur, on those who have ultimate power over her. This is
consistent with the historical fetishization of Asian women, which
includes an alleged sexual submissiveness and subservience that
are heightened because of the dangers they may be hiding (e.g.,
the Dragon Lady caricature or rumors of female Viet Cong soldiers and Vietnamese prostitutes who supposedly put cut glass or
other sharp objects in their vaginas to castrate American GIs).
A ﬁnal example underlines some of the anxieties I have been
suggesting as negotiated by the ad/altars and the proverbs contained within them. In an ad for Silvertab Levi’s, two black men
stand next to each other, facing—and almost challenging—the
camera. It is night, and other than a car light shining behind
them and some blurred, muted lights off to the right-hand side
of the page, the background is completely dark. One man wears
jeans and a jacket that approximates military camouﬂage gear,
along with heavy black shoes or boots. He gazes menacingly at
the camera, one hand beside his face, the other crossed under
his elbow. The second man wears jeans and jacket as well, with
brown boots and dark glasses. Written in large letters across the
two is the phrase, “Be careful what you wish for.”
One interpretation of the message is that it alludes to the fantasies of white women who desire interactions with black men. It
captures the white impulse that yearns for the exoticized ﬂavor
of blackness even as it is simultaneously terriﬁed of the actual
presence of the black, male body. Certainly the ad capitalizes on
stereotypical ideas about black men to endow the jeans by association with hypersexual, rough, mysterious, and dangerous qualities. The picture evokes the worlds of rap music, gangsterism, and
black militancy, and these are all signiﬁers of extreme black-male
sexuality. Thus, the proverb, if directed to a white audience, can
be read as a cautionary admonition against frivolously wishing for
encounters with black masculinity. “Black men are dangerous,
and you may get more than you bargained for,” the altar seems
to suggests. If directed to a black audience, and especially a male
one, the message may be to be careful how you wish for a more
“thuggish” kind of masculinity. As with the previous few advertisements, this one captures the paradoxical impulses of those in
power. Although it seems to warn against miscegenation, it relies
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on images of racial mixing that may be conjured in the minds of
the consumer and encourages a fetishistic fascination with those
images.

Conclusion
In this essay, I have suggested that proverbs are often coupled
with fetishes in American advertisements, and that along with the
fetishized, visual objects displayed in these ads, proverbs help to
negotiate between fears and desires. These fears and desires are
often connected to issues of race, gender, and class and reﬂect
social currents within the society. I have argued, furthermore,
that advertisements can be viewed as the equivalent of altars in a
religion of capitalism and that the consumer relationship with the
fetishized objects in ads often mirrors that of religious devotees.
Hence, the proverbs occur in an arena of highly charged social
and political discourse. As such, one of their functions is to mediate between opposing ideologies. Of course, in this context, the
proverb’s ultimate goal is to persuade the consumer to choose
the capitalist value and purchase the commodity. By no means
has my discussion covered the full range of ad/altars or kinds of
commodities that exist in American advertising; nor do I claim
that my analysis applies to every kind of advertisement containing proverbs. However, as my discussion has shown, proverbial
structures are not only prevalent in the fetishistic displays of contemporary advertisers but play signiﬁcant roles. Because of this,
they offer insights into cultural discussions focused on important
social issues and attest to the continued relevance of proverbs
and their study in contemporary American society.
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“The Early Bird Is
Worth Two in the Bush”
Captain Jack Aubrey’s Fractured Proverbs
Jan Harold Brunvand

T

he English author known as Patrick O’Brian (1914–2000)
was proliﬁc and accomplished in many literary genres. (His
real name was Richard Patrick Russ, and he invented his “Irish”
background.) “O’Brian” wrote short stories, novels, poetry, biographies (including a notable one of Pablo Picasso), and reviews;
he edited anthologies, and he made numerous English translations of French works. But Patrick O’Brian’s masterpiece, a series
of twenty maritime novels set during the Napoleonic War,1 published from 1969 to 1999, is what earned him the enthusiastic
praise of critics along with legions of devoted readers around the
world (e.g., Prial 1998, Lapham 2000). The novels’ complex and
historically accurate action occurs from 1800 to 1815 with some
allusions to earlier events.2 The setting is on ships of the British
Royal Navy in oceans and ports around the globe (with occasional
returns to England), and the two main characters who link the series are the nautical odd couple Captain Jack Aubrey and ship’s
surgeon Stephen Maturin.
Captain Aubrey is a huge, hearty, and ruggedly handsome
man who has spent most of his life at sea; a brilliant navigator, commander, and naval tactician; and an ofﬁcer who lives his
dangerous life with gusto and optimism, despite suffering many
setbacks to his career and injuries to his person. Dr. Maturin, in
contrast, is a plain, even rather ugly, unkempt, but vastly learned,
man; a naturalist (or “natural philosopher”) boundlessly curious
about the world around him, an enthusiastic collector of botanical
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and animal specimens, as well as a physician; and a covert British
intelligence agent who does not hesitate to eliminate in cold blood
enemies of the empire who stand in his way. Stephen Maturin, of
mixed Irish and Catalan background, speaks several languages,
including ﬂuent Latin and Greek, but is often grumpy or even
pessimistic and remains woefully ignorant of the customs and
jargon of the sea. He learns—and often unlearns—much navy lore
in the course of his many voyages with Aubrey, but he remains
awkward—even dangerous to himself and others—when around
any kind of waterborne vessel. The sailors on Jack’s ships take
elaborate care of The Doctor as he moves about the moorings,
deck, and rigging.
Different as the two men are in looks, talents, and personalities, Aubrey and Maturin are close friends and share the same
general background of classical and scientiﬁc education of the
time. They are united in their hatred of Napoleon and their love of
music, which they often enjoy during evenings at sea in The Captain’s cabin, Jack playing violin, Stephen ‘cello (O’Brian always
wrote the word with an apostrophe). Indeed, the two characters
meet on the ﬁrst page of the ﬁrst novel, Master and Commander,
at a concert in the governor’s house at Port Mahon on the island
of Minorca in the Mediterranean Sea, listening to four Italian musicians performing “Locatelli’s C major quartet.”3
Patrick O’Brian’s stylistic control in the Aubrey-Maturin series of period speech patterns, class dialects (including profanity
and obscenity), regional and ethnic expressions, foreign-language
quotations and allusions, technical naval terms and slang, and
even the dense bureaucratic prose of the British Admiralty Ofﬁce
is remarkable. Especially interesting to the folklorist is his use
of proverbs and proverbial speech. Merely a collection of these
proverbial items could constitute a substantial article, or a small
book, in itself,4 but something more than a simple dictionary
(which I will compile eventually) should be even more interesting.
O’Brian was well aware of the proverb as a traditional form
of expression; he (as the books’ narrator) refers to the genre by
name, as well as by other terms like “saying” (or “wise saying”),
“adage” (or “old adage”), “expression,” “saw,” “ﬁgure,” “tag,” and
“epigram.” In one passage, he lists the usual range of shipboard
conversation as “ﬂights of naval wit, ﬂabby puns, traditional
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jokes, proverbs, [and] saws” (FW, 95). In another book, he quotes
a captain, speaking to his wife, who begins to use the expression,
“There is a tide in the affairs of men . . .” but, after being interrupted, then attempts to complete and explain the saying: “. . .
what the proverb means is that you must make hay while the
sun shines but not force things. The minute your luck begins to
turn sullen you must strike your topgallantmasts down on deck
directly, and take a reef in your topsails, and prepare to batten
down your hatches and lie to under a storm staysail if it gets
worse” (RM, 12).
In studying O’Brian’s use of proverbs, one is tempted to follow
the lead of the conversation during one dinner-table scene and
look for English national character as revealed in their proverbs.
The observation one navy ofﬁcer makes over dinner is this:
There is very little good in the French: it is said that you can learn a
great deal about a nation from its proverbial expressions, and when
the French wish to describe anything mighty foul they say, “sale
comme un peigne” [i.e., “dirty as a comb”], which gives you a pretty
idea of their personal cleanliness. When they have other things to
occupy their mind, they say they have other cats to whip, a most
inhuman thing to do. And when they are going to put a ship about,
the order is “à-Dieu-va,” or “we must chance it and trust in God,”
which gives you some notion of their seamanship (LM, 30).

Dr. Maturin himself encouraged studying English national
character in proverbs in another passage when he meditated
upon “the stream of small merriment, long-established jokes, proverbial sayings and more or less droll allusions that made up so
large a part of his shipmates’ daily intercourse.” Maturin believed
such light conversation to be “a particularly English characteristic [which] he often found wearisome,” although he did concede
that this sort of traditional speech “had a value as a protection
against morosity and that it encouraged fortitude” (DI, 5). But
we are warned away from seeking clues to national character in
O’Brian’s English proverbs by the well-known comment of B. J.
Whiting:
The “national” proverbs do not offer problems which we can safely
attack with our present knowledge. We cannot hope to discover the
characteristics of the Englishman, the Frenchman, or the German
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Wolfgang Mieder issued a similar warning, explaining to an interviewer that “paroemiologists following that road [i.e., searching for national character in proverbs] have hit a dead end,” and
declaring by way of example, “I could put together a bunch of
proverbs that show Americans are materialistic, and I could put
together another collection showing that Americans really value
friendship and love” (Wolkomir 1992, 118).
There is an obvious and attractive alternative topic for study
in these ﬁne novels, namely, Captain Jack Aubrey’s constant
comical misuse of everyday expressions, allusions, quotations,
and especially traditional proverbs. This endearing personality
trait—so opposite to the captain’s superb command of his professional skills—is a major factor in humanizing and rendering
believable the heroic (if somewhat overweight) ﬁgure of this beribboned and often gloriously uniformed British naval ofﬁcer. Who
cannot love a character who says things like “’Tis an ill wind that
spoils the broth, you know” (DI, 35), or “Any stick will do to hang
a wicked dog” (FW, 157), or “Never count the bear’s skin before it
is hatched” (SM, 232), or “There’s a good deal to be said for making hay while the iron is hot” (TH, 331)?
O’Brian seems to have developed the idea gradually, while the
novels were under way, of having The Captain misuse common
expressions.5 Except for the misquotation “Alas poor Borwick”
(i.e., Yorick)6 in the ﬁrst volume (M&C, 146), Jack utters no fractured proverb until well into the second volume, when we read
this: “‘You must make your bed and lie on it.’ He paused, with a
feeling that this was not quite the epigram that he had wished”
(PC, 243); this is followed in that same volume by The Captain’s
slightly off-kilter observation that Stephen Maturin has, in his
opinion, “a singular genius for hiding [his] talent under a bushel”
(PC, 410). (The Biblical injunction mentions hiding a candle, although some quote it as a light or a lamp.) By the third volume in
the series, and constantly thereafter, Captain Aubrey says things
like “A bird in the hand is worth any amount of beating about the
bush” (HMS, 157), and “They have chosen their cake and must lie
in it” (HMS, 191). At this last remark, Stephen asks, “You mean,

Two in the Bush”

by making a collection of proverbs, for here the danger of permitting
a preconceived idea to determine our methods of collecting is too
difﬁcult to overcome. (Whiting 1994, 106)
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they cannot have their bed and eat it?” This then becomes the
ﬁrst in a series of incidents where The Doctor playfully corrects or
questions The Captain’s attempted witticisms.
Jack Aubrey seems to have particular problems with proverbs
that mention birds. Besides the one just quoted, he also says,
“There you have two birds in one bush” (HMS, 307). He refers to
“birds tarred with the same feathers” (HMS, 317) and speaks of
“beating two birds with one bush . . . or even three” (TMC, 67),
as well as killing “three birds at one blow” (SM, 165), and he is
quoted by Stephen Maturin as saying, “A bird in the hand waits
for no man” (DI, 61). Yet again struggling with the “killing bird”
proverb, Jack is later quoted, “‘This would be killing both birds
. . .’ He paused, frowned, muttered ‘over one stile’, and went on,
‘Well, never mind . . .’” (FSW, 236).
Many of Captain Aubrey’s confused quotations and sayings
reveal simple errors of mishearing or disremembering an original
word, as in the “Alas poor Borwick” comment, and there is often a certain logic in these errors. For example, when he speaks
of a “palm in Gilead” (HMS 50), or Napoleon “killing the golden
calf” (FW, 214), or Solomon having a thousand porcupines (TGS,
9), or ironically refers to Stephen as “a true Job’s mufﬂer” (TGS,
156), or compares himself, when brieﬂy wealthy, as having “Crocus [for] my second name” (COM, 6), or when he twice says that
he feels “as proud as Pompous Pilate” (COM, 207; YA, 117), or
mentions “Damon and Pythagoras” (PC, 406), he is merely reaching for and slightly missing the terms or names: balm, golden
goose, Solomon’s concubines, Job’s Comforter, Croesus, Pontius
Pilate, and Pythias. Similarly, when The Captain describes The
Doctor as being “obstinate as a bee in a bull’s foot” (HMS, 74), it
is evident that he has misheard the old saying about not knowing
a B (i.e., the letter) from a bull’s foot, which doesn’t make much
more sense that way, either (see RM, 24). In another well-intentioned but muddled Shakespearean reference, The Captain once
cries, “Lead on, Macbeth,” upon which a sailor who happens to
be named Macbeth springs forward and asks in a thick Scottish
dialect, “Wheer tu sirr?” When Jack corrects himself—“Lead on
Macduff”—the cry immediately goes through the ship, “Macduff
to the quarterdeck at the double,” and Jack must rephrase his order literally: “Belay there. . . . Scrub it. No, no. My meaning is, the
ofﬁcers may go over the side as soon as they please” (FSW, 50).7
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The mental processes by which The Captain arrives at some
of his other fractured proverbs are often quite obvious. When he
quotes, “If only pigs had wings, we should have no need for tinkers’ hands, as they say” (DI, 126), he is combining two things
that “they say,” ﬁrst about impossibilities (“If pigs had wings”),
and second about necessity (“If ‘ifs’ and ‘ands’ were pots and pans,
there were little need for tinkers”). When Aubrey compliments “a
fellow . . . who ran like a hare, without beating about the mulberry
bush, or making any bones about it” (SM, 77), he is just mixing
three traditional metaphors. He does it again when he says, “He
is the kind of lamb that lies down with the lion in wolf’s clothing”
(LM, 134). Jack’s remark, “Many a stitch saves time” (SM, 230),
although a fractured saying, applies pretty well to his hoisting extra sails for more speed. Even his remark, “There are two ends
to every pudding” (IM, 126), is at least as good a phrase as the
usual “two sides to every question.” Likewise, “There’s many a slip
twixt the cup and the sip” (COM, 268) is not quite right but means
about the same as the original. Once, in anger, Aubrey tells an ofﬁcer, “You shall sow what you have reaped” (TT, 182), reversing the
usual terms. Sometimes the correct proverbial expression is quite
obscure, as when Jack remarks that an ofﬁcer is “all wool and
no cry” (PC, 304) and again that some supposed omens are “all
cry and no wolf” (SM, 275); here he is half remembering the fable
about the boy crying wolf and confusing it with the Wellerism, “‘All
cry and little wool,’ as the Devil said while shearing the hog.”
As a sort of counterpoint to errors like this streaming from
The Captain’s mouth are such mangled expressions occasionally spoken by other characters, particularly the common sailors.
When Stephen brings a potto, a kind of lemur, on board, one of
the marine ofﬁcers says, “My servant Joe Andrews tells me that
many of the old African hands say there is nothing like a potto
for luck: and, after all, there is a potto’s ﬁeld in the Bible, is there
not?” (COM, 242). When The Captain takes a letter by dictation
from a Sicilian-born woman writing to her imprisoned husband,
a British naval ofﬁcer, he puzzles over her request to include the
statement that she has been true to him and “would not ply the
oar”; Aubrey thinks it over, then he writes carefully, “‘play the
whore’ . . . smiling secretly as he did so” (TH, 65).
The Doctor, although he has mastered the nautical term “sailing both by and large” by the end of the ﬁrst book (M&C, 411),
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continues to puzzle over some expressions throughout the series.
He refers to someone who “passed [an examination] with sailing
colours,” which is corrected by The Captain to “ﬂying colours,” to
which Stephen replies, “Let us not be pedantical, for all love” (IM,
303). Other examples can easily be found, for, as we read in one
scene,
Jack looked at Stephen with affection: Dr. Maturin could dash away
in Latin and Greek, and as for modern languages, to Jack’s certain
knowledge he spoke half a dozen; yet he was quite incapable of
mastering low English cant or slang or ﬂash expressions, let alone
the technical terms necessarily used aboard ships. Even now, he
suspected, Stephen had difﬁculty with starboard and larboard (RM,
21–22).

Perhaps the best example of Stephen’s problems with English
proverbial expressions is his uncertainty when someone tells him
that “the shipwrights will go through her [i.e., the ship] with a ﬁne
tooth comb” (LM, 205). The Doctor asks,
This tooth-comb, now, this ﬁne tooth-comb that the worthy shipwrights will be using—we often hear of it; it appears in daily speech.
And yet who has ever combed his teeth, in this or any other day?

When it is explained to him that “the ﬁne qualiﬁes the tooth rather than the comb . . .” (i.e., “ﬁne-tooth comb”), The Doctor responds,
“Of course, of course”. . . clapping his hand to his forehead. “This is
not my most brilliant hour, I ﬁnd.”

What is, perhaps, Stephen Maturin’s most brilliant witticism
comes when he offers the joke that the so-called dog watches,
which are shorter than the other watches aboard ship, were so
labeled because they are “cur-tailed” (PC, 428). It takes a moment
before the others understand it, but eventually a midshipman explains the joke: “He said, cur-tailed: the dog-watch is cur-tailed.”
This little pun, which O’Brian evidently found in an 1867 book
about sailor’s language (King 2000, 208) becomes a running gag
in the series, being repeated with much hilarity at least four times
in later novels (IM, 123; RM, 127–28; NC, 147; COM, 166).
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Returning to The Captain’s own wit, what is termed by the
narrator as “perhaps the best thing Jack had ever said,” is a complicated double pun, hardly worth explaining, based on naval
slang and English place names: “I must warn you that Plush often leads to Folly” (YA, 230) .8 Much better—and a proverb parody
to boot—results from The Captain’s trick of forcing The Doctor to
choose between two weevils found crawling through some ship’s
biscuits; when Stephen, puzzled by the request to choose, selects
the larger of the weevils, Jack gleefully exclaims, “There I have
you . . . you are bit—you are completely dished. Don’t you know
that in the Navy you must always choose the lesser of two weevils?” (FW, 54–55). This joke is thrice repeated in later books (SM,
218; TT, 148; COM, 117).
One should not assume that Captain Jack Aubrey is always
wrong about his proverbs or only utters proverb parodies; at
times, he hits the nail squarely on the head with an apt proverbial expression. For example, commenting on an instance of one
man’s cruelty toward another, he says, “When one sea-ofﬁcer is
to be roasted, there is always another at hand to turn the spit,”
explaining to Stephen that this is “an old service proverb” (PC,
105). Similarly, The Captain provides The Doctor with a plausible naval explanation for the common expression (often metaphorically applied), “the Devil to pay and no tar [or no pitch] hot”
(TMC, 280; the expression also occurs in IM, 138; TH, 311; and
HD, 11 and 105 ). Once, having a problem with an ofﬁcer under his command, Jack observes, quite appropriately, that the
man is “cutting his coat according to his cloth” (DI 175). When
Stephen objects mildly to Jack’s taking some albatross eggs for
their breakfast, we read this: “‘You cannot make an omelette
without breaking eggs,’ said Jack quickly, before the chance
should be lost for ever.” To this, Stephen replies, “I might say
something about pearls before swine—the pearls being these
priceless eggs, if you follow me—were I to attempt a repartee in
the same order of magnitude” (DI, 293; see also SM, 32). Even,
on one occasion, when The Captain ashore has had a few too
many drinks at a party, his wits are clear enough to retaliate
to a rival for a lady’s attentions by quoting, aptly, a line from
Dryden: “None but the brave deserve the fair,” even singing the
line as a sort of refrain “in his deep, surprisingly tuneful voice”
(SM, 56).
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In fact, Captain Jack Aubrey on a few occasions is surprisingly good at adapting proverbial expressions in new and interesting
ways. I believe it is an original idea when he converts a familiar
proverb into a kind of riddle, saying that one of his prisoners is
“rather like the creature that was neither ﬂesh nor fowl nor good
red herring but partook of each: the Sphinx” (WDS, 36). Another
effective transformation occurs one dark and stormy night when
The Captain observes, “Not a ﬁt night out for man or beast, as
the Centaur observed, ha, ha, ha!” (YA, 219). It also seems right,
though certainly unconventional, when Jack refers to Stephen as
a man whom “Lucifer could not hold a book, bell, or candle to for
pride” (NC, 169–70).
But most often, Captain Aubrey’s attempts at wit, quotation,
metaphor, or proverbial wisdom are somewhat fractured, and frequently these lapses are noted by listeners, as when he remarks
while speaking to an admiral that many of his loyal ofﬁcers and
men had “followed me since my ﬁrst command . . . in one fell
sloop.” The admiral asks, “What sloop, Aubrey?” to which Jack
lamely replies, “. . . I do not mean any speciﬁc vessel: it was an allusion to the Bible” (FW, 17). It should be noted, also, that earlier
in the same conversation, when the admiral refers to the French
ship La Fléche as being “quick as an arrow,” Jack does not catch
the bilingual pun but must be reminded that “ﬂéche is the French
for an arrow, Aubrey.” “Oh, indeed? I was not aware. Very good,
sir. Capital, upon my word. Quick as an arrow—I shall repeat
that.” “I dare say you will,” the admiral responds dryly, “and pass
it off as your own, too” (FW, 16).
Sometimes the intended corrections of Jack’s remarks are as
confused as the original error; when he is warned by yet another
admiral to be careful in his dealings with certain people, Jack promises, “I shall speak to them like a sucking dove,” and the admiral
corrects him, “Pig, Aubrey: sucking pig. Doves don’t suck” (RM,
25). In this instance, Jack is correctly quoting Bottom the Weaver
in A Midsummer Night’s Dream (1.2.85) who, however, is himself
misquoting the phrase “like a soughing [i.e., a cooing or moaning]
dove”; pigs and sucking have nothing to do with any of this.
O’Brian ﬁlled his novels with this sort of clever ambiguity; just
to cite one further example, in a conversation with his wife Sophie,
Jack admonishes her, “Sweetheart . . . you might as well save
your breath to cool your porridge.” Sophie asks, “What porridge?”
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and Jack explains, “Why, porridge—burgoo. It is what people say,
when they mean to give you a hint that it is no use carping on the
same string” (DI, 67). The proverbial phrase “to save one’s breath
to cool one’s porridge,” although sometimes spoken as “cool your
broth” or “cool your soup,” was originally “cool your pottage” (a
sort of stew) and occurs in writings by Plutarch, Rabelais, Cervantes, and others. But O’Brian most likely had in mind a remark
made by Elizabeth Bennet to Mr. Darcy in Chapter 4 of Pride and
Prejudice, one of his favorite books. Elizabeth remarks, “There
is a ﬁne old saying, which every body here is of course familiar
with—‘Keep your breath to cool your porridge,’—and I shall keep
mine to swell my song.” As for burgoo, that was, indeed, an oatmeal gruel or porridge served to sailors, although it has no real
connection to the proverbial phrase. As for “carping on the same
string,” Jack means harping, of course, and that form of the saying was used by Shakespeare, Cervantes, and a host of ordinary
people expressing their dislike of hearing the same old complaint
over and over again. Part of the humor in this scene obviously
derives from Sophie being even less aware than her husband of
such conventional expressions and their meanings.
Many of The Captain’s fractured proverbs are either mixedup versions of two or more sayings or else apt remarks that he is
not quite able to ﬁnish. Here are some examples of the proverb
blends: “‘The fall very nearly came before the pride,’ he said to
himself . . .” (FW, 94); “Let us cross that peacock when we come
to it” (FW, 219); “. . . a heavy frigate with a bite worse than her
bark” (SM, 294); “I am afraid there is no room for two nightingales
in one bush” (TH, 173); “The best-laid mice gang oft astray” (TH,
174); “Do you know what a lame duck does? . . . It attempts to pull
wool over your eyes” (TH, 200); “I am not one to ﬂing a hundred
thousand dollars in a gift-horse’s teeth” (FSW, 234); “At least it is
better than rushing at a bull in a china-shop without a plan” (LM,
150); “I cling to it day and night, like a bull in a china-shop. But
promises are made of pie-crust, you know” (YA, 237); “A needle in
a haystack would not bear the comparison, on such a thick night;
but a stitch in time saves nine, as you know very well” (LM, 169);
“No humming and whoreing, no barking about the wrong bush”
(TGS, 96); “Better a dead dog than a lead lion” (NC, 47); “The wish
could so easily be farther than the thought” (NC, 147); “My tongue
took the bit between its teeth, so I was laid by the lee again . . .”
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(NC, 195–96); “I am afraid I have been like a bear in a whore’s
bed” (WDS, 122; Jack is probably thinking of the saying “like a
bear with a sore head”); “We must not sell the bear’s skin before
we have locked the stable door” (WDS, 231); “What an early worm
you are to be sure” (YA, 24; he is thinking of the early bird that
gets the worm); “We are the very pink [peak?] of perfection” (YA,
211); and “I shall rest my laurels on that” (YA, 240).
One of Jack’s most glorious mixed-up proverbs occurs in his
thoughts as he considers his longtime servant, Preserved Killick:
“Killick was in many ways a wretched servant, fractious, mean,
overbearing to guests of inferior rank, hopelessly coarse; but in
others he was a pearl without a thorn. For a moment Jack passed
some other expressions in review, and having reached bricks
without price he went to sleep” (NC, 151).
When The Doctor joins in trying to ﬁnd the right expression,
it is evident that mostly he is mocking The Captain’s attempts at
wit without letting on. Consider this exchange:
“. . . you may say it is buying a dog and barking at the stable door
yourself—“
“The stable door after it is locked,” said Stephen, holding up his
hand.
“Just so: the stable door after it is locked, yourself. But there are
more things than heaven and earth, you know. . . .” (FSW, 137)

Later in the same novel, Jack tries the expression again, and it
comes out like this: “That would be locking the horse after the
stable door is gone . . .” (FSW, 293).
Here are some of The Captain’s unﬁnished proverbial expressions: “‘. . . A good woman is a’—there is something in the Bible
I don’t quite recall, but it hits the nail on the head, as you might
put it” (SM, 112); “‘What is sauce for the duck . . .’ began Jack
. . .” (FSW, 84); “I may be able to cook two geese with one—“ (RM,
66); “‘That is surely selling the bear . . . that is surely counting
your bears . . .’ he hesitated . . .” (LM, 175); and “I ﬁnd that I had
counted my geese without laying their eggs—that I had killed my
geese—that is to say . . .” (TGS, 277).
Again, when The Doctor realizes that Jack is ﬁshing around
for just the right conventional term, he “helps” with some tonguein-cheek suggestions, like this example (with The Captain speaking ﬁrst):
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“. . . I could see him as plain as . . .”
“The ace of spades?”
“No. Not quite that. As plain as a . . . God damn it. As plain as
the palm of my hand? A turnpike?”
“As Salisbury sphere? A red herring?”
“Perhaps so . . .” (FSW, 106).

They never do agree on the rest of the saying, which may have
been “plain as day . . . as your hand . . . as the nose on your face
. . .” etc.
As noted, the most charming instances of fractured proverbial
uses in the novels, and those that best reveal character, occur
when Stephen Maturin comments upon Jack Aubrey’s vagrant
way with witticisms, sometimes correcting him, sometimes agreeing (or pretending to). Stephen is often referred to as The Captain’s “particular friend,” and as such he feels free to speak his
mind, just as Jack does; neither one usually takes any offense
from whatever is said (although they do twice come close to dueling over a perceived slight). At any rate, these exchanges between
two old friends, several of which have been quoted already, are
wonderfully written. Here are some further examples, with The
Captain always beginning the conversation:
”Perhaps you could tell him to judge the pudding by its fruit.”
“You mean prove the tree by its eating.”
“No, no, Stephen, you are quite out: eating a tree would prove
nothing” (IM, 292).

*****
“It is no good carrying your pig to market and ﬁnding . . .” He
paused, frowning.
“It will not drink?”
“No, that ain’t that neither.”
“That there are no pokes to be had?”
“Oh well, be damned to literary airs and graces . . . .” (TGS,
114)

*****
“Only this morning I was thinking how right they were to say it
was better to be a dead horse than a live lion.” He gazed out of the
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scuttle, obviously going over the words in his mind. “No, I mean
better to ﬂog a dead horse than a live lion.”
“I quite agree.”
“Yet even that’s not quite right, neither. I know there is a dead
horse in it somewhere; but I am afraid I’m brought by the lee this
time, though I rather pride myself on proverbs, bringing them in
aptly, you know, and to the point.”
“Never distress yourself, brother; there is no mistake, I am sure.
It is a valuable saying, and one that admonishes us never to underestimate our enemy, for whereas ﬂogging a dead horse is child’s
play, doing the same to a lion is potentially dangerous, even though
one may take a long spoon.” (FSW, 307; Stephen alludes to “He who
sups with the Devil must have a long spoon.”)

*****
“. . . let us hope that the ﬁrst plan . . . comes to root. That is to say
. . .” He paused, frowning.
“Rules the roost?”
“No . . . no.”
“Takes fruit?”
“Oh be damned to it. The trouble with you, Stephen, if you do not
mind my saying so, is that although you are the best linguist I was
ever shipmates with, like the Pope of Rome that spoke a hundred
languages—Pentacost come again . . .”
“Would it be Magliabechi you have in mind?”
“I dare say: a foreigner, in any case. And I am sure you speak
quite as many, and like a native, or better; but English is not one of
them. You do not get ﬁgures quite right, and now you have put the
word clean out of my head.” (NC, 130)9

*****
And a ﬁnal example of one of these exchanges that involves a literary allusion:
He paused for quite a while and then in the tone of one quoting an
an aphorism he went on, “The heart has its reasons that the . . .
that the . . .”
“Kidney?” suggested Stephen.
“That the kidneys know not.” Jack frowned. “No, Hell and death,
that’s not it. But anyhow the heart has its reasons, you understand.”
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The richness, variety, and humor created by all the proverb
use and misuse in the Aubrey-Maturin novels lends itself very
well to parody, and it is no surprise to ﬁnd lists both of the original misquotations and also parodies of them circulating nowadays, either in print or on the Internet. The quotation that forms
part of my title is taken from The Aubrey Coat-of-Arms, an image
available as a JPEG ﬁle from one of the Patrick O’Brian Web sites,
where the motto is actually given in Latin as “Avis matutina duabus in dumo par est.” One can download the image and convert it
to use as a poster, letterhead, name tag, T-shirt, whatever.11
A book-length parody titled The Port-Wine Sea (Wenger 1999)
includes a number of renderings of fractured proverbs similar to
The Captain’s (here named Jack Audibly), including these: “Don’t
eat the horse before the cart” (p. 23), “Uneasy lies the head that
wears a frown” (p. 23), “deaf as a post-captain” (p. 35), “The road
to heaven is paved with good inventions” (p. 70), and “When in
Rome eat the sauce of the gander” (p. 115). It may be debated
whether these euphemisms are as good or better than the epigrams coined by O’Brian himself, but they are certainly pretty
close to the march and not to be despoiled, nor looked scantly at,
since a rolling stone butters no parsnips, as they say.
In the ﬁgure of Captain Jack Aubrey, Patrick O’Brian (who
himself inhabited something of an invented persona) created a
memorable character who is superb in his professional role at
sea, somewhat less successful on land (especially when it comes
to investments and politics), and altogether convincing as a believable personality. An important part of his credibility as a literary
character comes from the language he speaks—rich in the technicalities and jargon of early nineteenth-century sailing, but made
more human by his earnest efforts to ﬁnd appropriate proverbial
and other traditional expressions for his feelings, even when (or
especially when) he gets the sayings not quite right. These delights provide just one more reason to read what one reviewer
called “the best historical novels ever written.”12

Two in the Bush”

“It is a singularly complex organ, I am told.” (YA, 59; see also YA,
94)10
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Appendix: More Fractured Speech
(Spoken by Jack Aubrey, unless otherwise noted)
“. . . and I must remind you that Fortune is bald behind”
[spoken by R. T. Farquhar, a colonial administrator] “What is this
that Farquhar tells us about fortune? Is she supposed to have the
mange?” [asked by Jack] “I conceive he was referring to the old
tag—his meaning was, that she must be seized by the forelock,
since once she is passed there is no clapping on to her hair, at
all. In the ﬁgure she ships none abaft the ears, if you follow me.”
[reply by Stephen] (TMC, 235)
“There is something to be said for making hay while no clouds
obscure the sun; and that it is your rolling stone that gets the
worm” (DI, 62; spoken by Stephen to Jack).
“. . . as you know, one man may lead a horse to the water,
but ten cannot make him think” (FW, 176; spoken by Stephen to
Jack).
“You are not to suppose that they are all tarred with the same
feathers” (RM, 61).
“I was just wondering whether the infernal ptarmigan [i.e.,
termagant] was there when Sam called at Ashgrove Cottage . . .”
[Jack explains to Stephen] “Ptarmigans are those contentious forward cross overbearing women you come across only too often”
(RM, 87,88).
“He [Jack] was turning parsnips, butter and soft-words over
in his mind in the hope that something brilliant might come of it
. . .” (RM, 122; the narrator describing Jack).
“. . . although Fanny Harte may be neither Scylla nor Charybdis, they are very, very fond of one another, and when all is said
and done, that is what really signiﬁes” (LM, 63).
“. . . dirty dogs ate hungry puddings—that is to say, hungry
dogs ate dirty puddings . . .” (LM, 229).
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“Two precautions are better than one” (TGS, 288).

Two in the Bush”

“Upon my word, Jack, that woman is as headstrong as an allegory on the banks of Nile” (TGS, 73; spoken by Stephen).

“Do you know, I very nearly said a good thing just now, about
your cock and hen turtles. It was on the lines of sauce—sauce
for the goose being sauce for the gander, you understand. But it
would not quite take shape” (NC, 19).
“‘He counted his chickens without reckoning with his host,’
said Stephen” (NC, 91). “He counted his chickens without his
host, by God” (WDS, 249).
“. . . so there is a Roland for your. . . . The name Oliver ﬂoated
up out of a score of others. . . .” (NC, 180; Preserved Killick suggests that the saying may refer to “Roland . . . gunsmith off of the
Haymarket; and . . . Oliver’s Warranted Leadenhall Sausages.”)
“. . . roar like a bull in a basin” (NC, 222).
“‘Here’s a pretty kettle of ﬁsh,’ cried Jack. ‘An elegant God
damned kettle, upon my word’” (TT, 32).
“May I take it this is so, or is the ﬁsh wather to—that is to say
. . .” (TT, 46, referring to “The wish is father to the thought.”).
“‘Let them gather their peasecods while they may,’ said Jack,
‘Old Monday he’s a-dying’” (TT, 54).
“. . . a childhood memory to do with Satan and idle hands
ﬂoated there, but he could not quite ﬁx it . . .” (TT, 108; the narrator describing Jack).
“. . . as Captain Aubrey often says, ‘You cannot both have a
stitch in time and eat it’” (COM, 135; spoken by Stephen).
“‘Scylla and Charybdis ain’t in it, with a strong southwester
and a falling tide,’ said Jack. ‘Nor the Gorgonzola’” (YA, 108).
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“I shall sleep . . . like a crew of hedgepigs in an ivy-tuft . . .”
(YA, 165).
“‘I never said a word,’ cried Jack. ‘I was as mute as a swan’”
(HD, 141).
“‘. . . a near impossibility, like. . . .’ He searched for the word.
‘Making a mountain out of a molehill?’ [Stephen asks] ‘Even worse,
Stephen, even worse’” (BAM, 49).

Notes
1.

The Aubrey-Maturin novels, their dates of ﬁrst publication, and the
abbreviations used for reference are as follows:
M&C
PC
HMS
TMC
DI
FW
SM
IM
TH
FSW
RM
LM
TGS
NC
TT
WDS
COM
YA
HD
BAM

2.
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Master and Commander (1969)
Post Captain (1972)
HMS Surprise (1973)
The Mauritius Command (1977)
Desolation Island (1978)
The Fortune of War (1979)
The Surgeon’s Mate (1980)
The Ionian Mission (1981)
Treason’s Harbor (1983)
The Far Side of the World (1984)
The Reverse of the Medal (1986)
The Letter of Marque (1988)
The Thirteen Gun Salute (1989)
The Nutmeg of Consolation (1991)
The Truelove (1992; published in England as Clarissa Oakes)
The Wine Dark Sea (1993)
The Commodore (1994)
The Yellow Admiral (1996)
The Hundred Days (1998)
Blue at the Mizzen (1999)

All of my page references are to the W. W. Norton & Company
U.S. editions, which began in 1990 with the reissue of Master and
Commander and Post Captain, then continued through the series.
The essential reference works for historical, biographical, geographical, naval, military, musical, scientiﬁc, philosophical, gustatorial,
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Bowen Kerrihard’s Aubrey/Maturin quiz book. 1998. South Bend, Ind.: Quill
Communications Services.
Brown, Anthony Gary. 1999. Persons, animals, ships and cannon in the Aubrey-Maturin sea novels of Patrick O’Brian. Jefferson, N.C., and London:
McFarland & Co.
Cunningham, A. E., ed. 1994. Patrick O’Brian: Critical essays and a bibliography. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Grossman, Anne Chotzinoff, and Lisa Grossman Thomas. 1997. Lobscouse
& spotted dog: Which it’s a gastronimic companion to the Aubrey/Maturin
novels. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
King, Dean. 2000. Patrick O’Brian: A life revealed. New York: Henry Holt.
King, Dean, with John B. Hattendorf. 1996. Harbors and high seas: An atlas
and geographical guide to the Aubrey-Maturin novels of Patrick O’Brian.
New York: Henry Holt.
King, Dean, with John B. Hattendorf, and J. Worth Estes. 1995. A sea of
words: A lexicon and companion for Patrick O’Brian’s seafaring tales. New
York: Henry Holt.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Two in the Bush”

linguistic, and a host of other technical details in the Aubrey-Maturin novels are these:

This detail is typical of O’Brian’s sense of history and humor, for as
Anthony Gary Brown writes in his indispensable reference (1999),
“Pietro Antonio Locatelli (1695–1764) was an Italian violinist and
composer, famous as a great virtuoso and technical innovator. Although many of his works for both solo violin and string quartet
survive, the ‘great C major quartet’ . . . is not among them, appearing to be a happy invention by O’Brian (as is the trio of HD, 3)”
(1999, p. 195).
In a fairly attentive second reading of the series, I noted 472 proverbial expressions, an average of 23.6 per book. The low number
was 11 (in WDS), the high, 44 (in DI). Probably a close third reading
would bring the total to more than 500 items.
Although the characters Jack Byron and Tobias Barrow in O’Brian’s
novel The Unknown Shore (1959) are prototypes for Aubrey and
Maturin, resembling them in many ways, Jack in the earlier book
never misquotes or utters fractured proverbs.
The Captain may also be confusing Yorick/Borwick with two different ships mentioned in the novels named Berwick, one French, the
other British.
O’Brian’s biographer notes an instance during World War II when “a
lanky Harvard-educated American [possibly Archibald MacLeish] . . .
in a conversation corrected Patrick’s misquotation of some Shakespeare lines” (see King 2000, 93).
Plush and Folly are place-names in Dorset, and ofﬁcer William
Harding inherited a small estate between the two villages, which
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9.

10.

11.
12.

prompted Jack’s witticism. Plush was also the naval term for the
grog left over after the regular measure had been served out, which
by custom belonged to the cook. Thus, as the narrator explains,
“unless he had a good head for rum, this often led him to commit a
foolish action.”
Stephen is alluding to Antonio Magliabechi (1633–1714), a bibliographer and linguist said by his contemporaries to be “a living
library,” according to the note in Brown’s lexicon (1999, p. 204).
The aphorism Jack tries to quote here is from the Pensées of Blaise
Pascal (1623–62): “The heart has its reasons which reason cannot
know.”
The JPEG ﬁle is available at http://www.hmssurprise.org/Coat
.html
Richard Snow writing in the New York Times, and quoted on the
covers of the Norton paperback editions of Post Captain and The
Surgeon’s Mate.
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As the Crow Flies
A Straightforward Study of Lineal Worldview in
American Folk Speech
Alan Dundes
(For Wolfgang Mieder, Magister Proverbium,
paremiologist without peer)

“W

e do not see the lens through which we look.” So wrote
anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1887–1948) in an essay
entitled “The Science of Custom” that appeared in The Century
Magazine in 1929. Although this essay was later expanded to become the ﬁrst chapter of her classic Patterns of Culture, published
in 1934, for some reason, this succinct articulation of the difﬁculty
of perceiving one’s own culturally relative cognitive categories was
omitted. From a folklore perspective, it suggests that one of the
important potential contributions of folklore with respect to identifying the characteristics of that critical lens may be that native
categories of perception are clearly delineated in various genres,
including those subsumed under the rubric of folk speech.
In 1950, another outstanding anthropologist, Dorothy
Demetracopoulou Lee (1905–75) published her insightful paper
“Codiﬁcations of Reality: Lineal and Non-Lineal” in Psychosomatic
Medicine. Her main point was to demonstrate that fellow anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) had misread some of
his famous Trobriand Island ethnographic data by seeing lines
where the Trobrianders did not. In other words, Malinowski was
guilty of imposing Western lineality upon nonlineal phenomena.
While she did speak of anthropologists referring to “unilinear”
or “multilinear” courses of development and more generally of
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Westerners following a “line of thought,” she was not particularly
concerned with documenting Western lineal worldview. The bulk
of her discussion provided instances of Malinowski’s misinterpreting Trobriand culture. She did conclude, however, that “much of
our present-day thinking, and much of our evaluation are based
on the premise of the line and of the line as good” (Lee 1950, 96).
Lee’s brilliant essay did not receive all the credit it deserved
(see Graves 1957). It is my contention that Dorothy Lee was on
the right track and American folk speech amply conﬁrms her assertion that the line is absolutely central, if not sacred, in American worldview. But she did not distinguish between drawing parallel lines and concentric circles as a lecturer’s means of making
a point. In contrast, I argue it is “straight lines” that are crucial,
not curved ones. Moreover, the straight lines are often displayed
in the form of a square or box. It is precisely the combination of
“line,” “straight,” and “square,” I suggest, that shapes the lens
through which Americans (and other Westerners) look. These
constituent features that so signiﬁcantly affect our perception
are found repeatedly in dozens of examples from familiar folk
speech.
The word “line” or the plural “lines” occurs alone, in combination in various compounds, and often as an afﬁx, e.g., guidelines,
deadlines, outlines, bloodlines, hemlines, necklines, hairlines,
headlines, bylines, baselines, goal lines, property lines, airlines,
ship lines, railroad lines, bus lines, trolley or streetcar lines, chorus lines, battle lines, pipelines, assembly lines, picket lines, time
lines, datelines, telephone lines, ﬁshing lines, waterlines, coastlines, shorelines, skylines, and lifelines, among many others.
The line functions as a kind of limit. One must “toe the line,”
not “cross the line,” “lay it on the line,” or have one’s fate be “on
the line.” One may be asked to “hold the line,” meaning to maintain the status quo at any cost to prevent any unfavorable incursion or development. One can think or be “in line” (with the
prevailing code or trend) and by the same token, if an individual’s
behavior or suggestion is inappropriate, he may be admonished
that he is “(way) out of line.” One may seek to keep a rebellious
child “in line,” that is, insist that he or she conform to existing
social conventions. The son or daughter of a king is said to be “in
line” to occupy the throne. Presumably the heir must belong to
the appropriate “lineage.” To reach the Internet or use e-mail, one
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must go “online.” Runners begin a race at the “starting line” and
end at the “ﬁnish line.”
A line can be an occupation or profession. Upon an initial
meeting, one person may ask another, “What’s your line?” meaning “What do you do for a living?” If one’s vocation is the same
as one’s father/mother and grandfather/grandmother, one may
boast that he or she comes from “a long line” of doctors, lawyers,
educators, etc. If a line can reﬂect the past, it can also represent
a trajectory pointing toward the future. One can look forward to
success “down the line.” In business, one speaks of a line of products with the “top of the line” being the best. The “bottom line”
refers to the grand total or ﬁnal ﬁgure on a ﬁnancial balance sheet
but more metaphorically, to the ﬁnal upshot of a contract or deal.
If one seeks information about a product or a person, he is said to
be trying to “get a line on” it.
A line is also an insincere formulaic ploy (often a well-rehearsed
sales pitch) or tactic intended to sway or seduce an addressee, as
in trying to persuade a member of the opposite sex to accept an
invitation for a date. These are often termed “pickup lines.” Such
usage almost certainly relates to the notion of a “line of argument”
or “line of reasoning.” Political organizations often have speciﬁc
agendas or platforms which may be referred to as “party lines.”
It may simply be the inﬂuence of print, but one tends to refer to
poetry, even purely oral poetry, in terms of lines, and the same
goes for “learning one’s lines” or “forgetting one’s lines” in a stage
play. Clothing has “lining,” and a metaphor speaks of “lining one’s
own pockets” (with illegal funds). Even clouds have a “lining,” as
in the proverb, “Every cloud has a silver lining,” which in the best
tradition of American optimism urges citizens to “always look for
the silver lining.”
A line is still a line even if it’s narrow. One speaks of a “ﬁne
line” or a “thin line” when making a subtle distinction between
two different things. A line is no less a feature for its being intermittent, as in a “dotted line” upon which to sign one’s name, say,
to open a “line of credit” at a bank. With telephones, in former
times, one could have a “party line” or indulge in a “private line.”
A difﬁcult superior may take a “hard line” in dealing with a subordinate, especially if his performance is adjudged “borderline,”
and consequently “draw the line” in demanding future improvement. A ﬁred employee, without adequate salary or beneﬁts, may
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well fall below the “poverty line.” One can also draw a “line in
the sand” to indicate that an opponent can approach no farther.
The names of famous borders also include the word line, such as
the Mason-Dixon Line or the Maginot Line. Banks and insurance
companies often “redline” impoverished urban areas where credit
is denied residents. The red line in this instance serves as an
unofﬁcial and often illegal demarcation of areas that loan ofﬁcers
use to evaluate requests for funds.
It is not just that one is forced to stay “in line” and not “jump
the line” by disregarding the folk principle of “ﬁrst come, ﬁrst
served” in a “checkout line” at a grocery store, but there is an implicit and sometimes explicit understanding that the line must be
straight. Lines, of course, can be either straight or curved, but the
straight line provides the norm. “As the crow ﬂies” is a traditional
response to an inquiry as to how far away a given objective is.
“As the crow ﬂies” means the minimum distance from the present point to the objective as measured in a straight line. There is
also the proverb: “The shortest distance between two points is a
straight line.” Often, however, it is not possible to go directly from
point A to point B. Only crows (and other birds) can do so, ﬂying over obstacles that impede the progress of land-bound creatures.
Straight means direct, honest, and right, among other things.
One tries to “get one’s facts straight,” that is, correct. “Be straight
with me” is a request for honesty. “Setting the record straight”
is an attempt to eliminate previous errors. “Straight from the
horse’s mouth” refers to an unimpeachable source of information, presumably deriving from the practice of actually examining
a horse’s teeth (to determine its age and condition) as opposed to
simply taking the word of a horse trader. To speak “straight from
the shoulder,” a phrase apparently derived from boxing (referring
to a direct punch), means being frank and to the point, without
exaggeration or embellishment. The “straight dope” is slang for
true information. To be a “straight shooter” or a “straight arrow”
implies that the individual in question is completely honest and
trustworthy. Someone who is not so dependable may be urged
to “straighten up and ﬂy right.” “Straight talk” is sincere, honest talk. To “see straight” means to discern reality clearly. “To
go straight” implies that one may have had a shady past but
has now decided to lead a righteous, law-abiding life. If a person
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“plays it straight,” he or she is being totally above board, completely honest.
If a person is successful in a job, he may be promoted. The
promotion may be gradual, or it may be dramatic so that he goes
“straight to the top.” In stage comedy, the “straight man” has to
keep a “straight face” when he delivers a “straight line” to set up
the joke’s “punch line” uttered by the principal comedian. Straight
can also mean unadulterated, as in taking one’s whiskey “straight”
or “straight up,” that is, without any diluting mixer or ice cubes.
To do something “straightaway” means doing it right away. A parent may tell a child to “come straight home” after school, meaning
to come directly home without meandering or taking any wrong
turn or detour. Ideally, one’s destination lies “straight ahead.” To
win seven “straight” games (seven in a row) signiﬁes that one has
won an unbroken series or sequence. Straight also designates
conventional norms in sexuality. Hence, a “straight” is a heterosexual as opposed to a homosexual, at least in gay slang.
If straight conveys honesty, frankness, forthrightness, then it
may be contrasted with “crooked” (cf. the abridged form “crook”
for a criminal) or “bent,” as in “bent out of shape,” or someone who
“bends the law” or terms involving circles or the adjective “round.”
One must not get “out of line” and certainly, as already mentioned, not “cross the line.” Incidentally, “cross” implies departing
from “straight.” An individual may betray another by “crossing
up” that person. An even worse betrayal is called a “double cross.”
In any event, one makes a “beeline” for an objective and does so
by going “straight ahead” toward one’s goal.
This is very different from taking a “roundabout” way. Someone who “beats around the bush” is not being direct. Someone who
gets the “run around” is not being treated in an honest, truthful
manner. To “mess (kid, horse) around” is to waste time and not
stay on course. Someone who is driven crazy may be said to be
“(a)round the bend.” There is an old American folk metaphor, “to
go ‘round Robin Hood’s barn,” meaning to follow a winding road
or be long-winded. “Round Robin Hood’s barn makes a tedious
yarn” (Whiting 1977, 365; Mieder 1992, 38). The word “around”
may also signify inexactness or at best a vague approximation.
A friend tells another they should meet “around ﬁve o’clock.”
That is certainly not the same as specifying “ﬁve on the dot” (the
dot presumably being a point on the line?). Even the use of the
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Latin “circa” with respect to dates reﬂects the same indulgence
with approximation. A certain person may be said to have been
born circa 1900, circa being, of course, cognate with the English
word “circle.” A similar nuance of around is found in the common
leave-taking formula, “See you around,” meaning in no particular place at no particular time. To “round off ” a number, say an
amount of money owed, is a self-conscious admission that one is
willing to be inexact just for the sake of keeping things simple.
The negative associations of round and roundness in contrast
to straight are occasionally reversed in American proverbs. We
know that proverbs are famous for presenting two completely opposite points of view. “He who hesitates is lost” urges immediate
action to ensure success while “Look before you leap” recommends
caution. There is even a proverb covering this characteristic of the
genre: “The devil can quote scripture,” meaning that one can always ﬁnd a proverb to justify one’s position. So in contrast to “The
shortest distance between two points is a straight line,” we have
“The longest way round is the shortest way found.” But by the
same token, we also have “Don’t go round the world for a short
cut.” So the upshot is, “You pays your money, and you takes your
choice.” Still the general mistrust of round prevails: “Money is
round and rolls away” (Mieder 1992, 416).
The epitome of roundness is, of course, the circle (LoefﬂerDelachaux 1947; de Alvarez de Toledo 1951). “Circular reasoning”
is clearly in opposition to “thinking straight.” In terms of logic, if
one uses a proposition to lead to a conclusion and then purports
to prove the proposition by means of the conclusion, one is guilty
of “circular reasoning,” the idea being that one has completed a
circle so there is no starting point. One has argued or reasoned
in a circle (see Walton 1991; Rips 2002). A folk belief also states
that when one becomes lost, say in a forest, in the course of trying to ﬁnd one’s path to safety, one will wind up “going around
in circles.” A bit of military doggerel, which is, however, known
generally, conﬁrms the association of being frustrated or lost with
going in circles: “When in danger, when in doubt; Run in circles,
scream and shout.” Perhaps analogous to going in circles as a
metaphor for working to no purpose may be the expression “spinning your wheels” that signiﬁes “going nowhere fast.” A wheel is,
conceptually speaking, a kind of circle (Loefﬂer-Delachaux 1947,
69), and a “wheeler-dealer” or someone who “wheels and deals” is
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typically a person who is deceptive or even ruthlessly dishonest.
Finally, one of the most striking pieces of evidence revealing the
folk perception of circles is that a repeated series of actions that
lead to an increasingly negative situation may be termed a “vicious circle.” The adjective is surely telling!
If the circle (and roundness) connotes an undesirable state
of confusion, the square does the opposite. The square is obviously an expanded form of straight lines. “To square” accounts
is to settle matters equitably. One tries to treat others “fair and
square,” for example, by giving them a “square deal.” Meals that
are substantial and satisfactory are called “square meals.” One
tries to get “squared away,” meaning to get things in order, to be
prepared for whatever the future may hold. A “square shooter” is
synonymous with “straight shooter,” referring to someone who is
scrupulously honest. To face an issue “squarely” means to confront it head-on and directly. To stand behind someone or something “foursquare” implies being steady, unswerving, and without
equivocation. Two opponents will “square off” or “square up,” that
is, face one another directly, for a ﬁght.
The literal centrality of square in American (and very likely
Western) thought is also present in dwellings and city planning. It
is no coincidence that major cities typically express their identities in open areas commonly called “squares.” This is so even if
the shape of the area is not actually a square. Such is the case, for
example, with Times Square in New York City. Some city squares
are in that quadrangular shape, but many are not. Other venues
such as arenas may reﬂect the penchant for squares, e.g., Madison Square Garden, also in New York City.
Since the area of a geometric square is the length of one side
multiplied by itself—if a side is represented by s, then the area
of that square is said to be s “squared.” This principle has been
extended so that any number n multiplied by itself is said to be n
squared. This leads further to the term “square root.” The square
root of nine is therefore three. But there is nothing literally square
about either the number nine or threes. Mathematics has other
connections with lines and squares. For centuries, mathematicians interested in number theory have been fascinated by what
is called the “magic square.” This consists of an arrangement of
numbers in the form of a square so that every column, every row,
and each of the two diagonals adds up to the same sum, this

177

What Goes Around

Comes Around

178

total being called the “constant” (Meister 1952). A branch of geometry is called “lineal geometry,” and there are “linear algebras.”
In addition, there are “linear equations,” and in physics there are
“lines of force,” not to mention the “linear accelerator” by means
of which particles are propelled in straight paths.
The contrast between the square and the circle is not just a
matter of there not being any vicious squares. The fundamental opposition between these two basic metaphors is signaled by
the expression about attempting to “put a square peg in a round
hole” or the equally apt but perhaps less well known variant “to
put a round peg in a square hole.” The phrase may be used to
label a misﬁt, someone deemed not qualiﬁed or ﬁt to carry out a
particular task. In the present context, the expression states that
squareness and circularity are incompatible; they are mutually
exclusive. Another traditional articulation of this incompatibility
is the mathematical fool’s errand of trying to “square the circle.”
The idea of trying to ﬁnd a circle and square with equal areas
is allegedly an insoluble problem, a mathematical impossibility
(Hobson 1913; Jesseph 1999; but see Ruthen 1989). Hence, the
idiom is a way of suggesting the futility of a given action. Speaking of futility, when some project comes to naught, one may well
exclaim that it is “back to square one,” that is, one must return
to the very beginning of the enterprise to start all over again (possibly an allusion to a game such as hopscotch). A wastepaper
basket may be referred to as “the circular ﬁle,” that is, the place
to deposit unneeded correspondence. It may be worth noting that
both of the binary oppositions: straight/crooked and square/
round are reported in a single catchphrase once popular in England. Evidently, a humorous hyperbolic way of “setting a man
on his word” was to say, “Straight down the crooked lane and all
round the square” (Partridge 1961, 818).
Because square signals fairness and honesty, one should not
be surprised to see just how much squareness permeates society.
Perhaps the most popular traditional folk dance in American culture is called the “Square Dance.” This may be contrasted with
round dances such as the waltz, where dancers move or whirl in
circular fashion. But for that matter, in social dancing, beginners
are frequently taught to do the “box step.” Boxes, like squares,
are linear in nature. One is obliged to remain in a box in the same
sense as toeing the line and not crossing it.
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In baseball, for example, the batter steps into the “batter’s
box,” where a pitcher from the opposing team throws the ball into
what is called the “strike zone,” an imaginary rectangular area
above home plate through which a pitch must pass for the umpire behind the plate to call it a strike. If he misses the strike zone
(and the batter doesn’t swing), the pitch is labeled a ball, much
as a ball hit outside the left- or right-ﬁeld lines (also called “foul
lines”) is called a foul (as opposed to fair) ball. The place where
the pitcher stands is sometimes called the “pitcher’s box,” and if
too many batters are successful, thus forcing him to leave (to be
replaced by another pitcher), it is said he has been “knocked out
of the box.” The ﬁnal results of a baseball game, often appearing
in newspapers and giving the statistics (e.g., runs, hits, errors,
etc.), are called the “box score.”
Baseball, America’s national pastime, is just one instance of
the way boxes and lines permeate the culture. A “line drive” or
“liner” is a sharply hit ball with little or no arc. One of a pitcher’s
most effective pitches is a “curve” or “curveball,” that is, a ball
that does not go in a straight line toward home plate but rather
bends or curves in its ﬂight, the aim being to fool the batter so
he fails to hit it. In American slang, to “throw someone a curve,”
taken from baseball, means to ask an unfair question or make an
unreasonable demand. Again, “curve” like circle and round implies a departure from the “straight and narrow,” from directness
and honesty.
Many sports and games have lines. For example, in basketball, one shoots foul shots from a position immediately behind
“the foul line” aka “the free-throw line.” In football, there is an “offensive line,” consisting of players who protect their quarterback
when the team is on offense, or a “defensive line,” consisting of
players who attack the opposing quarterback. When a team is on
defense, there may be several of eleven players who are positioned
slightly behind the defensive line to shore up the defense, e.g.,
protect against a short pass by the opposing offense. These players are called “linebackers.” In football, the playing ﬁeld is divided
into ten ten-yard strips. Position on the ﬁeld is accordingly measured by “yard lines.”
No one likes to “boxed in,” but the fact is that Americans are
always “behind enemy lines,” so to speak. Lines are everywhere,
it seems, and when they meet, they frequently form rectangles
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and squares. (One need look no further than to the shape of most
windows and window panes, bricks and boards, picture frames,
postage stamps, rugs, and hundreds of other mundane objects.)
Though businessmen may look for an “angle,” there is always a
danger of being “cornered.” It is one thing to be boxed in but even
worse to be forced into a small corner of a quadrilateral enclosure.
At sporting events or theaters, would-be spectators go to the “box
ofﬁce” to purchase tickets. Typically, the best seats in the house
are the “box seats.” At sporting events, spectators are not allowed
to enter the actual playing area, e.g., the “boxing ring” (despite its
name, a square) or the baseball or football ﬁeld. They are obliged
to remain on the “sidelines.” An injured player may have to be
“sidelined” for a period of time. In ice hockey, a player who commits an infraction is punished by being sent to a particular area
on the sidelines termed the “penalty box.”
Houses and rooms therein may resemble boxes, and in the
bedroom, one sleeps on a rectangular mattress that sits squarely
on a “box spring.” Ofﬁce workers may be forced to occupy small
spaces called “cubicles.” (Why are pieces of ice used to chill drinks
in the shape of cubes? Round bits of ice surely function equally
well.) Early on, children are socialized by such rhymes as “Step
on a line, break your father’s (mother’s) spine.” The variant uses
terms other than line, but the message is the same: “Step on a
crack, break your father’s (mother’s) back.” A line is a limit that
must be respected, that is, not stepped on. In tick-tack-toe, the
winner is the person who can draw a straight line through either
three x’s or three o’s. In hopscotch, one must step carefully so as
not to go outside any of the series of boxes.
Whether it’s the military or show business, individuals are
constantly asked to “line up.” Suspected criminals are frequently
asked to participate in a “lineup” (to see if eyewitnesses can identify them as perpetrators of a crime). One also speaks of an outstanding “lineup” of talent, either on a sports team or a theatrical
stage. Drunk drivers, when stopped by police ofﬁcers, may be
asked to “walk a straight line” (as a sobriety test to prove that they
are sufﬁciently sober to be permitted to continue driving their
vehicles).
It should be noted that despite the ubiquity of lines and
squares in American worldview, the semantic associations are
not always positive. A square in slang terms is a “strait-laced”

As the
Crow Flies

person, someone who is excessively conventional and law abiding. There have even been a few proverbial attempts to denigrate
squareness, for example, “Be there or be square.” In other words,
show up for the event in question unless you are too inhibited or
fearful to do so. Other traditional verbal efforts to escape the vise
of linearity include the notion of “reading between the lines” and
the exhortation to “think outside the box.” But it can be said that
these very attempts to escape the boundaries imposed by lines
and boxes conﬁrm the existence of such cultural restraints.
If a person is terminally ill in the hospital and the EEG monitor suddenly shows that he or she has “ﬂatlined,” one can safely
say that person has reached “the end of the line” and, unless
cremated, is very likely to be shortly thereafter buried in a box
(cofﬁn).
What can we conclude from this brief demonstration of the
apparent American penchant for straight lines and squares as
well as a complementary mistrust of round curves and circles?
Do we, in fact, have a window on a facet of American worldview?
Anthropologist Aidan Southall suggests in a provocative, if admittedly speculative, essay devoted to an evolutionary approach to
architecture that original “circularity” has given way to “rectangularity” (1993, 378). Citing the discovery of a dome-shaped construction of arched branches, unearthed in the Ukraine and said
to be ﬁfteen thousand years old, perhaps one of the oldest-known
examples of human architecture, Southall wonders if this structure in any way symbolized the “dome of heaven.” He might well
have also considered such examples as the shape of the Eskimo
igloo or the curious beehive-shaped trulli in the village of Alberobello in southern Italy. In any event, he remarks that whereas
“sticks and stones are naturally round,” they tend to be replaced
as building materials by the cultural invention or borrowing of
“rectangular bricks and square stones.” He notes further, “Round
stools precede square thrones and chairs” and that “humankind
as a whole has clearly moved from the universal occupation of
the round to an almost universal occupation of the rectangular”
(1993, 379).
Here is Southall’s thesis in his own words:
It is more natural (though I use this adjective with great caution),
to live in the round than in the square, whether it is a question of
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dwelling or village, settlement or city. For virtually nothing in nature
appears in rectangular form, whereas round, spherical and curved
phenomena, both stationary and in motion are both ubiquitous and
so impressive as to imprint themselves on the human imagination
and consciousness. Is the rectangular city, then, a symbolic statement of human culture triumphing over nature by making an opposite statement? Surprisingly, in all the literature on nature and
culture I have not noticed the question raised. With the other pair
lurking behind, it becomes a question of whether the rectangular
city is a male statement as well.” (1993, 380)

Southall is not the ﬁrst to suggest an evolutionary sequence
from circular to rectangular structures. Robbins, for instance,
suggested that dwelling shapes and settlement patterns were
related to whether people were nomadic or sedentary: “Considerable archaeological data also indicate that as cultures have
moved from shifting to more settled subsistence patterns temporally, there has been a corresponding trend from circular to
predominantly rectangular dwellings,” and he hypothesized “that
circular ground plans will tend to be associated with relatively
impermanent or mobile settlement patterns, and that rectangular
house ground plans will tend to be associated with more permanent or sedentary community settlement patterns” (1966, 7; see
also Flannery 1972, 29–30).
One emerging controversial issue is not so much whether
there are round or square dwellings, but rather whether or not
speciﬁc social organizational constellations are associated with
either one (see Saidel 1993 and Flannery’s response). Of interest in the present context is the possibility there may be a common observable pattern in both house type and the conﬁguration or grouping of multiple dwellings. Whiting and Ayres claim
(1968, 126) that societies that build rectangular houses tend to
arrange them in a line or square. If this is the case, it indicates
that the pattern of circularity or squareness may apply equally to
house or dwelling shape and the overall settlement plan. Moreover, the charter, so to speak, for such a pattern may well extend
to the cosmos. One explanation for the priority of the circle is that
the sun (and moon) are perceived as celestial circles (Peet 1888;
Loefﬂer-Delachaux 1947; Lurker 1966, 523), not to mention the
perception of the horizon. Hence, architectural plans might have
been intended to mirror the celestial model. One thinks of the
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circular form of Stonehenge, for example, as a prime example of a
likely sacred construction connected with sun worship.
Lest the reader think that the idea that circularity may be
manifested in dwelling construction or other social forms is just
pure speculation on the part of academics, one should ponder the
following testimony given by a talented professional Oglala Sioux
storyteller in the early twentieth century:
The Oglala believe the circle to be sacred because the Great Spirit
caused everything in nature to be round except stone. . . . The sun
and the sky, the earth and the moon are round like a shield. . . .
Everything that breathes is round like the body of a man. Everything that grows from the ground is round like the stem of a tree.
Since the Great Spirit has caused everything to be round, mankind
should look upon the circle as sacred for it is the symbol of all
things in nature except stone. It is also the symbol of the circle that
marks the edge of the world. . . . The day, the night, and the moon
go in a circle above the sky. . . . For these reasons the Oglala make
their tipis circular, their camp circle circular and sit in a circle for all
ceremonies. The circle is also the symbol of the tipi and of the shelter.” (Walker 1917, 160; italics added)

It may well be that the distinction between nature and culture is not so much matched by one between the circle and the
square as by the presence or absence of the line. Nature does not
necessarily come in lines. Rather, man attempts to impose order
by perceiving or drawing lines. In terms of folk speech, there is
a desire to “connect the dots,” but the connected dots may form
circles as well as squares. Lines of latitude and longitude follow
the shape of the earth. Still, Southall may be correct in identifying a preference for rectangles, though I suggest that it would
be more accurate to say a preference for straight as opposed to
curved lines. It is a desideratum to “get all one’s ducks in a row,”
and it is surely no coincidence that man tends to plant his crops
in straight rows, or that the military obliges men to march in precise line formations, or that seniority and rank are indicated by
the number of stripes, which are essentially gloriﬁed lines. In the
navy, there is a distinction between “line ofﬁcers” as opposed to
staff or supply ofﬁcers, referring to an old label assigned to warships or “ships of the line.” All military units, not just the navy,
insist on performing prescribed tasks “in the line of duty.”
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While the evidence adduced from American folk speech cannot necessarily support the evolutionary aspects of Southall’s
argument, it seems to corroborate his “delineation” of a critical
distinction between the circle and the square. If one accepts and
expands upon his suggestion that the “rectangular city” is male—
and one can easily cite numerous examples of penile architecture, for example, the Washington Monument or the Empire State
Building—then one may go on to propose that roundness and
circles belong to the realm of the feminine. In evolutionary terms,
the (linear?) progression from circle to square then corresponds
to the alleged schema whereby original matriarchy was in time
replaced by patriarchy. Certainly in American folk speech, “curvaceous” refers to a woman’s well-shaped ﬁgure, signifying voluptuousness. It would not be used to refer to a man’s physique.
Moreover, it is women, according to American male stereotypes,
who are accused of not being able to think logically, that is, lineally.
In Shakespeare’s day, we have indisputable evidence that circle
referred to the female pudendum. In Romeo and Juliet (2.1.23–26),
we ﬁnd Mercutio’s bawdy remark: “‘Twould anger him to raise a
spirit in his mistress’ circle of some strange nature, letting it there
stand till she had laid it, and conjured it down.” In more recent
times, women of easy virtue were called “round heels,” presumably because they spent so much time on their backs that their
heels became increasingly rounded. (The term is also applied to
inferior boxers, who were so frequently knocked out that they
consequently suffered a similar fate.) So perhaps one can make a
justiﬁable case that women are round while men are square. It is,
after all, women who by nature have menstrual “cycles”; men do
not. The stereotypical association of women with roundness and
men with squareness (and hence women with vagueness, dissemblance, and dishonesty, as opposed to men with precision, directness, and candor) can easily be construed as part of the larger
paradigm that “aligns” women with nature and men with culture
(Ortner 1974). For that matter, the proposal that “rectilinear represents the male body image and curvilinear the female” is not
new (see Whiting and Ayres 1968, 128).
However, I would argue that both men and women in American culture think in lineal terms. This may be why there is resistance to the notion of reincarnation. Reincarnation implies that a
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person’s being or soul, after death, is recycled. A person is reborn
and begins life anew. In some religions, the recycling is repeated
ad inﬁnitum. In American worldview, in contrast, the progression
from birth through life to death is an irreversible path or line. One
may choose to believe (in a culturally sanctioned denial of human mortality) that one continues to live on in heaven, but that
belief does not include the possibility of being reborn on earth as
a new baby. Americans do observe a certain cyclicity of seasons:
spring, summer, fall, winter, a sequence from birth to death and
then rebirth, as well as the recurrent series of the days of the
week and months of the year, and Eliade credits the phases of
the moon: “appearance, increase, wane, disappearance, followed
by reappearance after three nights of darkness” as contributing
signiﬁcantly to the belief in cyclical concepts of time (1954, 86).
Nevertheless, years, the larger temporal units, are counted serially in an irreversible sequence. One can go back in time only
through ﬁction and fantasy. The point is that Americans, males
and females alike, perceive both time and space in lineal terms.
It is of some interest that a native Aleut environmentalist from
Alaska claims that it is precisely the lineal bias of Western society
that causes problems in the repeated failure to understand the
cyclical worldview systems of many aboriginal societies (Merculieff 1994).
We may conclude, therefore, that Dorothy Lee was right when
she alluded to the American (and Western) propensity toward codifying reality in lineal terms. In fact, the straight/circular dichotomy is of some antiquity; it existed in classical Greek literature
and philosophy (Bellew 1979). However, we may wish to modify
slightly Ruth Benedict’s pessimistic dictum that “we do not see
the lens through which we look.” Inasmuch as folklore does encapsulate native cognitive categories, we may through its analysis
indeed be able to see at least some small portion of that lens, as
I hope these few lines have succeeded in demonstrating. On the
other hand, perhaps I simply assumed what I planned to prove, in
which case I am undoubtedly guilty of circulus probandi.
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